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Author Archive | Sarah Baumgartel

Tuesday, May 16th, 2023

Supreme Court to decide how to decide which state drug convictions qualify as ACCA predicates

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in another pair of ACCA cases. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), a defendant who possesses a gun faces a minimum 15-year sentence if he has three prior state or federal convictions that qualify as “violent” felonies or “serious drug offenses.” We have talked a lot recently about what qualifies as a “violent” felony. Now it is time to consider “serious drug offenses.”

Under § 924(e)(2)(A), a “serious drug offense” includes offenses “under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”

Courts use the categorical approach to decide if a prior state conviction involves a “controlled substance,” comparing the elements of that …

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Categories: ACCA

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Friday, March 3rd, 2023

Circuit rejects new trial bid, despite evidentiary errors and refusal to voir dire on “antisemitic bias.”

In United States v. Mendlowitz, No. 21-2049-cr (2d Cir. March 2, 2023) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirms the defendant’s wire fraud convictions, despite possible evidentiary errors and the district court’s refusal to ask about “potential antisemitic bias” during jury selection.

On appeal following trial, the defendant challenged the district court’s exclusion of a proffered expert witness and a recorded conversation between the defendant and a cooperating witness. The Circuit largely agreed with defendant’s arguments: it recognized that, contra the district court, the proffered expert testimony about standard industry practices would have been relevant to the defendant’s good faith defense. The expert testimony also would have provided relevant information outside the average juror’s knowledge and beyond any government witness testimony.

With respect to the recorded conversation, the defendant argued that it reflected his state of mind at the time of the charged conduct and supported his defense. The district …

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Categories: expert witnesses, harmless error, jury selection, voir dire

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Circuit orders resentencing in light of statements that created a risk of the appearance that a defendant’s nationality impacted his sentence.

In United States v. Vasquez-Drew, No. 20-2195-cr (2d Cir. March 2, 2023) (summary order), the Second Circuit ordered the defendant resentenced before a new district judge because certain remarks the original judge made at sentencing created a “risk that a reasonable observer … ‘might infer, however incorrectly’ that Vasquez’s nationality played a role in determining his sentence.”

In sentencing the defendant, a Bolivian national, the district court (Cote, J.) stated that the sentence was “motivated by concerns about appropriate punishment, but also general deterrence,” and that it was “important” “that the people in Bolivia understand the kind of sentences that are potentially imposed here from engagement in activity to send cocaine into America.”

This decision follows an interesting and wide-ranging oral argument available here and previewed here.

Ultimately, the Circuit’s short summary order hewed closely to precedent: “[E]ven the appearance that the sentence reflects a defendant’s race or …

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Categories: sentencing, Uncategorized

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Categories: sentencing, Uncategorized

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Monday, February 27th, 2023

The Second Circuit Grants Panel Rehearing in Gibson to Reject the Government’s Request to Recast its Holding as Dicta

In United States v. Gibson, 55 F.4th 153 (2d Cir. 2022), the Second Circuit held that the defendant’s 2002 New York state conviction for attempted third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance was not a “controlled substance” offense under the career offender Sentencing Guideline because the New York drug schedules in 2002 included naloxegel, which had been removed from the federal schedules in 2015, making the New York offense categorically broader than the federal controlled substance offense when Gibson was sentenced in 2020. The government had conceded that the New York 2002 schedule was broader than the current federal schedule, but argued that the comparison should be between the New York and federal schedules in 2002. The Circuit rejected that argument. See December 8, 2022, Blog post.

The government (W.D.N.Y.) sought panel rehearing, asking the Court to issue an amended opinion stating that this holding was actually dicta. …

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Categories: guideline, sentencing

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Supreme Court to review the scope of the expanded “safety valve.”

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pulsifer v. United States, No. 22-340, to clarify the First Step Act’s expansion of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)’s “safety valve.”

Section 3553(f) permits a district court to sentence a defendant below the otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum for federal drug offenses if the defendant meets certain criteria. The 2018 First Step Act expanded this provision.

As relevant here, to be eligible for the safety valve, a defendant must have a limited number of criminal history points. The defendant must “not have–

(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from
a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and

(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines ….”

The “and” has been a source of confusion.

Several circuits hold the “and” …

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Categories: safety valve, sentencing

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Categories: safety valve, sentencing

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Argument preview: Second Circuit appoints amicus to defend sentence apparently based on defendant’s national origin.

