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Author Archive | Matt Larsen

Tuesday, May 21st, 2019

Favorable Finding on First Step Act Feature

 

The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, allows judges to now “impose a reduced sentence” on people sentenced before August 3, 2010, for certain offenses involving 5 grams or more of crack cocaine.  There’s been a lot of litigation on the Act — yielding over 200 written decisions nationally so far — with a number of bad rulings from courts relying on pro se pleadings or meritless arguments from the government.  Judge Allyne Ross, of the Eastern District of New York, recently addressed both and issued a good ruling for people serving (or not) long crack sentences.

In United States v. Miles, the defendant had been sentenced in 2009 for a 50-gram crack offense that then carried a mandatory minimum of 10 years, which Judge Ross imposed.  After passage of the First Step Act, Miles moved pro se for a reduced sentence given that, per the …

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Categories: First Step Act of 2018

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Wednesday, June 7th, 2017

“Toxic” Hearsay Warrants New Trial

In an opinion yesterday, the Second Circuit (Jacobs, Pooler, Hall) ordered a retrial of Armani Cummings based on the admission of non-harmless hearsay.

Cummings was charged with killing two people in the course of committing drug crimes.  A government witness testified, in essence: “Someone told me Cummings threatened to kill me.”  The Court explained that this was not an admissible statement by Cummings (the party opponent) but, rather, was double hearsay from a third party “someone” and thus inadmissible.

The error of admitting the statement, the Court further held, was not harmless: “The hearsay was especially toxic because it created a grave risk that the jury would use it as evidence of Cummings’s murderous propensity” and thus convict him for being a “bad man” rather than for committing the two alleged murders.

Of particular note, the Court ordered a retrial even though (1) the jury heard evidence that Cummings …

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Categories: harmless error, hearsay

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Categories: harmless error, hearsay

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Tuesday, November 15th, 2016

Despite the Jones Delay, EDNY Rules New York Robbery is Not a “Crime of Violence”

still-not-a-cov

As blogged about here, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Jones that New York robbery is not a “crime of violence” for federal sentencing purposes.  And as blogged about here, the Circuit then vacated that ruling pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles v. United States.

Notwithstanding Jones being put on hold, Judge Cogan of the Eastern District of New York has ruled — like the Jones court and Judges Ross and Weinstein in pre-Jones rulings — that New York robbery is not a “crime of violence.”  The decision, available here, explains that New York robbery can be committed with less than the “violent” force required by the force clause of the Career Offender Guideline (which controls in felon-in-possession cases), and that the Guideline’s residual clause was effectively invalidated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  Because the Guideline’s …

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Categories: crime of violence, robbery

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Categories: crime of violence, robbery

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Tuesday, October 25th, 2016

Restitution Isn’t A Windfall

waterfalls-img

In today’s United States v. Stevens, the Second Circuit (Winter, Chin, Droney) remanded a case for further proceedings because it was unclear whether the district court made the findings needed to support its restitution order.

Stevens fraudulently obtained a loan, ultimately acquired by Capital One Bank, for his business partnership.  The partnership later repaid Capital One in full and Stevens pleaded guilty to fraud in federal court.  The judge, in addition to ordering Stevens’s imprisonment, ordered him to pay restitution to the partnership.  The Second Circuit remanded, however, because “the district court did not make sufficient factual findings, which are necessary to our review of the restitution award.”

“Because restitution is intended to make the victim whole, it must be based only on the actual loss caused by the scheme.  Restitution is not intended to provide a victim with a windfall.”  And where a victim is reimbursed by a …

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Categories: restitution

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Wednesday, October 19th, 2016

Manslaughter is Not a “Crime of Violence”

keep-calm

In a recent ruling, Judge Woods of the Southern District held first-degree manslaughter in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) is not a “crime of violence” under the pre-August 1, 2016, Career Offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.  A person commits such manslaughter when, “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person.”

Judge Woods first held this offense does not qualify under the Guideline’s residual clause as that clause was “rendered void” by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  The judge next held the offense does not qualify under the Guideline’s force clause because “one can be found guilty of manslaughter under the New York statute on the basis of an omission.” Specifically, “the failure to perform a legally imposed duty” permits conviction if the inaction leads to another’s death.  People …

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Categories: ACCA, career offender, crime of violence, manslaughter, murder

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Tuesday, October 4th, 2016

U.S. v. Jones: Hold That Thought…

patience_2014_01_31-22

In United States v. Jones, previously blogged about here, the Second Circuit held New York robbery is not a categorical “crime of violence” under the Career Offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.  The Court’s opinion was based in part on the view, shared by the government and all but one of the circuits, that the Guideline’s residual clause is “likely void for vagueness in light of the Supreme Court’s analysis of the ACCA’s [Armed Career Criminal Act’s] identical phrase in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).”

