Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog


Wednesday, August 19th, 2020

Circuit Reverses Convictions For Aiding And Abetting VICAR Murder For Insufficient Evidence

In United States v. Anastasio, the Circuit (Carney, joined by Jacobs and Pooler), reversed two convictions for aiding and abetting VICAR murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), for insufficient evidence. Specifically, the Circuit held that Anastasio undertook no affirmative act that facilitated the murders; he had merely been in the company of the murderers, without offering any assistance, before and after (but not during) the shootings.

Anastasio was a member of the 10th Street Gang in Buffalo. Members of a rival gang shot and injured the brother of a 10th Street member, Delgado. Later that day, 10th Streeters, including Anastasio, beat someone they believed belonged to the rival gang. Still later that day, 10th Streeters, again including Anastasio, met at an apartment to discuss further retaliation. Delgado told those present of his plan to shoot at members of the rival gang and instructed everyone present to find guns. Several did …


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Categories: aiding and abetting, Batson, RICO

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Circuit Vacates LWOP Sentence Based On Inadequate Consideration Of Juvenile Offender’s Age

In United States v. Delgado, the Circuit (Pooler, joined by Jacobs and Carney) vacated a life sentence imposed on a 17-year-old convicted of two murders, on the ground that the district court had failed to give the requisite consideration to the defendant’s age, as required by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).

Delgado was a gang member in Buffalo. A rival gang shot and injured Delgado’s brother. In retaliation, Delgado attacked members of the rival gang, but wound up shooting and killing two bystanders instead. He was 17 at the time. After a jury trial, Delgado was convicted of multiple offenses arising from his long-term gang membership, including RICO conspiracy (predicated in part on the murders), drug conspiracy, and § 924(c). The district court (Arcara, WDNY) sentenced him to life.

The Circuit vacated the life sentence. The …

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Categories: 3553(a), 924(c), Batson, bruton, RICO

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Categories: 3553(a), 924(c), Batson, bruton, RICO

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Thursday, August 6th, 2020

Rehaif claim cannot be brought in second or successive § 2255 motion because the decision involved statutory interpretation and did not render a “constitutional” rule as required by AEDPA’s gatekeeping provision.

In Mata v. United States, 2d Cir. No. 20-1875, a panel of the Court (Park, Nardini, and Menashi) held in a per curiam opinion that federal prisoners cannot rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct 2191 (2019), to challenge their underlying conviction or sentence in a second or successive § 2255 motion. This is so because while § 2255(h)(2) requires that a successive motion be based on (among other things) “a new rule of constitutional law,” Rehaif’s holding – that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) requires proof that the defendant knew that s/he fell within a relevant class barred from possessing a gun – was a matter of statutory interpretation and not based on the Constitution.…

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Categories: 2255, Rehaif

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Categories: 2255, Rehaif

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Tuesday, August 4th, 2020

District court erred in relying on uncharged conduct to select the applicable Guideline provision, and the error is not harmless despite the court’s claim that it would have imposed the same sentence under the correct Guideline.

In United States v. Huberfeld, 2d Cir. No. 19-436 (L), the Court (opinion by Judge Pooler, joined by Judges Lynch and Menashi) vacated both a 30-month sentence and a $19 million order of restitution for basically the same reason – the district court erred in relying on uncharged criminal conduct, beyond and broader than what the defendant actually pleaded guilty to via a negotiated information and plea agreement, in selecting the applicable Guideline provision and awarding restitution. The Court also found that the Guideline-selection error is not harmless, despite the district court’s claim that it would’ve imposed the same 30-month sentence under the correct Guideline, because under the circumstances here, the Court was not “confident” that the incorrect range did not “clearly” affect the court’s selection of the ultimate sentence.

Here’s the factual gist. Huberfeld solicited investments for Platinum Partners, a hedge fund. He spoke to co-conspirator Jona Rechnitz, …


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Categories: bribery, guideline, restitution, Uncategorized

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Wednesday, July 29th, 2020

Second Circuit: 31-Day Delay In Seeking Warrant To Search Seized Tablet Computer Violates Fourth Amendment, But Suppression Not Warranted Because Delay Resulted From Mere “Isolated Negligence.”

In United States v. Smith, the Circuit (Meyer, D. Conn., joined by Katzmann and Kearse), the Circuit held that police violated the Fourth Amendment by waiting 31 days before seeking a warrant to search a seized tablet computer, but declined to apply the exclusionary rule because the error was due to “isolated negligence,” and because existing precedent would not have told an objectively reasonable police officer that the delay was unreasonable.