“It has long been settled in this Circuit” that “national origin and naturalized status” cannot be “the basis for determining” a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Arslanouk, 853 F. App’x 714, 720 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007)). The Circuit is thus “compelled” to order resentencing where a district court’s reference to “deter[ring] others sharing that national origin” “create[s] an improper appearance that a defendant’s national origin or immigration status might be driving the choice of sentence.” Id. at 721 (ordering resentencing where district court said sentence would send a “message” that “Russian organized crime that seeks to come to the shores of the United States … will be dealt with, with the power of our criminal justice system”).

In United States v. Vasquez-Drew, No. 20-2195-cr, the district court (Cote, J.) sentenced the defendant, a Bolivian national, to …

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Thursday, August 25th, 2022

The government can garnish your 401(k) for restitution

In United States v. Greebel, 21-993-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2022), the Second Circuit holds that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) enables the government to garnish a defendant’s retirement accounts to pay restitution.

Defendant Greebel was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud and ordered to pay over $10 million in restitution. Pursuant to this restitution order, the government tried to garnish two of his 401(k) retirement accounts. The defendant objected. The Circuit found that these accounts’ plans permitted the defendant himself to withdraw lump-sums. And because the MVRA empowered the government to reach any property “in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest,” allowing the government to “step[] into the defendant’s shoes, acquiring whatever rights the defendant himself possesses” to property, the funds were fair game for the government.

In so holding, the Circuit addressed a potential conflict between the MVRA and the …

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Categories: MVRA, restitution

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Monday, August 22nd, 2022

No GAAP violation, no expert, no problem

Are accounting standards and securities laws as complex as the tax code? Not according to the Second Circuit. In United States v. Petit, Taylor, Nos. 21-543-cr, 21-559-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 22, 2022) (summary order), the Second Circuit upheld the securities fraud convictions of two former public company executives charged with using “accounting tricks to artificially inflate” their company’s reported revenue in quarterly reports.

The defendants, who were convicted after trial, argued that the government failed to prove their so-called “tricks” violated any Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). They also argued that the district court gave erroneous jury instructions on the scienter element (“knowingly and willfully”) and conscious avoidance.

The Circuit was unmoved. According to the Circuit, the “government was not required to prove” the defendants “violated GAAP,” so long as the defendants “intentionally misled investors.” Similarly, to prove the charged fraud, the government “did not need to offer expert …

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Categories: conscious avoidance, securities law

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Thursday, March 17th, 2022

Lack of rationale for denying compassionate release prompts Jacobson remand.

In United States v. Nosov, No. 21-187-cr (2d Cir. March 17, 2022) (summary order), the Second Circuit ordered a limited remand for clarification of a court’s denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C, § 3582(c)(1)(A), pursuant to United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 1994).

In Nosov, the defendant moved for a reduction of his concurrent life terms, citing his youth at the time of the offenses, his rehabilitation, and his health conditions. The government agreed that the defendant’s obesity put him at increased risk from COVID-19, and that this could constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.

Nonetheless, without further explanation, the district court opined that the defendant had not shown “extenuating and compelling” reasons warranting a reduction and denied the motion. This finding was in tension with the government’s concession and the Circuit noted that the …

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Tuesday, March 15th, 2022

District court can’t delegate inpatient treatment decision, but Hobbs Act restitution order stands.

In a March 14, 2022 summary order, the Second Circuit reiterated the limits of a district court’s authority to delegate decisions about supervised release to the Probation Department. In United States v. Ely, No. 17-3081-cr, the court imposed a special condition of release requiring the defendant to complete “outpatient and/or inpatient drug treatment.” This wording left it to the Probation Department to decide which. But because inpatient treatment “entails a significantly greater restriction on a defendant’s liberty than outpatient treatment,” the district court was not permitted to delegate this decision to Probation. The Circuit accordingly vacated this portion of the defendant’s sentence.

In the same order, the Circuit declined to find that the district court plainly erred by imposing restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) for a Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy. As relevant here, the MVRA mandates restitution for any “crime of violence,” as defined in 18 …

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Categories: delegation, restitution, supervised release

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Monday, January 10th, 2022

“We can do that. We don’t even have to have a reason.”

Today’s Second Circuit summary order in United States v. Foskey, No. 21-149-cr, brings to mind a Caddyshack line that I think of often (quoted above). In Foskey, the Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of a motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Before the Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court had abused its discretion in denying his motion, failing to follow United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020), and failing to sufficiently explain its denial of release. Before the district court, the government had argued that Brooker was wrongly decided and that the district court should not follow it. The district court denied the defendant’s release motion in docket entry orders that did not make clear what legal standard it applied or whether it followed Brooker.

But, per the Circuit, “the district court made no mention …

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Categories: 3582(c)(1)(A), compassionate release

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