Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog


Thursday, June 27th, 2024

A victory for lenity?

Yesterday, in Snyder v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 18 USC 666 prohibits bribes to state and local officials, but does not prohibit  gratuities to state and local officials. The difference between a bribe and a gratuity is largely one of timing of the agreement: a bribe is given to a public official to induce them to take future action, while a gratuity is given to a public official to thank them for taking a past action.  (But, note that “rewards” are still covered by Section 666). Applying the statute to gratuities would create “traps for unwary state and local officials.” The court trots out various examples:  “Is a $100 Dunkin’ Donuts gift card for a trash collector wrongful? What about a $200 Nike gift card for a county commissioner who voted to fund new school athletic facilities? Could students take their college professor out to Chipotle …

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Supreme Court Summarily Vacates Second Circuit’s Opinion In United States v. Montague, Which Upheld A Barebones CCE Indictment Alleging No Specific Predicate Violations.

In United States v. Montague, 67 F.4th 520 (2d Cir. 2023), a divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed a barebones CCE indictment alleging only that the defendant “did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully engage in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise in that he did violate Title 21 United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 846, which violations were part of a continuing series of violations of said statutes,” without specifying any predicate violations. Judge Menashi wrote the opinion, joined by Judge Bianco. Judge Jacobs dissented. The opinions are fully discussed in our blog post dated May 12, 2023.

On October 18, 2023, the full Circuit denied rehearing en banc, over the dissent of five judges, written by Judge Perez. United States v. Montague, 84 F.4th 583 (2d Cir. 2023).

On June 17, 2024, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the …

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Categories: CCE, grand jury, indictment

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Monday, June 24th, 2024

In United States v. Rahimi, the Supreme Court applies Bruen for the first time to a criminal statute

At long last, the Supreme Court last week issued its eagerly-anticipated decision in United States v. Rahimi, involving a post-Bruen Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which criminalizes possession of a firearm while one is subject to a domestic violence restraining order. Unsurprisingly to anyone who listened to the oral argument, the Court, in a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, voted 8-1 to uphold the criminal ban.

Justice Thomas dissented. Justice Sotomayor issued a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kagan. And Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson each penned separate concurrences. So there’s lots to review in the 100+ page opinion, more than can be done in this blog post. However, the top-level takeaways from the (relatively brief) majority opinion are as follows:

Clarification of the Bruen test: “relevantly similar” wins the day. Over the last two years, many lawyers (and judges) have …

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Sunday, June 23rd, 2024

Smith reaffirms defendants’ right to confront forensic experts, while leaving open the question of which expert statements are “testimonial.”

Last week, the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Smith v. Arizona, No. 22-899 (June 21, 2024), that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to confront experts who provide forensic evidence for the prosecution. This right extends to testimonial statements by experts whose testing and opinions form the basis of a different expert’s opinion.

This issue should have been straightforward. The Supreme Court has long held that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses who provide forensic evidence against them. Thus, if a prosecutor wants to introduce the results of forensic testing, the defendant must have an opportunity to cross-examine the analyst responsible for the test. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 658 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314-15 (2009).

But a defendant’s confrontation right extends only to “testimonial hearsay”—that is, out-of-court testimonial statements offered for their truth. And courts have …


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Thursday, May 23rd, 2024

What categorical approach?

Today, in Brown v. United States, the Supreme Court held that state drug convictions count as ACCA predicates if they involved a drug that was on the federal drug schedules at the time of the state conviction. In Brown, legislatures had eliminated two substances from the relevant drug schedules – hemp and ioflupane – between the time of the petitioners’ original cases and their ACCA cases. Thus, the state and federal drug schedules did not match at the time of their ACCA cases. The petitioners argued that, under the categorical approach, their prior state cases were not ACCA predicates.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the drug schedules at the time of the ACCA conviction are essentially irrelevant. In reaching this decision, Justice Alito highlighted the facts of the petitioners’ prior drug offenses at length, emphasizing that the petitioners had possessed marijuana and cocaine, “not hemp …

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Wednesday, May 8th, 2024

A district court may not base its sentence on a disagreement with the categorical approach.

In United States v. Marcus Odom, No. 23-6105 (2d Cir. May 8, 2024) (summary order), the Second Circuit upheld the defendant’s challenged prison sentence, while also opining that a sentencing court may not increase a prison sentence based on its disagreement with the so-called “categorical” approach.

Odom’s case was before the district court for resentencing as a result of United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), applying the well-established “categorical” approach. Odom had originally pled guilty to attempted Hobbs Act robbery and a violation of § 924(c) but, following Taylor, his § 924(c) conviction was vacated. He was resentenced on the attempted Hobbs Act robbery alone.

