Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog


Monday, April 24th, 2023

(1) Evidence was sufficient to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) — which prohibits using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct to produce a visual depiction of that conduct — when the defendant created a video showing a fully clothed, sleeping teenager and the defendant (nearby) engaging in conduct with himself. (2) Also, a 5-level sentencing enhancement, for engaging in a “pattern of activity” involving “prohibited sexual conduct,” was proper — under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) — based on the offense of conviction and proof (by a preponderance) of just one other prohibited act. (3) Finally, a 70-year prison sentence, the Circuit holds. isn’t substantively unreasonable. United States v. Osuba, No. 20-3322, __ F.4th ____ (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2023) (C.J.J.’s Calabresi, Park, Nardini).

I. The sufficiency of the evidence to prove the production count: 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)

Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, after a jury trial, of violating 18 U.S.C. §  2251(a), which mandates a minimum 15-year prison term for: “Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct . . .”

Back in 2018, Appellant “was in the living room of his girlfriend’s house, talking to someone over Kik Messenger, an instant-messaging app.” See Opinion (“Op”) at 4. While “[h]is girlfriend’s seventeen-year-old daughter was sleeping, fully clothed, on the couch in the same room, with her face turned away from him[,]” he “turned on his camera and recorded two short videos” that “show him masturbating close to the minor—first sitting or lying …

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Appellant’s submission of (three) “forged letters” of support, to the sentencing court, results in a 5-level increase in offense level: a two level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1) and the denial of a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility (id. § 3E1.1). United States v. Strange, No. 21-2923, __ F.4th ____ (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2023) (C.J.J.’s Pooler, Wesley, and Menashi).

Background

Appellant worked for a company that (generously) matched the charitable donations of its employees “up to $25,000 in donations per employee annually.” Opinion (“Op”) at 2. From 2015 to 2019, Appellant he “carried out a scheme to defraud” by “submitt[ing] fake documentation purporting to show that he, as well as some of his coworkers, had made significant charitable donations to an entity that Strange himself controlled.” Op at 2-3. The coworkers “had no knowledge of the submissions.” Op at 3. Appellant received about $600,000 from the company’s matching program, which he used “for personal expenses.” Id.

Appellant ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343). And his initial Guidelines range was “33 to 41 months incarceration.” Op at 3.

But a few days before sentencing, he submitted three letters “each encouraging the imposition of a probationary sentence rather than imprisonment.”Op at 3. The government …


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Categories: acceptance of responsibility, obstruction of justice, wire fraud

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Thursday, April 13th, 2023

Second Circuit holds that prison term of one year and one day for convicted fraudster is unreasonably lenient.

In Watts v. United States, Nos. 21-2925(L), 21-3028 (2d Cir. Apr. 12, 2023) (summary order), the Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions for various counts involving securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. But, at the Government’s urging on its cross-appeal, the court vacated his sentence—which included a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment of one year and one day—as substantively unreasonable because it was  “shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” Fortunately, the decision is an unpublished summary order, meaning that it has no precedential effect.

Watts was convicted in the Eastern District of New York (Seybert, J.), of charges that, over a four-year period, he and his co-defendants schemed to defraud investors in several publicly traded companies by artificially controlling the price and volume of traded shares in those companies. In brief, Watts and other insiders at public companies allegedly hired a Long Island “boiler room” to …

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Friday, April 7th, 2023

Certiorari petition to watch: United States v. Rahimi, No. 22-915

In United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), criminalizing firearm possession by a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order, was facially unconstitutional in light of N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, — U.S. –, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). In doing so, it became the first — and only — circuit to invalidate a federal criminal statute on Second Amendment grounds.

Within weeks, the government filed a “highly expedited” Supreme Court petition, acknowledging the lack of a Circuit split but contending that the Fifth Circuit’s decision was incorrect, had “significant disruptive consequences,” and “threatens grave harm for victims of domestic violence.”

Rahimi’s response is due on April 20, 2023. Amicus briefs should be due 30 days after that. Bruen aficionados: keep your eyes peeled and start hitting refresh on that …


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Wednesday, April 5th, 2023

Kidnapping is Not a Crime of Violence

Most courts (and the government) have for a while acknowledged that kidnapping is not a crime of violence given that it can be accomplished through deception and thus without physical force.  The Second Circuit has now acknowledged this too, holding in US v. Eldridge that NY kidnapping in aid of federal racketeering isn’t a 924(c) predicate: it can be committed using “deception to hold a victim in a place” and thus without “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.”

PS – The career offender guideline lists “kidnapping” as a COV but doesn’t define it, meaning the generic definition (how most jurisdictions define it) applies.  The DC Circuit surveyed the law and decided generic kidnapping requires “a criminal purpose beyond the mere intent to restrain the victim.”  US v. De Jesus Ventura, 565 F.3d 870, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Neither federal kidnapping nor NY kidnapping requires such heightened …

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Categories: 924(c), crime of violence

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Wednesday, March 22nd, 2023

Today, in United States v. Lewis, the Second Circuit strongly reaffirmed that the Circuit has no “categorical rule” about Fourth Amendment standing over shared spaces in multi-unit buildings. On the contrary, the Circuit noted that people who live in single-family homes should not have greater Fourth Amendment protections then people in multi-unit buildings. It counseled that courts should use an “individualized approach” to assess a person’s privacy interest over any shared spaces.

