In United States v. St. Hilaire, __F.3d__, 2020 WL 2563112 (2d Cir. May 21, 2020), the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Jacobs (joined by Judges Calabresi and Chin), for the first time addressed the meaning of the four-level sentencing guideline enhancement for possessing a firearm with “an altered or obliterated serial number,” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). Looking to the rulings of other Circuits, the Second Circuit ruled on two distinct issues pertaining to the enhancement. First, the Court concluded that although a gun may have its serial number on multiple locations, the enhancement applies even if the serial number is “altered or obliterated” in only one of multiple locations. Second, the Court held that for a serial number to be deemed “altered,” the number must be illegible to the naked eye and not merely defaced. The Court affirmed the application of the enhancement in this case based …
Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog
Judge Menashi’s First Criminal Opinion Goes Against the Defendant
In US v. Richardson, #19-412, Judge Menashi, joined by Judges Walker and Chin, affirmed the district court’s ruling that the defendant qualified as a career offender. The defendant’s prior offenses were (1) federal conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine (21 USC §§ 841 (a) (1) & 846) and (2) New York attempted possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00/220.16(1)).
The issue on appeal was whether each of these offenses is a “controlled substance offense” under USSG § 4B1.2. A “controlled substance offense” is defined as “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance … or the possession of a controlled substance … with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” USSG § 4B1.2(b). Application note 1 …
Second Circuit Rules that Conviction Stands for Defendant Who Died While His Appeal Was Pending
In the Anglo-American legal tradition, if the accused dies before a conviction becomes final, the conviction is vacated and the indictment is dismissed. This is called “abatement” of the conviction, and hopefully most of you have not encountered it. The idea is that the defendant will now face the Lord’s justice, not the King’s, and that the family should not have to live with the stigma of a conviction that was not final.
The defendant in US v. Mladen, 18-0616, died during the pendency of his appeal, but the Second Circuit decided that abatement was too generous a remedy for him. The opinion is by Judge Kearse, joined by Judges Walker and Livingston. Perhaps the problem was that, although convicted only of one count of 18 USC § 1001, he also admitted to making anonymous threats against a federal judge. Then, while in jail awaiting sentence in this case, …
Second Circuit Holds that Only One JVTA Assessment is Permitted even where there are Multiple Counts of Conviction
The defendant in US v. Haverkamp, 18-3735, pleaded guilty to one count of distribution and receipt of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to 121 months in prison. In addition, the district court imposed the $100 mandatory special assessment under 18 USC § 3013 on each count. The court also imposed the $5000 assessment under 18 USC § 3014 on each count. The latter assessment, applicable only to certain offenses, was added to the law in 2015 by the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, and is commonly known as the JVTA assessment.
On appeal, in an opinion by Judge Parker, joined by Judges Sack and Chin, the Second Circuit held that only one JVTA assessment is permitted for any defendant even if there are multiple eligible counts of conviction. The Court relied principally on the language of § 3014, which instructs …
Supreme Court Reverses Ninth Circuit for Bypassing the Adversary System
A Supreme Court term is not complete without a few slap downs of the Ninth Circuit such as this one.
The defendant in United States v. Sineneng-Smith operated an immigration consulting business in California. Between 2001 and 2008, she charged unwitting clients for help in applying to a path-to-citizenship program even though she knew the program had expired. The clients paid over $6000 each, for a total of more than $3.3 million. The defendant was convicted of violating, inter alia, 8 USC § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Defense counsel argued that the statute did not cover her conduct and that, if it did, the statute violated her First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government.
On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit appointed amici to raise additional issues framed by the panel. It then reversed the conviction on one of those issues, holding that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. …
Unanimous Supreme Court Tosses Bridgegate Conviction
Kelly v. United States concerns New Jersey’s well-known Bridgegate scandal, where officials with ties to Gov. Chris Christie decided to punish the residents of Ft. Lee because their mayor would not endorse Christie for reelection in 2013. So, beginning on the first day of school, and under the guise of a traffic study, the defendants arranged for the three toll lanes of the George Washington Bridge usually reserved for Ft. Lee traffic to be reduced to one. This created a traffic armageddon in Ft. Lee, jeopardizing community safety.
The defendants were fired, federally indicted, and convicted of crimes involving wire fraud and federal program fraud. The convictions were affirmed by the Third Circuit.