Some judges have complained about the categorical approach and Odom’s district judge is apparently among them. At the …


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Wednesday, May 1st, 2024

IAC claim rejected on direct appeal because lack of prejudice to defendant is “beyond doubt” and district court sufficiently explained its sentence given “the lesser specificity required for a [revocation] sentence”

Not sure why United States v. Antonio Ortiz, 2d Cir. No. 22-1775-cr (April 30, 2024), is a published opinion rather than a summary order. Judge Menashi’s opinion for the panel (Calabresi, Menashi, Perez) rejects Ortiz’s challenge to his five-year sentence, imposed upon revocation of supervised release after the district court found that he raped his teenage daughter on several occasions.

The issues are fact-specific. Two are worth noting.

First, although the Circuit generally declines to address an IAC claim raised for the first time on direct appeal, it will decide the issue when “the record is developed and the resolution of the claim is beyond doubt.” Op. 7 (citing cases). Here, the record shows that any alleged ineffectiveness by Ortiz’s counsel (in failing to offer certain evidence) would have made no difference to the district judge (the fact-finder),

Second, although a sentencing court is required to state in open …


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Tuesday, April 30th, 2024

Circuit holds that federal supervised release only begins when the defendant is released from subsequent state custody, not when he is released from federal custody into state custody.

In United States v. Freeman, No. 23-6394 (2d Cir. April 23, 2024), the defendant was ordered to begin his supervised release almost ten years after his release from federal prison, when he was finally released from state custody on charges that were dismissed. Freeman argued that his supervised release term began upon his release from federal prison and was not tolled by his state detention. 18 U.S.C. 3624(e),  provides that “a prisoner whose sentence includes a term of supervised release after imprisonment shall be released by the Bureau of Prisons to the supervision of a probation officer” and that “supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment.” It further provides that the term of supervised release is tolled for any period in which the person is “imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime” unless the sentence is less than …


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Monday, April 29th, 2024

Defendant’s complaint concerning scope of prior appellate mandate is barred by appellate waiver in new plea agreement, and the district court did not err in considering his sectarian motivation at sentencing

In United States v. Maalik Alim Jones, 2d Cir. No. 22-2958-cr (April 29, 2024), the panel (Walker, Park, Perez) in a per curiam opinion rejects Jones’s challenge to his 25-year sentence, imposed on remand after a prior appeal and following Jones’s guilty plea under a new plea agreement in which he waived the right to appeal “any sentence” of 300 months or lower. Jones is an American citizen who moved to Somalia and joined al-Shabaab, “an Islamic terrorist organization.” Op. 3. He pleaded guilty to various offenses based on the group’s murderous attacks in Kenya and Somalia.

Most of the issues are fact-specific, but two are worth noting.

First, despite the appellate waiver, Jones contended to the Circuit that the district court (and the Government) exceeded the scope of its prior mandate on remand (for various reasons). And he claimed that his “challenge to this Court’s mandate overrides the …

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Monday, April 22nd, 2024

Supreme Court: District Court’s Failure To Enter Preliminary Order Of Forfeiture Prior To Sentencing Does Not Bar Court From Ordering Forfeiture At Sentencing.

In United States v. McIntosh, No. 22-7386 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2024), a unanimous Supreme Court held that a district court’s failure to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture prior to sentencing, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B), “does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review.”

McIntosh participated in a series of Hobbs Act robberies. During one of them, he took $70,000 in cash, and used part of that sum to buy a BMW. He was indicted for several counts of Hobbs Act robbery and corresponding 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offenses. The indictment included a forfeiture allegation identifying robbery proceeds and the government also provided a bill of particulars identifying the BMW as forfeitable. McIntosh was convicted at trial. Prior to sentencing, the government did not seek, and the district court did not enter, the preliminary order of forfeiture …

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Friday, April 12th, 2024

Yet again, the Second Circuit vacates an unexplained condition of supervised release.

Yes, the Second Circuit means it! If the district court doesn’t explain why a special condition of supervised release is required in a particular case, the Circuit will vacate the condition.

Today, yet again, the Second Circuit vacated a condition of supervised release because the district court did not explain the reasons for imposing the condition or make an individualized assessment it was necessary for Mr. Syed. In Mr. Syed’s case the vacated condition was broad electronic and GPS monitoring, without any reasonable suspicion required. In that way Syed is a lot like United States v. Salazar, decided last year.

But, in a broader sense, Syed is just the latest in a string of Second Circuit decisions vacating conditions of supervised release. See also United States v. Alex Oliveras, No. 21-2954 (2d Cir. March 15, 2024), United States v. William Jimenez, No. 21-2954 (2d Cir. March 18, 2024), …

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