Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog


Wednesday, August 3rd, 2016

An Uphill Battle

United States v. Elvin Hill, No. 14-3872-cr (Circuit Judges: Jacobs, Livingston, and Droney).(Disclosure: This is an appeal that this Office litigated).

In this direct appeal,  Mr.  Hill argued: (1)  that Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) did not “categorically” constitute a “crime of violence” under the “force” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3);  and (2) that Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)  applied to the residual clause of  § 924(c)(3), which is worded similarly to that of the ACCA statute — 18 U.S.C.. § 924(e)(2)(B) — and that Johnson rendered 924(c)(3)’s residual void for vagueness. Both claims were rejected by the Circuit.

The Cateqorical approach: The Circuit stated that it was applying the “categorical approach” in determining whether the predicate crime (the Hobbs Act robbery) was a “crime of violence” under §924(c).  The categorical approach looks only to the statutory definition of the predicate …


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Categories: 924(c), crime of violence, Hobbs Act, Johnson

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More to Follow

Johnson (Bad) News:

Today, the Circuit  decided  Hill adverse to the defendant. It holds that Hobbs Act Robbery is “categorically” a “Crime of Violence” under 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c)(3).  It also holds that Johnson does not apply to § 924(c): i.e., it does not  “effectively render[]  the ‘risk-of-force clause’” of § 924(c) “void for vagueness.” United States v. Elvin Hill, No. 14-3872-cr (Jacobs, Livingston, and Droney).

We are still digesting the Opinion. More will follow.  But defense counsel will still have to raise and litigate these claims until the Supreme Court decides the issue. The Government already has a cert petition pending with the Supreme Court  based on defendant wins in the Ninth Circuit and two other circuits. This Second Circuit case clearly creates a split that the Supreme Court will most likely take on.…


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Categories: 924(c), crime of violence, Hobbs Act, Johnson

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Tuesday, August 2nd, 2016

Second Circuit Updates – August 2, 2016

Yesterday, in United States v. Carabello, 12-3839, the Second Circuit held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless “pinging” of a defendant’s cell phone.  Law enforcement officers searching for Caraballo in connection with the execution-style murder of one of his drug associates asked Sprint to utilize its emergency procedures to “ping” Caraballo’s cell phones so that the phones, and hopefully Caraballo, could be located through the triangulation of signals given off by the phones in response to the “pings” sent by Sprint.

The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of suppression, holding that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless pinging.

The Court reviewed the exigency factors laid out in Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(en banc) and United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769-70 (2d Cir. 1990)(en banc) and considered these factors …


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Categories: cell phone location information

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Friday, July 29th, 2016

Petition to file a Second or Successive 2255 petition is granted by the Circuit –in a Career Offender case based on Johnson and the cert. grant in Beckles — and the district court has discretion to proceed without waiting for the Beckles decision.

Today the Circuit amended its decision in Blow v. United States, No. 16-1530 (Katzmann, chief judge; Wesley and Hall, circuit judges). It added a single line at the end of the opinion to say that the district judge has discretion to proceed on Blow’s  2255 petition and  is not required to hold the petition in abeyance until the Supreme Court decides  Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544, 2016 WL 1029080 (U.S. June 27, 2016).

The Circuit’s initial opinion was filed about two weeks ago, on July 14, 2016. It granted Blow’s motion to file a Second or Successive 2255 petition. But it  “instructed” the district court to “hold Blow’s §2255 motion in abeyance pending the outcome of Beckles.

In Beckles,  the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)  — which declared that the “residual clause” of the …


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Categories: 2255, career offender, Johnson, Uncategorized

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Tuesday, July 26th, 2016

Second Circuit Updates – July 26, 2016

The Court today issued no published decisions in criminal cases but did decide one criminal matter in a summary order: United States v. Wilson, No. 15-1991-cr (2d Cir. July 26, 2016) (Pooler, Sack, and Lynch).

Wilson had been convicted of two counts: theft of government property, which carries a ten-year maximum prison term, and aggravated identity theft, which carries a mandatory consecutive prison term of two years. The district court (Judge Scullin) imposed the statutory maximum term of 12 years. The Circuit affirmed.

At sentencing, the court correctly calculated the Guidelines range of imprisonment to be 168-210 months and imposed a lower sentence, 144 months, which the Circuit found to be procedurally and substantively reasonable.

But the Circuit noted that it was “troubled” by the district court’s conduct at sentencing. In particular, the court had stated that it felt deceived by letters submitted by the defendant’s wife and father. …

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Categories: sentencing

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Thursday, July 21st, 2016

New York Robbery is Not a “Crime of Violence”

marble rye-blog

In today’s United States v. Jones, the Second Circuit (Walker, Calabresi, Hall, C.JJ.) overruled its prior precedents in light of Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), and Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), to hold that “a first‐degree robbery conviction in New York is no longer necessarily a conviction for a ‘crime of violence’ as that term is used in the Career Offender Guideline.”