In an order published yesterday, the Court vacated the Jones opinion pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles v. United States.  Beckles will decide whether the Guideline’s residual clause survived Johnson.  After Beckles is decided, a final judgment will issue in Jones.

Takeaways for the Defense Bar

1.  In ACCA cases, the absence of Jones poses …

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Categories: ACCA, career offender, Johnson, robbery

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Friday, September 23rd, 2016

Is Hobbs Act Extortion a “Crime of Violence”?

In today’s United States v. Sheehan, the Second Circuit (Winter, Wesley, Lynch) affirmed a conviction for using a “destructive device” during a “crime of violence,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii).

Wearing a wig, an arm sling and makeup, Sheehan planted an almost-complete pipe bomb in a Home Depot on Long Island.  He sent a letter to the store, saying there was a bomb and demanding $2 million so he could “go[] to a warm climate with thin brown girls and drink [him]self to death.”  He promised to repay the money in the form of a $2 million “life insurance policy naming Home Depot beneficiary.”  The almost-complete bomb was recovered and no one was hurt.

Arrested and brought to trial, Sheehan conceded guilt on what was charged as the underlying “crime of violence” — Hobbs Act extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 — but denied …

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Categories: explosives, extortion

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Thursday, September 22nd, 2016

net-meme

In today’s United States v. Harris, the Second Circuit (Newman, Calabresi, Raggi) decided two things with respect to supervised release.

First, “18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) does not preclude revocation of supervised release on the basis of conduct that earlier prompted a modification of supervision conditions.”  Here, the district court first modified Harris’s terms of supervision — based on his being arrested for allegedly selling drugs — and later revoked supervision when that suspected violation was confirmed by two police officers credibly testifying to witnessing the drug sale.

Second, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(c) does not preclude revocation of supervised release on the basis of hearsay if (1) there is good reason to proffer hearsay and (2) the hearsay is sufficiently reliable.  Here, a witness who claimed Harris punched her “professed fear of retaliation” if she testified against him, which the Court deemed good reason to excuse her …

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Categories: Confrontation Clause, supervised release

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Thursday, July 21st, 2016

New York Robbery is Not a “Crime of Violence”

marble rye-blog

In today’s United States v. Jones, the Second Circuit (Walker, Calabresi, Hall, C.JJ.) overruled its prior precedents in light of Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), and Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), to hold that “a first‐degree robbery conviction in New York is no longer necessarily a conviction for a ‘crime of violence’ as that term is used in the Career Offender Guideline.”

New York robbery, whatever its degree, is “forcible stealing” and requires actual or threatened “physical force upon another person.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00.  This does not make the offense a “crime of violence,” the Circuit explained, because New York courts “have made clear that ‘forcible stealing’ alone does not necessarily involve the use of ‘violent force'” required to make something a “crime of violence” under the Guideline’s force clause.  “Violent force” is “strong” and “substantial,” Johnson, …

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Categories: ACCA, career offender, crime of violence, robbery

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Tuesday, July 19th, 2016

Filing a Notice of Appeal: Just Do It!

In today’s United States v. Lajud-Pena (Diaz), the Second Circuit (Pooler, Parker, Livingston, C.JJ.) granted the government’s motion to dismiss an untimely appeal but remanded with instructions that the district court “convert the Appellant’s notice of appeal (as supplemented by the Defendant’s brief claiming ineffectiveness resulted in his failure to timely file his appeal) into a petition” under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Should the aspiring appellant establish in district court that his lawyer failed to timely file a notice of appeal as instructed, the relief will presumably be issuance of a new judgment from which he could appeal.  See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); United States v. Fuller, 332 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2003).  And should that appeal ultimately prove unsuccessful, the Circuit indicated the “converted” § 2255 petition seeking “only reinstatement of the right to a direct appeal” will not render a subsequent § …

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“Precipitous Pepper Purchase” Precludes Pot Pushers’ Partying

peppers

In today’s United States v. Compton, the Second Circuit (Walker, Raggi, Hall, C.JJ.) held a Border Patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to stop Compton and his brother, found to be transporting 145 pounds of marijuana, based on “(1) the brothers’ avoidance of [a Border Patrol] checkpoint, (2) the checkpoint’s proximity to the [Canadian] border, and (3) the brothers’ peculiar attempt to conceal the avoidance.”  The “peculiar attempt” was the brothers’ “abruptly slow[ing] down” when their SUV came within sight of the checkpoint and then “veer[ing] into the U‐shaped driveway of [a] vegetable stand” where they each bought “a pint of peppers.”

“Because [the agent] had already determined that the SUV had made the abrupt turn into the vegetable stand in order to avoid the checkpoint, [he] could reasonably interpret the pepper purchase to be an attempt to conceal that avoidance.  He could reasonably discount the probability of an alternate …

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Categories: Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion, terry stop

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