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Tuesday, November 14th, 2023

In a summary order, the Second Circuit vacates a district court’s judgment imposing a complete ban on internet use, as a condition of supervised release. The Circuit concludes that it’s “substantively unreasonable” to impose such a ban on someone whose offense involved child pornography, and no evidence suggested he “is likely to seek out children on social media or prey on them in reality.” United States v. Gonyea, Nos. 22-1722-cr, 22-1727-cr (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2023) (C.J.J.’s Jacobs, Lohier, Lee) (“Summary Order”).

I. Background

In 2017, Appellant was convicted of one count “of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1)” and sentenced to 72 months’  imprisonment “and a life term of supervised release.” Order at 3.

In 2021, after his release from custody, Probation Officers discovered that he had “created two email accounts but failed to disclose them to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services,” as required by the terms of his supervised release. Id. Probation Officers also “seized an unauthorized cell phone . . . containing at least three images of child pornography.” Order at 3-4.

After Gonyea admitted to several supervised release violations, the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment “and a new life term of supervised release.” Order at 4. In addition, he “separately  pleaded guilty . . . to one count of …

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Categories: child pornography, Sex offender registration, substantive unreasonableness, supervised release

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Monday, July 10th, 2023

Circuit vacates condition of supervised release that limited defendant to possessing only one “Internet-capable device,” which the Probation Department could search at any time.

In United States v. Salazar, No. 22-1385-cr (2d Cir. July 6, 2023) (Livingston, Chin, Kahn) (summary order), my colleague Sarah Baumgartel persuaded the Circuit that the District Court committed reversible error by imposing a special condition of supervised release that prohibited the defendant from possessing more than one “personal Internet-capable device” and authorized the Probation Department to monitor all the data on that device at any time and for any reason.

The defendant had pleaded guilty to one count of possessing child pornography. At sentencing, the court imposed 30 months’ imprisonment plus 5 years’ supervised release. One of the conditions of supervised release prohibited the defendant from possessing more than one “personal Internet-capable device” and authorized the Probation Department to search that device at any time  and for any reason.

On appeal, the Circuit vacated this condition. It held that the condition was “neither narrowly tailored nor carefully explained.” …

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Categories: child pornography, supervised release

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Monday, April 24th, 2023

(1) Evidence was sufficient to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) — which prohibits using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct to produce a visual depiction of that conduct — when the defendant created a video showing a fully clothed, sleeping teenager and the defendant (nearby) engaging in conduct with himself. (2) Also, a 5-level sentencing enhancement, for engaging in a “pattern of activity” involving “prohibited sexual conduct,” was proper — under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) — based on the offense of conviction and proof (by a preponderance) of just one other prohibited act. (3) Finally, a 70-year prison sentence, the Circuit holds. isn’t substantively unreasonable. United States v. Osuba, No. 20-3322, __ F.4th ____ (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2023) (C.J.J.’s Calabresi, Park, Nardini).

I. The sufficiency of the evidence to prove the production count: 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)

Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, after a jury trial, of violating 18 U.S.C. §  2251(a), which mandates a minimum 15-year prison term for: “Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct . . .”

Back in 2018, Appellant “was in the living room of his girlfriend’s house, talking to someone over Kik Messenger, an instant-messaging app.” See Opinion (“Op”) at 4. While “[h]is girlfriend’s seventeen-year-old daughter was sleeping, fully clothed, on the couch in the same room, with her face turned away from him[,]” he “turned on his camera and recorded two short videos” that “show him masturbating close to the minor—first sitting or lying …

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Tuesday, September 6th, 2022

A prior conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 130.50(3) (1965) categorically “relates to” the sexual abuse of a minor, justifying the sentencing enhancements (for child pornography offenses) of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) and (b)(2) — which aren’t unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Ragonese, No. 20-3371-cr, __F.4th__ , 2022 WL 3903437 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2022) (Sack, Lynch, and Bianco, Circuit Judges).

  1.  The sentencing enhancements of 18 U.S.C.§ 2252A(b)(1) and (b)(2)

This case concerns the recidivist sentencing enhancements of the child pornography statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. For offenses involving “possession” of child pornography, the penalty is 0 to 10 years’ imprisonment. For “receipt,” there’s a 5-year mandatory minimum prison sentence. But, if the defendant has a prior state conviction under a law “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward,” the minimum penalties are significantly enhanced: for possession, the minimum prison sentence increases from 0 years to 10 years; for receipt, the minimum increases from a 5-year prison term to 15 years. See18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (receipt),  (b) (2) (possession). (The maxima also increase:  from 10 years to 20 years for possession, and from 20 years to 40 years for receipt).

In this case, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing …

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Categories: child pornography, plain error, vagueness

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Friday, August 28th, 2020

Government operation of child pornography website to catch visitors is not outrageous government misconduct and the good faith exception applied to evidence found through a warrant based on the site.

United States v. Caraher, No. 18-511 (2d Cir. August 25, 2020)(Hall, joined by Lynch and Menashi), involved the government’s takeover and operation of the child pornography website “Playpen” for two weeks so that it could track visitors to the site, identify their identities and locations, and search their computers. The FBI obtained a warrant allowing them to search “activating computers” of “any user or administrator who logs into the Playpen website by entering a username and password.” Caraher was such a visitor and agents located him and searched his computer. The district court held that the warrant violated Fed. Rule Crim P. 41(b) and 28 U.S.C. 636(a) but applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

The Court followed its prior decision in United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 111 (2d Cir. 2019), addressing the same warrant and holding that, even if the search and the …

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Categories: child pornography, good faith

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Wednesday, July 29th, 2020

Second Circuit: 31-Day Delay In Seeking Warrant To Search Seized Tablet Computer Violates Fourth Amendment, But Suppression Not Warranted Because Delay Resulted From Mere “Isolated Negligence.”

