Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog


Friday, June 21st, 2019

A SCOTUS plurality holds that Congress authorizing the U.S. Attorney General  “to specify the applicability” of  SORNA’s registration requirements to people convicted before SORNA was enacted (in 2006), is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority under Article I, § 1 of the Constitution.

Yesterday, in Gundy v. United States, Sup. Ct. No. 17-6086, 2019 WL 2527473 (June 20, 2019), a case out of the Second Circuit, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) — which authorizes the U.S. Attorney General “to specify the applicability” of the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) to people convicted before the statute’s enactment (in 2006) — is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

The lead opinion was written by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. See Opinion (“Op.”) at 1-18. Justice Alito filed a short, one-page, opinion “concurring in the judgment.” Concurrence, Alito, J., at 1. And Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Dissent, Gorsuch, J., at 1-33. Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the decision since he was not on the …


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Categories: delegation, Sex offender registration

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Favorable decision in a First Step Act case, concerning the defendant’s eligibility for relief and the nature of the proceeding under the Act: United States v. Rose, No. 03-CR-1501, _F.3d_, 2019 WL 2314479 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2019)

Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018,  Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018),  empowers district courts to “impose a reduced sentence” on people who were convicted of certain cocaine base (crack cocaine) offenses before August 3, 2010, when the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was enacted. It makes retroactive — to defendants sentenced before August 3, 2010 — the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act that raised from 50 to 280 grams, the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the enhanced penalties of § 841(b)(1)(A); and raised from 5 grams to 28 grams the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the enhanced penalties of § 841(b)(1)(B).

The two movants in  United States v. Rose, No 03-CR-1501,  __F.3d__,   2019 WL 2314479 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2019) (VEC), had been convicted at a trial, in 2005, of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack …


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Categories: fair sentencing act, First Step Act of 2018

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Tuesday, June 18th, 2019

Supreme Court declines to overturn the dual sovereignty doctrine

In Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646, decided on June 17, 2019, the Supreme Court declined to overturn its “dual-sovereignty” doctrine — in the face of a Double Jeopardy challenge — in a 7-2 decision written by Justice Alito. Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646, 2019 WL 2493923 (June 17, 2019).

Terance Gamble was convicted in Alabama under the state’s felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm statute, after local police found a gun in his car during a traffic stop. He was sentenced to 1 year in prison (10 years’ imprisonment with all but 1 year suspended). He then was subjected to a second prosecution for the same conduct “by the United States under its own felon-in-possession law. ” Op. at 1. After Gamble’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was denied, he pleaded guilty to the federal offense and was sentenced to 4 years in federal prison. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed …

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Monday, June 17th, 2019

En banc Sixth Circuit Holds That Guidelines “Controlled Substance Offenses” Do Not Include Attempts

In United States v. Havis, the en banc Sixth Circuit held, unanimously, that a Tennessee state offense criminalizing the attempted delivery of a controlled substance was not a “controlled substance offense,” for purposes of U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1 and 4B1.2. ___ F.3d ___, 2019 WL 2376070 (6th Cir. June 6, 2019) (en banc). Overruling prior Circuit precedent, the Court explained that attempts appear only in Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2(b), not in the text of the Guideline itself. Consequently, the inclusion of attempts was not an interpretation of § 4B1.2(b)’s text, to which deference would be owed under Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), but rather an addition to § 4B1.2(b)’s text, due no deference at all:

To make attempt crimes a part of § 4B1.2(b), the Commission did not interpret a term in the guideline itself—no term in § 4B1.2(b) would bear that …

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Friday, June 14th, 2019

Second Circuit defines when it is illegal for an immigrant to possess a firearm

On June 13, 2019, the Second Circuit affirmed the gun possession conviction in US v. Balde.

The story of this case began in 2006, when Mr. Balde’s temporary permission to be in the United States legally was revoked while he was visiting his mother in Guinea during her final illness. He returned by way of JFK airport, where he was informed for the first time that his legal status had been cancelled. He was detained, and the government, alleging that he was inadmissible, initiated removal proceedings. Eventually he was ordered removed, but was then released while he challenged his removal.

To make a long story short, in 2015, over seven years after he received a final order of removal, Mr. Balde was involved in a fight in a Bronx delicatessen and allegedly pulled out a gun. He pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by …

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Supreme Court issues a new ruling on the definition of generic burglary

In Quarles v. United States, decided on June 10, 2019, a unanimous Supreme Court held that “remaining-in” burglary qualifies as a crime of violence for ACCA purposes even if the defendant does not form the intent to commit a crime in the building or structure until sometime after the unlawful remaining commences.

