Author Archive | Steve Statsinger

United States v. Vaval, No. 04-121-cr (April 12, 2005)(Winter, Sotomayor, and Parker)(op. by Winter). In this opinion, the Court addressed two important issues regarding guilty plea practice – the sufficiency of the allocution and the government’s obligations under a plea agreement.

Facts
Troy Vaval and his confederates made arrangements to sell firearms to a confidential informant. When the CI showed up to close the deal, Vaval and the others robbed him, stealing the buy money, his wallet and jewelry, and his car.

Vaval pled guilty to one count of robbery of federal property with a dangerous weapon, pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreement listed the relevant statutory maxima, but had “N/A” next to the line for restitution. In addition, although the government retained the right to describe to the court Vaval’s criminal conduct, it agreed to “take no position concerning” where within the applicable guideline range Vaval should …

United States v. Brown, No. 04-3137-cr (March 22, 2005 )(McLaughlin, Sotomayor, C.J.J. and Cedarbaum, D.J., Op. by McLaughlin). Inthis opinion, the Court considered the imposition of special conditions of supervised release relating to the defendant’s finances where the defendant was not convicted of a financial crime, and where no fine or restitution was imposed. It upheld a condition requiring the defendant provide his probation officer with any requested financial information, but vacated one prohibiting him from incurring any new debts without the officer’s permission.

Facts: In November of 2003, Kenneth Brown pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine. His presentence report revealed that he had sustained drug-related convictions in 1995, 1997, 1998 and 2001. In addition, his employment history between 1996 and 2001 was “sparse, sporadic, and could not be verified.” Brown was sentenced in May of 2004 to 70 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. The court …

United States v. Angelo Ramos, No. 04-2004-cr (March 14, 2005)(Newman, Sack and Parker, op. by Sack). In this case, the Court of Appeals rejected a claim that a delay of several years between the time the defendant violated his supervised release by committing a new state crime and the time the violation was actually adjudicated either deprived the court of jurisdiction or amounted to a due process violation.

Facts

The relevant facts can be reduced to a simple timeline:

September 18, 1996: Defendant Angelo Ramos is sentenced in federal court to 36 months’ imprisonment and one year of supervised release.

May 1, 2000: Ramos begins his supervised release term.

November 24, 2000: Ramos is arrested and detained in an unrelated state case.

November 29, 2000: Ramos’ probation officer notifies the federal court of the arrest and seeks a warrant, but the court does not order one.

April 21, 2001: …

United States v. Barrow, No. 03-1074 (March 2, 2005)(Sack, Raggi and Hall, Op. by Raggi). In this case, the Court upheld the district court’s conclusion that the defense had opened the door to the government’ s use of statements that the defendant made at proffer sessions, even though the proffer statements did not directly contradict counsel’s assertions at trial.

Facts: Defendant Calvin Johnson was charged with selling crack cocaine either to an informant or an undercover officer on various dates in 2001. Shortly after his arrest, he made the decision to try to cooperate, and attended three debriefings with the government during the first half of 2002. At each proffer session, he executed a proffer agreement that provided that the prosecutors could use the statements that Mr. Johnson made “as substantive evidence to rebut any evidence offered or elicited, or factual assertions made, by or on behalf of …

United States v. Fernandez, No. 04 Cr. 539 (RPP)(S.D.N.Y. January 31, 2005)(Judge Patterson)

In an important ruling for defendants who face a 15-year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (generally known as “A.C.C.A,” and set out in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)), Judge Patterson recently held that a New York State youthful offender adjudication (a “Y.O.”) does not serve as a predicate conviction under this sentence enhancement statute.

Facts

Clint Fernandez, who pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), had the following relevant prior convictions. A 1993 conviction for second-degree robbery, for which he received a Y.O., a 1995 state drug conviction for a Class C felony, and a 1998 state attempted robbery conviction. It was indisputed that the 1995 and 1998 convictions were A.C.C.A. predictates. The only question was whether the 1993 Y.O. was, as well.

The Judge’s Ruling…

United States v. Schneider, No. 03-1764 (January 14, 2005)

Background

Jeffrey Schneider was an accountant at a company that funded residential loans, and was implicated in a fraudulent scheme on the part of some of the company’s principals to skim funds from escrow accounts. There were several years of contententious pretrial proceedings, some of the highlights of which included: (1) a failed proffer session at which defense counsel balked at some of the terms of the agreement, which led the prosecutor to tell Schneider that his attorney was “making a very big mistake;” and, (2) a decision by different prosecutors more than a year later not to pursue criminal charges, even though an indictment had been filed.

Schneider went to trial and was acquitted. He then moved in the district court for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment, which has been codified as a statutory note to 18 U.S.C. § …

In United States v. Scott, No. 04-937-cr (January 11, 2005), the Court considered several important questions relating to collateral challenges to the deportation underlying an illegal reentry prosecution.

Background

Kevin Eric Scott had previously appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, and the Court had remanded the case to the district court to consider the effect of United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2003), which was decided while Scott’s appeal was pending. On remand, the Scott again challenged his deportation, asserting that his immigration attorney’s failure to seek 212(c) relief amounted to a due process voilation. The district court rejected this argument, and again denied the motion to dismiss.

The Court’s Ruling

In this second appeal, the Court again held that, as in Perez, ineffective assistance of counsel at a deportation hearing could be the basis for a collateral …