In United States v. Smith, the Circuit (Meyer, D. Conn., joined by Katzmann and Kearse), the Circuit held that police violated the Fourth Amendment by waiting 31 days before seeking a warrant to search a seized tablet computer, but declined to apply the exclusionary rule because the error was due to “isolated negligence,” and because existing precedent would not have told an objectively reasonable police officer that the delay was unreasonable.

Police encountered Smith, drunk to the point of unconsciousness, in his car on the side of the road in a rural area of upstate New York. After removing Smith from the car, and while searching the car for identification, an officer observed a tablet computer on the front passenger seat displaying what appeared to be child pornography. The officer arrested Smith for DUI and seized the tablet. Smith was released and refused consent to search the tablet. However, …

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Categories: child pornography, Exclusionary Rule, Fourth Amendment

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Tuesday, May 26th, 2020

Second Circuit Holds that Only One JVTA Assessment is Permitted even where there are Multiple Counts of Conviction

The defendant in US v. Haverkamp, 18-3735, pleaded guilty to one count of distribution and receipt of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to 121 months in prison. In addition, the district court imposed the $100 mandatory special assessment under 18 USC § 3013 on each count. The court also imposed the $5000 assessment under 18 USC § 3014 on each count. The latter assessment, applicable only to certain offenses, was added to the law in 2015 by the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, and is commonly known as the JVTA assessment.

On appeal, in an opinion by Judge Parker, joined by Judges Sack and Chin, the Second Circuit held that only one JVTA assessment is permitted for any defendant even if there are multiple eligible counts of conviction. The Court relied principally on the language of § 3014, which instructs …

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Friday, January 17th, 2020

Circuit Holds That New York Offense of Possession of a Sexual Performance By a Child (N.Y. Penal Law §263.16) Categorically Matches 18 U.S.C §2252(a)(4)(B) and Is an Aggravated Felony Under the INA.

In Quito v. Barr, __ F.3d __ 2020 WL 218590 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2020) (Wesley, Livingston, Bianco),  the Second Circuit held that attempted possession of a sexual performance by a child under N.Y. Penal Law §263.16 is an aggravated felony under the INA because it categorically fits the definition of the federal offense of possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), an enumerated aggravated felony. The Court rejected petitioner’s arguments that the New York statute sweeps more broadly because it does not require knowledge of the minor’s specific age and does not include the affirmative defense to §2252(a)(4)(B) for someone who possessed fewer than three images and promptly destroyed them or turned them over.

The Court ruled, as a threshold matter, that it was not bound by its previous holding in Weiland v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2016),  that  a “nearly identical” New York …

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Categories: aggravated felony, categorical approach, child pornography

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Tuesday, May 14th, 2019

Jenkins II: Circuit Vacates and Remands Child Pornography Sentence, Again

You may remember that, back in April 2017, the Second Circuit vacated a 225-month sentence for a person convicted of the possession and transportation of child pornography as “shockingly high.” In Jenkins I, the Circuit wrote an extensive opinion, chock-full of quotable portions for sentencing memos and appeals, about why the child pornography guidelines can produce “unreasonable results.”

On remand, however, the district court resentenced Mr. Jenkins to 200 months of imprisonment – still an exceedingly long sentence for a first conviction.

On Friday, the Circuit reversed again, this time sending the case to a new district judge. Although Jenkins II is a summary order, it still has potentially useful language about why it is error for a district court to rely on studies or statistics about people convicted of child pornography offenses as a reason to believe that a particular person committed a prior “undetected” offense. As the …

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Categories: 3553(c), child pornography

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Friday, November 2nd, 2018

Second Circuit Upholds “Barbaric,” but Somehow Substantively Reasonable, Sentence

In a remarkably fatalistic opinion, the Second Circuit rejected a substantive reasonableness challenge to a 25 year sentence for child pornography sentence charges. The sentence, the panel explained, was “barbaric without being all that unusual.” United States v. Sawyer, No. 15-2276 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2018) (Jacobs, Pooler, Crawford (D. Vt.)), available here.

The defendant in Sawyer was initially sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment on charges of sexual exploitation and receiving child pornography. The defendant’s PSR documented that the defendant suffered a childhood of severe physical and sexual abuse. The district judge described this childhood as “horrific” and “nightmarish,” but admonished the defendant that “I can’t excuse that darkness in your heart and soul that made you prey upon two innocent children.” Slip op. at 3-4. (The defendant was prosecuted for having, but not distributing, graphic cellphone photos of two young girls with whom he had …

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Friday, June 22nd, 2018

Circuit Upholds Warrantless Search of Car, Remands for Resentencings to Consider Downward Departures and Concurrent Sentences

In United States v. Jones, the Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of a car parked in the common parking lot of a multi-family building.  The Circuit held Jones had no legitimate expectation of privacy in his car because it was parked in a driveway shared by tenants of two multi-family homes, not within the curtilage of his private home, and he did not have exclusive control over the driveway.  Op. at 13-15.

In United States v. Sawyer, the Circuit remanded the case for the second time, this time for resentencing in front of a new district judge.  The Circuit previously had vacated as substantively unreasonable a 360-month sentence for the offenses of producing and receiving child pornography.  In that opinion, the Circuit held that the “30-year sentence would have been appropriate for ‘extreme and heinous criminal behavior’ and the …

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Categories: automobile exception, child pornography, concurrent, curtilage

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