Archive | speedy trial

Today the Second Circuit ordered that a defendant’s indictment be dismissed with prejudice because his 6th Amendment speedy trial right was violated. The opinion in United States v. Tigano, 15-3073 (2d Cir. 2018) (Winter, Walker, Pooler), available here, is a case study in “poor trial management,” slip op at 5, and the improper use of competency hearings. (Like the Circuit’s other recent speedy trial decision, Tigano arises out of the Western District of New York.) The opinion also raises fascinating questions about the tensions that can arise between the imperatives to respect a defendant’s autonomy and act in what a lawyer believes to be the defendant’s strategic interest. In doing so, the opinion offers cautionary lessons for the government and defense counsel alike.

Mr. Tigano and his father were indicted in July 2008 as co-defendants on drug and weapons charges. He was then subjected to nearly seven …

Sentencing Resource Counsel Ada (“Sissy”) Phleger has the details, including as to the practical relevance of the case:

On Monday, the Supreme Court granted-vacated-and-remanded a case involving the Speedy Trial Act, White v. United States (17-270), in light of the Solicitor General’s confession of error. While the Government’s confession blocked merits review in Mr. White’s particular case, its arguments can be useful to others who encounter the issue (particularly in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits).

The Sixth Circuit had rejected Petitioner Jimmie White’s Speedy Trial Act claim which turned on how to treat the time spent in ultimately unsuccessful plea negotiations. Mr. White sought cert, presenting the following question:

Whether, under the Speedy Trial Act, time engaged in a plea negotiation that does not result in a finalized plea agreement is automatically excludable as “other proceedings concerning the defendant” under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1), as four circuits hold;

Today the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal with prejudice of two drug-related counts on constitutional speedy trial grounds. In U.S. v. Pennick, the government appealed a Western District judge’s order dismissing these counts after a six-and-a-half year delay between when the defendant was charged and when his trial began. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Circuit rejected the government’s challenge. The summary order, available here, is particularly valuable to practitioners seeking to raise speedy trial claims that are messy, but nonetheless meritorious.

The Circuit held that the district court appropriately balanced the four factors established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to assess whether a constitutional speedy trial violation has occurred. These factors are: (1) the length of the delay before the defendant was brought to trial, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his speedy trial right in advance of …