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Tuesday, December 3rd, 2024

Circuit vacates supervised release revocation sentence.

In United States v. Jose Ramos, No. 23-6723 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2024), the Circuit vacates a significantly above Guidelines sentence imposed for the defendant’s violations of supervised release.

There is a lot going on in Ramos, including apparent factual and legal errors related to the defendant’s original underlying sentence. And numerous alleged supervised release violations.

As relevant here, the defendant admitted some low-level violations (petit larceny and failing to inform his probation officer of an address change). The Sentencing Guidelines recommended between 8 to 14 months for these violations. But the district court sentenced Ramos to 5 years in prison.

The Circuit held this sentence procedurally unreasonable: The district court failed to adequately explain its basis for imposing this above-Guidelines sentence. In addition, the record left open the possibility that the district court had improperly relied on unproven conduct in imposing this sentence. As a result, the …

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Friday, November 22nd, 2024

Second Circuit affirms above-Guidelines sentence, finding sufficient context and reliability for both ambiguous video and pending state indictment

In United States v. Chatman, No. 23-7895, a panel of the Second Circuit (Kearse, Sullivan, Robinson, JJ.) summarily affirmed an above-Guidelines sentence for Talmage Chatman, finding no error in the district court’s application of a four-level enhancement based on a video of Mr. Chatman firing the gun or in the district court’s consideration of a pending state indictment in pronouncing sentence.

The district court applied a four-level enhancement by determining that Mr. Chatman was committing another felony (attempted assault) while unlawfully possessing ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). It based that finding on a video showed Mr. Chatman firing a weapon while walking down a street, though no other individuals or targets were depicted. Thereafter, the district court considered the fact that Mr. Chatman had been arrested and indicted for a state-law narcotics violation while his federal case was pending, though the state case remained open. Although the parties …

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Categories: 922(g), sentencing, sentencing findings

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Wednesday, May 8th, 2024

A district court may not base its sentence on a disagreement with the categorical approach.

In United States v. Marcus Odom, No. 23-6105 (2d Cir. May 8, 2024) (summary order), the Second Circuit upheld the defendant’s challenged prison sentence, while also opining that a sentencing court may not increase a prison sentence based on its disagreement with the so-called “categorical” approach.

Odom’s case was before the district court for resentencing as a result of United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), applying the well-established “categorical” approach. Odom had originally pled guilty to attempted Hobbs Act robbery and a violation of § 924(c) but, following Taylor, his § 924(c) conviction was vacated. He was resentenced on the attempted Hobbs Act robbery alone.

Some judges have complained about the categorical approach and Odom’s district judge is apparently among them. At the …

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Thursday, December 7th, 2023

Circuit Vacates Two Supervised Release Conditions

In United States v. Rodriguez, No. 22-1820-cr (2d. Cir. Dec. 7, 2023) (summary order), the Circuit (Kearse, Calabresi, and Nathan) vacated two drug- and alcohol-related special conditions on plain error review.

At sentencing, the district court imposed a condition requiring Rodriguez to undergo drug treatment evaluation, and “if deemed necessary,” attend outpatient drug treatment. The written judgment, however, imposed an unconditional drug treatment requirement, without the evaluation component. The Court vacated the written condition due to its conflict with the district court’s oral pronouncement at sentencing, which “ordinarily controls”; “a defendant must be present at pronouncement of sentence.” It remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the oral sentence.

The district court also imposed a condition that Rodriguez abstain from alcohol during the aforementioned treatment. While the government agreed that the treatment condition should be vacated unless an evaluation deemed it necessary, it argued that the alcohol provision could …

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Friday, March 3rd, 2023

Circuit orders resentencing in light of statements that created a risk of the appearance that a defendant’s nationality impacted his sentence.

In United States v. Vasquez-Drew, No. 20-2195-cr (2d Cir. March 2, 2023) (summary order), the Second Circuit ordered the defendant resentenced before a new district judge because certain remarks the original judge made at sentencing created a “risk that a reasonable observer … ‘might infer, however incorrectly’ that Vasquez’s nationality played a role in determining his sentence.”

In sentencing the defendant, a Bolivian national, the district court (Cote, J.) stated that the sentence was “motivated by concerns about appropriate punishment, but also general deterrence,” and that it was “important” “that the people in Bolivia understand the kind of sentences that are potentially imposed here from engagement in activity to send cocaine into America.”

This decision follows an interesting and wide-ranging oral argument available here and previewed here.

Ultimately, the Circuit’s short summary order hewed closely to precedent: “[E]ven the appearance that the sentence reflects a defendant’s race or …

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Monday, February 27th, 2023

The Second Circuit Grants Panel Rehearing in Gibson to Reject the Government’s Request to Recast its Holding as Dicta

In United States v. Gibson, 55 F.4th 153 (2d Cir. 2022), the Second Circuit held that the defendant’s 2002 New York state conviction for attempted third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance was not a “controlled substance” offense under the career offender Sentencing Guideline because the New York drug schedules in 2002 included naloxegel, which had been removed from the federal schedules in 2015, making the New York offense categorically broader than the federal controlled substance offense when Gibson was sentenced in 2020. The government had conceded that the New York 2002 schedule was broader than the current federal schedule, but argued that the comparison should be between the New York and federal schedules in 2002. The Circuit rejected that argument. See December 8, 2022, Blog post.

