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Archive | Fourth Amendment

Monday, March 18th, 2024

Special conditions of supervised release must be based on an individualized assessment of the defendant and adequately explained.

In two recent decisions, the Second Circuit reiterated the requirements for imposing special conditions of supervised release: a sentencing court must undertake an “individualized assessment” of the defendant and “state on the record the reason for imposing” any special condition. The failure to do so is error.

In United States v. Alex Oliveras, No. 21-2954, — F.4th — (2d Cir. March 15, 2024), the Circuit vacated a special condition allowing the federal probation officer to conduct suspicionless searches of the defendant and his property.

The defendant argued, first, that this special condition violated the Fourth Amendment, and, second, that it was not adequately justified on the record.

The Circuit recognized that individuals on supervised release have a diminished expectation of privacy, and that probation officers have a legitimate need to fulfill their supervisory duties by conducting searches. At the same time, supervisees retain Fourth Amendment rights and conditions infringing …

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Categories: Fourth Amendment, special needs, supervised release

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Thursday, February 29th, 2024

A post-sentencing examination of previously seized electronic data does not violate the Fourth Amendment. And the subsequent prosecution of the defendant for producing child pornography – based on evidence discovered in that examination – is not barred by the prior plea agreement concerning his conviction for possessing child pornography.

In United States v. Cory Johnson, 2d Cir. No. 22-1086-cr (February 27, 2024), the panel (Livingston, Carney, Bianco) rejects Johnson’s claims and affirms his conviction and 20-year sentence for producing child pornography (CP) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The opinion, by Chief Judge Livingston, concludes that the instant prosecution for CP production – which follows Johnson’s 2019 conviction for CP possession, after a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement– is not barred by the prior agreement. The opinion also rules that the evidence leading to the production charge, discovered during an examination of electronic data seized in the possession case that occurred after Johnson’s sentencing, was not obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

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Here’s the gist.

After “Johnson was first identified by federal authorities as trading child sexual abuse material (CSAM) within an Internet chat group in 2018, the execution of a search warrant …

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Categories: child pornography, Fourth Amendment

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Tuesday, January 17th, 2023

The government’s use of a former cellmate’s testimony to introduce a defendant’s statements about his planned trial strategy didn’t violate the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel where the witness wasn’t a government informant when the defendant confided in him. Also, a federal probation officer’s warrantless search of the home and car of a person “serving a term of supervised release” didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment because the probation officer needed only a “reasonable suspicion” to search, not a warrant or probable cause. United States v. Chandler, No. 18-1841, 56 F.4th 27 (2d Cir. [Dec. 27,] 2022) (C.J.J.’s Lynch, Carney, and Sullivan).

This appeal addresses a Fourth Amendment claim raised in the context of a Probation Officer’s search of the home and car of  “an individual serving a term of supervised release.” The Circuit concludes that the searches were valid because the Probation Officer had a “reasonable suspicion” that the defendant was committing crimes.

The case also addresses the scope of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel “when the government presents a witness to whom the defendant has volunteered his thoughts about defense strategy and who, after learning the defendant’s thoughts, agrees to testify for the government.” Here, the government witness was a person who shared a jail cell with the defendant, during a two-week period of pretrial detention, and later became a government informant. Because the witness “was not a government informant when Chandler spoke to him about Chandler’s expected trial strategy, the government did not …

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Categories: Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion, Sixth Amendment, supervised release

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Wednesday, August 3rd, 2022

Second Circuit Holds That a Fourth Amendment Challenge to Evidence Seized Under a State Warrant Is Not Precluded by a Prior Guilty Plea in State Court.

In United States v. Jones, No. 20-3009 (2d Cir. Aug.1, 2022), the Circuit (Livingston, joined by Chin and Nardini) held that the defendant’s state guilty plea did not preclude him from challenging the evidence seized pursuant the state warrant in his federal case because the Fourth Amendment claim was not raised in state court. On the merits, the Court upheld admission of the evidence under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Jones had pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor in Tennessee based on evidence seized under several warrants and was subsequently charged in federal court with production of child pornography with respect to another minor. The defendant moved to suppress that evidence seized under the Tennessee warrants, and the federal warrants as fruit of the poisonous tree. The district court held that Jones’s state guilty plea collaterally estopped him from challenging the Tennessee warrants and, …

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Categories: collateral estoppel, Exclusionary Rule, Fourth Amendment, good faith

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Monday, July 19th, 2021

Second Circuit reverses a suppression order, applying “special needs doctrine” to uphold a parole officer’s search of parolee’s house without reasonable suspicion.

In United States v. Braggs, No. 20-892 (2d Cir. July 13, 2021), the Second Circuit reversed the suppression of guns and drugs found in a search of defendant’s house by his New York state parole officer. The search was based on an anonymous tip that “Mr. Braggs may have guns in his house.” The District Court for the Western District of New York suppressed the evidence, as well inculpatory statements made during subsequent police questioning at his house, on the ground that the search was not based on reasonable suspicion. The district court relied on the State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision directive requiring essentially a reasonable suspicion standard for such a search, and Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), which tied the parameters of a search of a state parolee to the consent required of as a condition of parole.