Police encountered Smith, drunk to the point of unconsciousness, in his car on the side of the road in a rural area of upstate New York. After removing Smith from the car, and while searching the car for identification, an officer observed a tablet computer on the front passenger seat displaying what appeared to be child pornography. The officer arrested Smith for DUI and seized the tablet. Smith was released and refused consent to search the tablet. However, …


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Categories: child pornography, Exclusionary Rule, Fourth Amendment

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Wednesday, July 22nd, 2020

Flawed “Interested Witness” Instruction Requires New Trial

In United States v. Solano, the Circuit (Kearse, joined by Calabresi and Carney) held that the district court’s interested witness instruction—namely, that “any” witness with “an interest in the outcome” of the trial had “a motive to testify falsely”—was plain error requiring vacatur of the conviction, because the defendant had testified and the instruction violated the presumption of innocence. Mr. Solano was represented on appeal by our own Daniel Habib.

Solano, a commercial truck driver, was arrested after picking up and delivering a sealed shipping container that had held cocaine and was now under surveillance. He was charged with attempting to distribute a controlled substance. At trial, the sole disputed issue was knowledge. The government’s principal proof came from three law enforcement officers who testified that, in a post-arrest interview, Solano had confessed knowledge. Solano, for his part, testified that he did not know that the container had held …

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Categories: jury instructions

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Categories: jury instructions

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Tuesday, July 21st, 2020

Circuit Will Decide En Banc Whether New York First-Degree Manslaughter Is a “Violent Felony” and “Crime of Violence.”

In United States v. Scott, 954 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2020), a divided panel held that New York first-degree manslaughter is neither a predicate “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act nor a “crime of violence” under the Career Offender Guideline because it can be committed by complete inaction and therefore without the use of force, as defined in Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). The panel also held that New York first-degree manslaughter does not match any of the generic offenses enumerated in the Career Offender Guideline.

On July 10, 2020, the Circuit granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc. No briefing schedule has yet been issued. Stay tuned.…


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Categories: career offender, crime of violence, violent felony

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Monday, July 20th, 2020

Circuit Affirms Conviction on Charges Relating to Scheme to Evade U.S. Sanctions Against Iran; Instructional Error Regarding IEEPA Was Harmless.

Does the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) impose criminal liability for evading or avoiding the imposition of sanctions not yet in place, or only existing prohibitions already imposed? In United States v. Atilla, No. 18-1589 (2d Cir. July 20, 2020) (Pooler, Hall, and Sullivan), the Circuit agreed with the defendant that the latter, narrower construction is correct and that the district court mischarged the jury on this issue. But the Court held the error harmless because “the jury was properly instructed on an alternative theory of liability for which the evidence was overwhelming.”

Atilla, a Turkish national and former Deputy General Manager of Turkey’s state-owned bank, was convicted on charged relating to a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions against Iran. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the IEEPA, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the …

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Friday, July 17th, 2020

Second Circuit grants suppression motion and holds that reasonable suspicion for stop was not established by defendant’s match to suspect’s race, even in combination with other factors, because a description based primarily on race is not particularized enough to guard against police overreach or harassment.

In United States v. Walker (No. 18-3729), __ F.3d __, 2020 WL 3966958 (2d Cir. July 14, 2020), the Second Circuit, in a decision by Judge Pooler (joined by Judges Calabresi and Carney), reversed the district court’s denial of Jaquan Walker’s suppression motion, holding that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Walker based on his purported match to a photograph because the police lacked “little meaningful identifying information” besides the race of the suspect, and even the additional details of “medium-to-dark skin tone, glasses, facial hair, and long hair,” did not suffice to constitute specific, articulable facts upon which to base the stop. In addition, the court held that the search of Walker, which yielded drugs and incriminating statements, was insufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional stop, despite the subsequent police discovery of an unrelated arrest warrant for Walker. Given that the justification for the stop fell “woefully short …


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Categories: Fourth Amendment, reasonable suspicion, terry stop

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Thursday, July 9th, 2020

Glimmer of Hope for Challenging pre-Rehaif Guilty Pleas to § 922(g)(1)?

In “a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) [], the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”  Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019).

The most common § 922(g) offense is gun possession by someone “who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”  § 922(g)(1).  Rehaif requires such a person to have known — when he possessed the gun — that he had previously been convicted of such a crime.

In United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2019), the Second Circuit held someone wishing to challenge his pre-Rehaif guilty plea must show a “reasonable probability that . . . [he] would not have entered the plea” if he …

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Categories: Rehaif

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Wednesday, July 8th, 2020

Supreme Court REALLY Keeps the Faith

Monday’s post, titled Supreme Court Keeps the Faith, discussed the Court’s distaste for “faithless electors.”

In two 7-2 rulings today, the Court took its distaste for the faithless to a new level, ruling labor and health laws largely do not apply to religious organizations.

In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, two teachers sued the Catholic schools that fired them.  One teacher said she was fired because she’d asked for a leave of absence to treat her breast cancer (she later died); the other said she was fired for being too old.  In neither case did the school cite a religious reason for the firings (the reasons were, respectively, an unspecified failure to follow the curriculum and keep classroom order, and difficulty administering a reading and writing program).  Though the teachers were not nuns or religious instructors (or, for one teacher, even Catholic), their duties included conveying …

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Categories: Supreme Court

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