United States v. Ivezaj, No. 06-3112-cr (2d Cir. June 11, 2009) (Feinberg, Miner, Parker, CJJ)
Six defendants were convicted of racketeering and related offenses arising from their efforts to break the hold that New York City’s traditional organized crime families had on illegal gambling.
The primary challenge on appeal concerned two RICO predicate acts that alleged violations of New York state’s extortion statute. In New York, extortion involves compelling another person to “deliver … property” to himself or a third person through fear of a future injury. “Property” is any personal property or “article, substance or thing of value … which is provided for a charge or compensation.” The defendants argued that control over illegal intangible property such as a gambling operation was not “property” and could not be “delivered.”
The circuit disagreed. Surveying New York case law, the court first concluded that the state recognizes that intangible property – for example, a tenant’s right to occupy an apartment – is covered by the extortion statute. New York courts have also held that “illegal tangible goods,” such as narcotics, can constitute “property.” From those two propositions, the circuit readily concluded that illegal intangibles are also “property” under New York law.
The circuit’s own Hobbs Act jurisprudence bolstered this conclusion. Indeed, the court in 2006 held that “intangible property rights can qualify as extortable property under the Hobbs Act,” whether legal or not.
The court characterized the defendants’ claim that control over an illegal gambling business could not be “obtain[ed]” or “deliver[ed]” as “imaginative but overly literal,” since New York courts have already held that intangible property rights can be extorted.
Relatedly, the defendants also claimed that one of their beating victims was not a “victim” of the inchoate extortion offense, since he was not an “owner” of the extorted property. The court held that, since the defendants were charged with attempt and conspiracy offenses, it was sufficient that the defendants thought he was an owner.
Finally, the defendants challenged their § 924(c) convictions, which related back to the substantive racketeering count, arguing that racketeering did not constitute a “crime of violence.” Applying the traditional “categorical approach” to both the racketeering statute and the statutes underlying the predicate acts, the court disagreed. “[W]here the government proves (1) the commission of at least two acts of racketeering and (2) at least two of those acts qualify as ‘crime[s] of violence’ under § 924(c),” a racketeering conviction serves as a predicate for a § 924(c) conviction.
Finally, the court tackled an open Guidelines question in racketeering cases. One defendant challenged his aggravating role enhancement on the ground that the district court should have looked only to the conduct alleged in the charged RICO predicates, and not to his role in the enterprise as a whole. The circuit disagreed, adopting the reasoning of a Seventh circuit case. In racketeering prosecutions, role adjustments function just as they do in any other prosecution: the sentencing court is to look to the count of conviction and all relevant conduct.