The Second Circuit ruled that …

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Thursday, May 27th, 2021

Supreme Court holds that there is no “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

In Caniglia v. Strom, decided May 17, 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no such thing as a “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

This case began when Mr. Caniglia had an argument with his wife at their Rhode Island home.  He then retrieved a pistol from the bedroom and asked his wife to “shoot [him] now and get it over with.”  Instead, she left the house and spent the night at a hotel.  In the morning, when Mr. Caniglia did not answer his phone, she called the police and asked them to check on him.  The police found him on his porch.  Mr. Caniglia confirmed his wife’s account of the events of the previous evening, but denied that he was suicidal.  The police called an ambulance and eventually convinced him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation.  Later, his …

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Friday, April 16th, 2021

The Supreme Court holds that when the police shoot the driver of a car, that is a “seizure” even if the wounded motorist manages to drive away.

In Torres v. Madrid, decided on March 25, 2021, the Supreme Court determined that a seizure takes place for Fourth Amendment purposes when the police shoot someone who is escaping from the scene, even if her escape is successful.

The context for this decision was a § 1983 lawsuit by Roxanne Torres alleging that the police used excessive force when they seized her. The police approached her suv, and she started to drive away. The two officers fired 13 shots, wounding her twice, but she continued to drive. The district court and the 10th Circuit ruled that because the police had not touched Ms. Torres or succeeded in getting her to stop, there had not been a seizure. Therefore, she could not bring a claim that the police used excessive force during a seizure.

The Supreme Court reversed by a 5 to 3 vote. In an opinion by Chief …

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Wednesday, July 29th, 2020

Second Circuit: 31-Day Delay In Seeking Warrant To Search Seized Tablet Computer Violates Fourth Amendment, But Suppression Not Warranted Because Delay Resulted From Mere “Isolated Negligence.”

In United States v. Smith, the Circuit (Meyer, D. Conn., joined by Katzmann and Kearse), the Circuit held that police violated the Fourth Amendment by waiting 31 days before seeking a warrant to search a seized tablet computer, but declined to apply the exclusionary rule because the error was due to “isolated negligence,” and because existing precedent would not have told an objectively reasonable police officer that the delay was unreasonable.

Police encountered Smith, drunk to the point of unconsciousness, in his car on the side of the road in a rural area of upstate New York. After removing Smith from the car, and while searching the car for identification, an officer observed a tablet computer on the front passenger seat displaying what appeared to be child pornography. The officer arrested Smith for DUI and seized the tablet. Smith was released and refused consent to search the tablet. However, …

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Categories: child pornography, Exclusionary Rule, Fourth Amendment

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Friday, July 17th, 2020

Second Circuit grants suppression motion and holds that reasonable suspicion for stop was not established by defendant’s match to suspect’s race, even in combination with other factors, because a description based primarily on race is not particularized enough to guard against police overreach or harassment.

In United States v. Walker (No. 18-3729), __ F.3d __, 2020 WL 3966958 (2d Cir. July 14, 2020), the Second Circuit, in a decision by Judge Pooler (joined by Judges Calabresi and Carney), reversed the district court’s denial of Jaquan Walker’s suppression motion, holding that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Walker based on his purported match to a photograph because the police lacked “little meaningful identifying information” besides the race of the suspect, and even the additional details of “medium-to-dark skin tone, glasses, facial hair, and long hair,” did not suffice to constitute specific, articulable facts upon which to base the stop. In addition, the court held that the search of Walker, which yielded drugs and incriminating statements, was insufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional stop, despite the subsequent police discovery of an unrelated arrest warrant for Walker. Given that the justification for the stop fell “woefully short …

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Categories: Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion, terry stop

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Monday, October 28th, 2019

Second Circuit affirms grant of summary judgment dismissing claim of excessive force in handcuffing on grounds of qualified immunity, but notes that the right to raise such a claim is now “clearly established” law.

On October 25, 2019, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Sack (joined by Judge Hall and Judge Droney), concluded that an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment can be established based on excessive use of force in handcuffing, even where the plaintiff signaled discomfort during the handcuffing only through brief and non-verbal manifestations. However, the Court nonetheless affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff’s action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it was not “clearly established law” at the time of the officer’s actions that a plaintiff who did not verbally complain or request to have her handcuffs adjusted or removed could recover on a handcuffing-based excessive force claim. Therefore, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity, and the Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants.

In Cugini v. City of New York, __ …

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Categories: Fourth Amendment, Police Misconduct, Uncategorized

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Friday, September 6th, 2019

Second Circuit holds that Fourth Amendment not violated by Suffolk County program that permits nonprofit organization to conduct home visits with individuals on the sex offender registry in order to confirm the accuracy of their registration address.

On September 4, 2019, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Droney (joined by Judge Cabranes and Judge Raggi), affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Suffolk County in a case where an individual who was required to register as a sex offender argued, in a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that home visits conducted by an organization the county had contracted with to verify his address for the registry constituted unreasonable seizures. The Court, which assumed without deciding that there was state action and that the plaintiff was “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, held that the visits were constitutional under the “special needs” doctrine.

In Jones v. County of Suffolk and Parents for Megan’s Law, No. 18-1602-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 4, 2019), the County of Suffolk had contracted with a private nonprofit organization, Parents for Megan’s Law (“PFML”), to visit …

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