The petitioner contended that his Michigan conviction for “home invasion” did not constitute a predicate crime of violence under ACCA (18 USC § 924(e)). ACCA defines a crime of violence to include “burglary.” Under the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Taylor v. United States, 495 US 575, the generic statutory term “burglary” means any offense that involves the unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure with intent to commit a crime therein. The issue in Quarles was whether remaining-in burglary occurs only if a person has the intent to commit a …


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Categories: ACCA, burglary, crime of violence

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The Second Circuit has withdrawn its opinion in Thompson v. Barr

On May 30, 2019, the Second Circuit withdrew the per curiam opinion in Thompson v. Barr, #17-3494, that was issued on May 13. The opinion found that NY assault in the second degree (NYPL § 120.05(1)) is an aggravated felony crime of violence for immigration purposes under the force clause of 18 USC § 16(a).

The panel opinion in Thompson did not discuss whether the fact that a crime can be committed by omission as well as by commission affects whether that offense “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” 18 USC § 16(a). The pro se petitioner did not raise that issue, and it is pending before the Second Circuit in US v. Scott, #18-163 (argued Jan. 10, 2019). This probably accounts for the decision to withdraw the Thompson opinion.…


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Categories: crime of violence, immigration

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Friday, June 7th, 2019

Let’s wait a bit on the non-delegation argument …

The Circuit today affirmed the defendant’s conviction in United States v. Michael O’Brien, which principally rejects, on fact-specific credibility grounds, his 4th and 5th Amendment arguments concerning Miranda and an alleged consent to search. Judge Kearse’s typically thorough opinion lays out the details; no legal ground is broken.

The only issue of note is the Court’s rejection of O’Brien’s additional claim that the substance he was accused of distributing — methylone (a.k.a. Molly) — was improperly placed on the federal list of controlled substances. O’Brien argues that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power by authorizing the Attorney General (who in turn re- or sub-delegated that authority to the D.E.A.) to determine whether a substance belongs on the federal schedule of controlled substances.

Judge Kearse rejected this argument on procedural and substantive grounds. First, it was untimely because he did not make this argument until after he was convicted. …

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Monday, June 3rd, 2019

Pretrial detention later credited against a term of imprisonment imposed upon conviction tolls period of supervised release under § 3624(e)

Section 3624(e) of Title 18 of the U.S.C. provides that “[a] term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days.” The question sometimes arises as to whether pretrial detention similarly tolls the term of supervised release. Although pretrial detention is not, on first look, a “period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction” for a crime, things look murkier when considered retrospectively. This is because courts often, upon the defendant’s subsequent conviction for the offense for which he was detained pretrial, credit that period of detention against the term of imprisonment ultimately imposed. Indeed, § 3585(b) requires such credit in federal cases.

Today the Supreme Court ruled in Mont v. United States, Sup. Ct. …

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Supreme Court to decide whether plain-error review applies when defendant does not object to sentence as substantively unreasonable at sentencing

Today the Supreme Court granted cert. in Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, S. Ct. No. 18-7739, to resolve the earth-shattering question of whether plain-error review applies to an appellate claim of substantive unreasonableness (i.e., “The sentence is too damn long!”) when defense counsel did not object to the sentence’s unreasonableness at sentencing. The case comes out of the 5th Circuit, the only Circuit to apply plain-error review in this situation. Eight Circuits have held that a post-sentence objection is not required to invoke regular ol’ “substantive reasonableness” review (i.e., abuse of discretion review) on appeal. The Second Circuit has dodged this question, concluding every time that it need not resolve the issue because the challenged sentence is proper even under ordinary reasonableness review. See, e.g., United States v. Nesbitt, 757 F. App’x 13, 14 (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2018).

 

As we breathlessly await The Nine’s …


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Categories: plain error, Rule 52, substantive reasonableness

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Thursday, May 23rd, 2019

The New Go-To Ruling on Insufficient Evidence

Oh, insufficient evidence– so hard to show in district court after a jury convicts, harder still on appeal with all the “deference” shown to the government.  Yet both were done in United States v. Pauling, where the government sought an enhanced charge and punishment based on five words spoken by neither the defendant nor his co-conspirator.

John Pauling was alleged to have agreed with a supplier named “Low” to sell 100 grams of heroin.  There was proof as to 89 grams, but the government needed 11 more.  So it offered the jury a wiretapped call between Pauling and some guy named “Steve” in which Steve said he wanted “same thing as last time” and referenced the “14th floor.”  The government argued that meant Pauling would get 14 more grams of heroin from Low and sell them to Steve, which would put the total of the Pauling-Low conspiracy over 100 …

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