United States v. Brown, No. 04-3137-cr (March 22, 2005 )(McLaughlin, Sotomayor, C.J.J. and Cedarbaum, D.J., Op. by McLaughlin). Inthis opinion, the Court considered the imposition of special conditions of supervised release relating to the defendant’s finances where the defendant was not convicted of a financial crime, and where no fine or restitution was imposed. It upheld a condition requiring the defendant provide his probation officer with any requested financial information, but vacated one prohibiting him from incurring any new debts without the officer’s permission.
Facts: In November of 2003, Kenneth Brown pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine. His presentence report revealed that he had sustained drug-related convictions in 1995, 1997, 1998 and 2001. In addition, his employment history between 1996 and 2001 was “sparse, sporadic, and could not be verified.” Brown was sentenced in May of 2004 to 70 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. The court imposed neither a fine nor restitution, but did impose the mandatory $100 special assessment, which was to be paid through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. It also imposed several special conditions of supervised release that had not been recommended by the Probation Department. The two at issue on appeal were that Brown provide the Probation Department with “access to any requested personal and/or business financial information” (the “financial information condition”) and that he obtain approval from the Probation Office before incurring “any form of debt, including, but not limited to, use of existing credit cards, new credit cards, lines of credit, mortgages or private loans” (the “no-new-debts condition”).
The Court of Appeals’ Decision: The Court upheld the financial information condition but vacated the no-new-debts condition.
Covering well-trod ground, the Court began by observing that special conditions of supervised release are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and that such conditions must be “reasonably related” to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence to protect the public, afford adequate deterrence, and address the defendant’s rehabilitative needs. In addition, a special condition must involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve those ends.
Under these standards, the Court upheld the financial information condition, even though it was not necessary to ensure the payment of a fine or restitution. Brown’s “criminal record and sparse employment history” demonstrated a proclivity to support himself through criminal activity and thus the financial monitoring condition would be an “effective tool to ensure that [he] did not return to drug dealing after his release from prison.”
Brown fared somewhat better with respect to the no-new-debts condition. The Court first observed that there was no “readily apparent” connection between Brown’s offense and the condition, since the offense did not involve the incursion of debt and he was not in debt to any large degree. Similarly, the Court did not believe that the condition would deter future criminal conduct, protect the public or assist in Brown’s rehabilitation. The Court also found that it was a greater restriction on Brown’s liberty than was reasonably necessary. Since he was indigent, the use of credit cards or other forms of credit might be “necessary to facilitate his reintegration into society” after prison. While the government had argued that the condition would guard against the possibility that Brown could accumulate excessive debt, which could make him more susceptible to relapsing into criminal behavior, the Court rejected this, remarking that this justification would render “a bar on debt accumulation … appropriate in almost every case.”
Although the Court vacated the no-new-debts condition, it did not strike it from the judgment. Since neither Brown nor the government had notice that the district court was going to impose such a condition, the Court was concerned that the record was not fully developed as to this issue. It therefore remanded the case for further findings with instructions to either “enter a more tailored condition regarding debt accumulation, or drop the condition entirely.”