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Author Archive | Edward S. Zas

Friday, June 11th, 2021

Circuit Affirms Grant of Habeas Relief Based on Clear Confrontation Clause Violation.

In Garlick v. Lee, No. 20-1796, the Circuit (Wesley, Sullivan, and Menashi) upheld Chief Judge Colleen McMahon’s decision to grant a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Garlick was convicted in state court of first-degree manslaughter. At trial, an autopsy report—prepared at the request of law enforcement during an active homicide investigation—was admitted into evidence over Garlick’s objection through a witness who had not participated in the autopsy or the preparation of the autopsy report. On appeal, the First Department affirmed the conviction, concluding that Garlick’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was not violated because the autopsy report did not link the commission of the crime to Garlick and therefore was not “testimonial.”

On collateral review, the district court granted Garlick’s § 2254 petition because the First Department’s decision was an “unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”

The Second Circuit affirmed. Judge Menashi’s opinion …

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Categories: habeas corpus, manslaughter

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Categories: habeas corpus, manslaughter

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Thursday, June 10th, 2021

Supreme Court holds that a crime with a mens rea of recklessness is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Today’s big legal news is Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. __ (2021), in which the Supreme Court held that a criminal offense with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).

Borden pleaded guilty as a felon-in-possession of a firearm. The prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, which mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for persons found guilty of illegally possessing a firearm who have three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony.” An offense qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause if it necessarily involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). One of Borden’s three predicate convictions was for reckless aggravated assault in violation of Tennessee law. He argued that this offense was not a violent felony under the …

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Categories: ACCA, mens rea, violent felony

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Categories: ACCA, mens rea, violent felony

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Wednesday, June 9th, 2021

Scheme to Bribe Basketball Coaches Fouls Out.

In United States v. Dawkins, No. 19-3623(L) (2d Cir. June 4, 2021) (Raggi, Sullivan, and Nardini), the Circuit affirmed the defendants’ convictions arising from a scheme to bribe college basketball coaches, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). As relevant, Section 666 makes it a crime to bribe “an agent of an organization … in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization … involving anything of value of $5,000 or more,” provided that “the organization … receives, in any one[-]year period, [federal] benefits in excess of $10,000.”

The defendants argued on appeal, among other things, that this statute requires (1) a “nexus” between the “agent” to be bribed and the federal funds received by his or her organization; and (2) evidence that the “business” of a federally funded organization, to which the bribery scheme is connected, be commercial in nature.

The Circuit rejected both …

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Categories: bribery

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Tuesday, June 8th, 2021

Government Did Not Act Unconstitutionally or in Bad Faith by Refusing to Make “Substantial Assistance” Motion Under § 3553(e).

In United States v. Trimm, No. 20-2264 (2d Cir. June 2, 2021) (per curiam) (Livingston, Jacobs, and Menashi), the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that the government’s refusal to make a “substantial assistance” motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) was unconstitutional and motivated by bad faith. Accordingly, the Court vacated the defendant’s sentence and, to preserve the appearance of justice, remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Trimm pleaded guilty to conspiracy to use a minor to produce child pornography. Trimm also agreed to assist the government in securing the conviction of her co-conspirator. The agreement vested in the government sole discretion to determine whether and how to credit Trimm’s cooperation, including whether to file a “substantial assistance” motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, § 3553(e), or both.

After evaluating Trimm’s assistance, the government decided to make a motion under …

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Categories: 3553(a)

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Thursday, April 22nd, 2021

Second Circuit Holds that Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery Is a § 924(c) “Crime of Violence.”

The Circuit ruled today in United States v. McCoy, No. 17‑1315(L) (Kearse, Parker, and Sullivan, JJ.), that the crime of attempting to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), remains a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), even after United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). The Circuit had previously held that a completed Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence,” United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018), but that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not, United States v. Barrett, 927 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019).

In McCoy, the Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that attempted Hobbs Act robbery, like conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, does not qualify as a “crime of violence” because it does not necessarily have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened …

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Categories: crime of violence, Davis, Hobbs Act

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Categories: crime of violence, Davis, Hobbs Act

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Monday, April 19th, 2021

Supreme Court Grants Review to Clarify Rules Governing Forfeiture or Waiver of Constitutional Right to Confront Witnesses

The Supreme Court granted certiorari today in Hemphill v. New York (No. 20-637), to resolve the following question: “Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant who opens the door to responsive evidence also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.”