Unfortunately for Vashun Lewis, however, the Circuit still found that he hadn’t shown a reasonable expectation of privacy over a back “porch” area that led to a common stairway. (The area described as a porch seems to have been inside the building, although it is not entirely clear from the decision). The Circuit said that Lewis had “neither pointed to any relevant evidence nor made any arguments pertinent to his reasonable expectation of privacy over the porch.”…

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Wednesday, March 8th, 2023

Second Circuit Vacates §§ 924(c) And 924(j) Convictions Predicated On Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery, But Affirms § 924(c) Conviction Predicated On VICAR Assault With A Deadly Weapon.

In two direct appeals, the Second Circuit  addressed follow-on issues arising from United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) (holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) crime of violence).

In United States v. Collymore, No. 19-596 (2d Cir. March 7, 2023) (per curiam) (Sullivan, Park, Nardini), the Circuit, on direct appeal, vacated 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j)(1) convictions predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery in light of Taylor. Taylor itself required vacatur of the § 924(c) conviction, and the Circuit reasoned that because a § 924(c) violation is an element of a § 924(j)(1) offense, Taylor also required vacatur of the latter conviction.

However, the Circuit rejected, on plain-error review, Collymore’s argument that his guilty plea was invalid. At Collymore’s Rule 11 colloquy, the magistrate judge had advised him—correctly, under pre-First Step Act law—that his §§ …

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Categories: 924(c), Hobbs Act

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Friday, March 3rd, 2023

Circuit rejects new trial bid, despite evidentiary errors and refusal to voir dire on “antisemitic bias.”

In United States v. Mendlowitz, No. 21-2049-cr (2d Cir. March 2, 2023) (summary order), the Second Circuit affirms the defendant’s wire fraud convictions, despite possible evidentiary errors and the district court’s refusal to ask about “potential antisemitic bias” during jury selection.

On appeal following trial, the defendant challenged the district court’s exclusion of a proffered expert witness and a recorded conversation between the defendant and a cooperating witness. The Circuit largely agreed with defendant’s arguments: it recognized that, contra the district court, the proffered expert testimony about standard industry practices would have been relevant to the defendant’s good faith defense. The expert testimony also would have provided relevant information outside the average juror’s knowledge and beyond any government witness testimony.

With respect to the recorded conversation, the defendant argued that it reflected his state of mind at the time of the charged conduct and supported his defense. The district …


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Circuit orders resentencing in light of statements that created a risk of the appearance that a defendant’s nationality impacted his sentence.

In United States v. Vasquez-Drew, No. 20-2195-cr (2d Cir. March 2, 2023) (summary order), the Second Circuit ordered the defendant resentenced before a new district judge because certain remarks the original judge made at sentencing created a “risk that a reasonable observer … ‘might infer, however incorrectly’ that Vasquez’s nationality played a role in determining his sentence.”

In sentencing the defendant, a Bolivian national, the district court (Cote, J.) stated that the sentence was “motivated by concerns about appropriate punishment, but also general deterrence,” and that it was “important” “that the people in Bolivia understand the kind of sentences that are potentially imposed here from engagement in activity to send cocaine into America.”

This decision follows an interesting and wide-ranging oral argument available here and previewed here.

Ultimately, the Circuit’s short summary order hewed closely to precedent: “[E]ven the appearance that the sentence reflects a defendant’s race or …


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Monday, February 27th, 2023

The Second Circuit Grants Panel Rehearing in Gibson to Reject the Government’s Request to Recast its Holding as Dicta

In United States v. Gibson, 55 F.4th 153 (2d Cir. 2022), the Second Circuit held that the defendant’s 2002 New York state conviction for attempted third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance was not a “controlled substance” offense under the career offender Sentencing Guideline because the New York drug schedules in 2002 included naloxegel, which had been removed from the federal schedules in 2015, making the New York offense categorically broader than the federal controlled substance offense when Gibson was sentenced in 2020. The government had conceded that the New York 2002 schedule was broader than the current federal schedule, but argued that the comparison should be between the New York and federal schedules in 2002. The Circuit rejected that argument. See December 8, 2022, Blog post.

The government (W.D.N.Y.) sought panel rehearing, asking the Court to issue an amended opinion stating that this holding was actually dicta. …

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Supreme Court to review the scope of the expanded “safety valve.”

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pulsifer v. United States, No. 22-340, to clarify the First Step Act’s expansion of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)’s “safety valve.”

Section 3553(f) permits a district court to sentence a defendant below the otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum for federal drug offenses if the defendant meets certain criteria. The 2018 First Step Act expanded this provision.

As relevant here, to be eligible for the safety valve, a defendant must have a limited number of criminal history points. The defendant must “not have–

(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from
a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and

(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines ….”

The “and” has been a source of confusion.

Several circuits hold the “and” …


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