The government (W.D.N.Y.) sought panel rehearing, asking the Court to issue an amended opinion stating that this holding was actually dicta. …

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Supreme Court to review the scope of the expanded “safety valve.”

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pulsifer v. United States, No. 22-340, to clarify the First Step Act’s expansion of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)’s “safety valve.”

Section 3553(f) permits a district court to sentence a defendant below the otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum for federal drug offenses if the defendant meets certain criteria. The 2018 First Step Act expanded this provision.

As relevant here, to be eligible for the safety valve, a defendant must have a limited number of criminal history points. The defendant must “not have–

(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from
a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and

(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines ….”

The “and” has been a source of confusion.

Several circuits hold the “and” …

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Argument preview: Second Circuit appoints amicus to defend sentence apparently based on defendant’s national origin.

“It has long been settled in this Circuit” that “national origin and naturalized status” cannot be “the basis for determining” a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Arslanouk, 853 F. App’x 714, 720 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Kaba, 480 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007)). The Circuit is thus “compelled” to order resentencing where a district court’s reference to “deter[ring] others sharing that national origin” “create[s] an improper appearance that a defendant’s national origin or immigration status might be driving the choice of sentence.” Id. at 721 (ordering resentencing where district court said sentence would send a “message” that “Russian organized crime that seeks to come to the shores of the United States … will be dealt with, with the power of our criminal justice system”).

In United States v. Vasquez-Drew, No. 20-2195-cr, the district court (Cote, J.) sentenced the defendant, a Bolivian national, to …

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Wednesday, May 27th, 2020

Second Circuit defines “altered” serial number on a firearm for purposes of the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B) to mean that at least one serial number on the firearm is illegible to the naked eye.

In United States v. St. Hilaire, __F.3d__, 2020 WL 2563112 (2d Cir. May 21, 2020), the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Jacobs (joined by Judges Calabresi and Chin), for the first time addressed the meaning of the four-level sentencing guideline enhancement for possessing a firearm with “an altered or obliterated serial number,” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). Looking to the rulings of other Circuits, the Second Circuit ruled on two distinct issues pertaining to the enhancement. First, the Court concluded that although a gun may have its serial number on multiple locations, the enhancement applies even if the serial number is “altered or obliterated” in only one of multiple locations. Second, the Court held that for a serial number to be deemed “altered,” the number must be illegible to the naked eye and not merely defaced. The Court affirmed the application of the enhancement in this case based …

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Categories: 922(g), firearms, sentencing

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Tuesday, February 11th, 2020

Second Circuit Rules That No Statement of Reasons Is Required For a VOSR Sentence.

In United States v. Smith, __ F.3d __ , 2020 WL 521612 (Feb. 3, 2020) (Wesley, Chin, Sullivan), the Court of Appeals held that no Statement of Reasons (“SOR”) need be filed for a sentence imposed in a VOSR, even if it is above the Guidelines range, because the Sentencing Commission has not provided an SOR form for a VOSR. The Court overruled its prior precedent holding that a Statement of Reasons was required for a VOSR sentence, e.g. United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 251-52 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Sindima, 488 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2007), after a “mini-en banc” procedure of circulating the opinion to all active members of the Court. The Second Circuit reasoned that the prior rule was based on an earlier version of the 18 U.S.C. §3553(c)(2) which was amended in 2010. Unlike the former statute, which required …

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Wednesday, December 11th, 2019

The Second Circuit issues an amended opinion in United States v. Pugh, No. 17-1889-cr, __F.3d__, 2019 WL 6708812 (Dec. 10, 2019) (“Pugh II”), a material support to terrorism case. As in the initial opinion — that was discussed in this blog on Sept. 3, 2019 — the Circuit affirms the convictions, but vacates consecutive prison sentences (totaling 420 months) as procedurally unreasonable because of the inadequate statement of reasons for the sentences.

Yesterday, the Circuit issued an amended opinion in United States v. Pugh. The initial decision issued on August 29, 2019 (United States v. Pugh, 937 F.3d 108) and was discussed in this blog. See infra, posting of Sept. 3, 2019.

The Amended Opinion reaches the same results as the initial opinion. The Circuit  (1) rules against the defendant on the marital communications privilege, Pugh II, 2019 WL 6708812 at *2-*4 ; (2) finds sufficient evidence of an “attempt” to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)), id. at *4-*6; and (3) finds sufficient evidence of obstruction and attempted obstruction of an “official proceeding” (18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(1),  (c)(2)), id. at *6-*7 ; but (4) vacates consecutive sentences totaling 420 months’ imprisonment because of the inadequacy of the Judge’s explanation for the consecutive sentences. Id. at *8-*12.

The Amended Opinion corrected …

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Categories: 3553(c), evidence, marital communications privilege, Material Support, material support statute, obstruction of justice, official proceeding, sentencing, sentencing allocution, terrorism

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