On May 8, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the convictions in an opinion by Justice Kagan. The Court agreed that corruption and abuse of power occurred in this case, but “not every corrupt act by state or …
Pop off, G-Unit
In a murder-for-hire trial, is it constitutional for a defense attorney to concede—over his client’s objection—that the client hired someone to shoot at the victim (an element of the offense), but argue that the client did not intend for the victim to die?
This may seem like a strange strategic choice, but it starts to make more sense in context. On May 1, 2020, in United States v. James Rosemond, No. 18-3561, the Second Circuit takes a foray into the world of hip hop while considering a defendant’s Sixth Amendment autonomy rights.
Rosemond, aka “Jimmy Henchman,” was a manager and music executive whose Czar Entertainment managed, among others, The Game, Brandy, Gucci Mane, and Salt-n-Pepa. Czar had a rivalry with Violator Records, whose offices were located across the street. Violence ensued. Per the Second Circuit,
…The rivalry intensified in February 2005. At that time, Czar represented rapper Jayceon Taylor,
“Our mindless addiction to punishment”: Keeping up with Covid-19 in the BOP
This week, the Federal Bureau of Prisons announced the death of an inmate named Andrea Circle Bear from Covid-19. In January 2020, a pregnant Ms. Circle Bear was remanded to begin serving a 26-month federal sentence for a nonviolent drug offense. She contracted Covid-19 in custody. On April 1, her baby was delivered by cesarean section. On April 28, Ms. Circle Bear died.
As FAMM President Kevin Ring put it, “[N]othing better demonstrates our mindless addiction to punishment more than the fact that, in the midst of a global pandemic, our government moved a 30-year-old, COVID-vulnerable pregnant woman not to a hospital or to her home, but to a federal prison. Her death is a national disgrace ….”
This “mindless addiction” is particularly stark in Ms. Circle Bear’s case, but it is no less apparent in the actions of the BOP and our local United States Attorney’s Offices as this …
Examining the scope of crack resentencings under the First Step Act
Last week we highlighted the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Holloway, No. 19-1035, holding that a motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B), not § 3582(c)(2).
In United States v. Chambers, No. 19-7104, 2020 WL 1949249 (4th Cir. Apr. 23, 2020), the Fourth Circuit recently reached the same conclusion in addressing a slightly different issue. In Chambers, the district court erroneously applied a career offender enhancement in a First Step Act crack resentencing, because the career offender enhancement had been applied at the original sentencing. Overturning this decision, the Fourth Circuit holds that the “First Step Act does not constrain courts from recognizing Guidelines errors” and that “any Guidelines error deemed retroactive … must be corrected in a First Step Act resentencing.”
Although this is a somewhat narrow issue, the …
Compassionate Release and Covid-19
Numerous district courts in the Second Circuit and across the country have used the expanded compassionate release provision of the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), to release at-risk defendants from custody during the Covid-19 crisis. These courts have found that the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, combined with underlying medical issues that increase a defendant’s risk from the virus, can constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons to reduce the defendant’s sentence and order release from custody.
The national Federal Defenders website and Douglas Berman’s Sentencing Law and Policy blog are two great sources of information about these compassionate release grants.
Here I wanted to highlight a few notable decisions within the Second Circuit related to this issue.
In United States v. Gerard Scparta, No. 18 Cr. 578 (AJN), ECF Dkt. 69 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2020), Judge Nathan granted a compassionate release motion of a 55-year old defendant who suffers from …
Some Summary Orders: Bikes, Guns, Fines
On April 27, 2020, the Second Circuit issued three summary orders in criminal matters.
In United States. v. Cuello, No. 19-2053, the Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of suppression of a gun found during a traffic stop. This “traffic” stop was of a bike that did not have proper “head and tail lights,” in violation of New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1236(a). During the stop, police asked the bike rider for identification and his “bicycle registration.”
Did you know that “bicycle registration” is a thing? Apparently, the Syracuse Revised General Ordinances, Section 29-1 requires every person in the city of Syracuse who owns a bicycle operated in the city to register that bicycle “with the chief of police.” Well.
When the bike rider failed to produce his registration, police asked him about a black backpack he was wearing. Because how suspicious is it to be riding …