New York robbery, whatever its degree, is “forcible stealing” and requires actual or threatened “physical force upon another person.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00.  This does not make the offense a “crime of violence,” the Circuit explained, because New York courts “have made clear that ‘forcible stealing’ alone does not necessarily involve the use of ‘violent force'” required to make something a “crime of violence” under the Guideline’s force clause.  “Violent force” is “strong” and “substantial,” Johnson, …


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Categories: ACCA, career offender, crime of violence, robbery

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Wednesday, July 20th, 2016

Second Circuit Updates – July 20, 2016

There were three summary orders from the circuit today.

Remanded again: In United States v. White, the circuit reaffirmed that the district court must consider material post-sentencing conduct when resentencing a defendant. Ms. White’s case had already been remanded by the circuit once before because the district judge did not make factual findings to support a sentence enhancement. At the resentencing, the district court made ambiguous comments suggesting that it was ignoring her post-sentencing rehabilitation. The circuit, therefore, sent Ms. White’s case back to the district judge again. This time, the judge must consider whether the evidence of Ms. White’s rehabilitation merited a reduced term of supervised release.

Two affirmances: In United States v. Galanis, the circuit upheld the district court’s revocation of bail pending trial because there was probable cause that the defendant had continued his criminal activity; and, in United States v. Sturgis, the circuit …


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Categories: bail, recusal, rehabilitation

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Tuesday, July 19th, 2016

Filing a Notice of Appeal: Just Do It!

In today’s United States v. Lajud-Pena (Diaz), the Second Circuit (Pooler, Parker, Livingston, C.JJ.) granted the government’s motion to dismiss an untimely appeal but remanded with instructions that the district court “convert the Appellant’s notice of appeal (as supplemented by the Defendant’s brief claiming ineffectiveness resulted in his failure to timely file his appeal) into a petition” under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Should the aspiring appellant establish in district court that his lawyer failed to timely file a notice of appeal as instructed, the relief will presumably be issuance of a new judgment from which he could appeal.  See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); United States v. Fuller, 332 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2003).  And should that appeal ultimately prove unsuccessful, the Circuit indicated the “converted” § 2255 petition seeking “only reinstatement of the right to a direct appeal” will not render a subsequent § …

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“Precipitous Pepper Purchase” Precludes Pot Pushers’ Partying

peppers

In today’s United States v. Compton, the Second Circuit (Walker, Raggi, Hall, C.JJ.) held a Border Patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to stop Compton and his brother, found to be transporting 145 pounds of marijuana, based on “(1) the brothers’ avoidance of [a Border Patrol] checkpoint, (2) the checkpoint’s proximity to the [Canadian] border, and (3) the brothers’ peculiar attempt to conceal the avoidance.”  The “peculiar attempt” was the brothers’ “abruptly slow[ing] down” when their SUV came within sight of the checkpoint and then “veer[ing] into the U‐shaped driveway of [a] vegetable stand” where they each bought “a pint of peppers.”

“Because [the agent] had already determined that the SUV had made the abrupt turn into the vegetable stand in order to avoid the checkpoint, [he] could reasonably interpret the pepper purchase to be an attempt to conceal that avoidance.  He could reasonably discount the probability of an alternate …


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Categories: Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion, terry stop

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Friday, July 15th, 2016

Second Circuit Updates – July 15, 2016

The Record of the Psychiatric Evaluation of a Rape Complainant was Material Under Brady and State Court’s Ruling to the Contrary was Unreasonable Application of the Kyles standard.

(Full disclosure: Colleen Cassidy, today’s blogger, briefed and argued this case)

In Fuentes v. Griffin, Docket NO. 14 – 3878, the Second Circuit (KEARSE, J.), held that the state prosecutor’s suppression of the rape complainant’s psychiatric evaluation (the “Record”) violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that the state court unreasonably applied the materiality standard of Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), in rejecting that claim. The state trial was a closely contested rape case with a consent defense, in which a sexual encounter on the roof of the complainant’s building was undisputed and the only issue was whether it was rape or consensual. The only witnesses to the encounter were the complainant and the defendant-petitioner …

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Categories: Brady, Kyles, sex offenses

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Categories: Brady, Kyles, sex offenses

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Thursday, July 14th, 2016

Your emails are a bit safer from the government’s eyes…so long as they are stored outside of the United States

In a big privacy and technology ruling, the Second Circuit vacated an order holding Microsoft in civil contempt for failing to comply with a warrant demanding user content that was stored in Ireland. The circuit concluded that US courts are not authorized to enforce “Stored Communications Act” warrants requesting electronic communications stored abroad. As Judge Lynch pointed out in his concurrence, if Microsoft stores your electronic communications abroad your privacy is now “absolute as against the government,” but, of course, your “privacy is protected against Microsoft only to the extent defined by the terms of their contract.”

And, in other news today, Johnson litigation continues…

Last year, in Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was void for vagueness. Last month, the Supreme Court granted cert in United States v. Beckles to decide whether Johnson applies retroactively to …

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Categories: Johnson

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Categories: Johnson

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