The facts are straightforward. In 2006, someone fired a 9- millimeter handgun during a melee in the Bronx, killing a child in a passing car. When Hemphill was tried for the crime, he contended that the shooter was another man at the scene, Nicholas Morris. As part of that defense, Hemphill elicited testimony that the police had recovered a 9-millimeter cartridge on Morris’s nightstand hours after the shooting. The State then successfully moved to introduce a guilty plea from Morris in which he said he possessed a different gun—a .357 revolver—at the scene of the shooting. The New York courts rejected Hemphill’s claim that …

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Categories: Confrontation Clause, Sixth Amendment

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Wednesday, July 22nd, 2020

Flawed “Interested Witness” Instruction Requires New Trial

In United States v. Solano, the Circuit (Kearse, joined by Calabresi and Carney) held that the district court’s interested witness instruction—namely, that “any” witness with “an interest in the outcome” of the trial had “a motive to testify falsely”—was plain error requiring vacatur of the conviction, because the defendant had testified and the instruction violated the presumption of innocence. Mr. Solano was represented on appeal by our own Daniel Habib.

Solano, a commercial truck driver, was arrested after picking up and delivering a sealed shipping container that had held cocaine and was now under surveillance. He was charged with attempting to distribute a controlled substance. At trial, the sole disputed issue was knowledge. The government’s principal proof came from three law enforcement officers who testified that, in a post-arrest interview, Solano had confessed knowledge. Solano, for his part, testified that he did not know that the container had held …

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Categories: jury instructions

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Tuesday, July 21st, 2020

Circuit Will Decide En Banc Whether New York First-Degree Manslaughter Is a “Violent Felony” and “Crime of Violence.”

In United States v. Scott, 954 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2020), a divided panel held that New York first-degree manslaughter is neither a predicate “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act nor a “crime of violence” under the Career Offender Guideline because it can be committed by complete inaction and therefore without the use of force, as defined in Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). The panel also held that New York first-degree manslaughter does not match any of the generic offenses enumerated in the Career Offender Guideline.

On July 10, 2020, the Circuit granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc. No briefing schedule has yet been issued. Stay tuned.…

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Categories: career offender, crime of violence, violent felony

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Monday, July 20th, 2020

Circuit Affirms Conviction on Charges Relating to Scheme to Evade U.S. Sanctions Against Iran; Instructional Error Regarding IEEPA Was Harmless.

Does the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) impose criminal liability for evading or avoiding the imposition of sanctions not yet in place, or only existing prohibitions already imposed? In United States v. Atilla, No. 18-1589 (2d Cir. July 20, 2020) (Pooler, Hall, and Sullivan), the Circuit agreed with the defendant that the latter, narrower construction is correct and that the district court mischarged the jury on this issue. But the Court held the error harmless because “the jury was properly instructed on an alternative theory of liability for which the evidence was overwhelming.”

Atilla, a Turkish national and former Deputy General Manager of Turkey’s state-owned bank, was convicted on charged relating to a multibillion-dollar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions against Iran. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the IEEPA, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the …

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Saturday, June 6th, 2020

Eligibility for First Step Act relief depends on the statutory offense for which a defendant was sentenced, not the “actual conduct.”

The First Step Act of 2018 authorizes district courts to make a discretionary decision about whether and how to reduce a defendant’s sentence, but only if the defendant was sentenced for a “covered offense.” The Act defines a “covered offense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . ., that was committed before August 3, 2010.”

The question in United States v. Davis, No. 19-874 (2d Cir. June 5, 2020) (Katzmann, Wesley, and Bianco), was whether Davis was originally sentenced for a “covered offense,” in which case he was eligible for a sentencing reduction. The defendant said he was sentenced for a “covered offense” because he had been convicted and sentenced for conspiring to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine, in a violation of 21 U.S.C. …

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Categories: First Step Act of 2018

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Friday, June 5th, 2020

The “realistic probability” test has no role to play in the “categorical approach” when a state statute on its face is broader than the federal definition.

Here’s an important decision you may have missed because it arises in the context of an immigration proceeding rather than a criminal case. In Williams v. Barr, No. 18-2535 (2d Cir. May 27, 2020) (Jacobs, Carney, and Bianco), the Circuit clarified that, under the “categorical approach” for determining whether a state statute criminalizes more conduct than the relevant federal counterpart, the “realistic probability” test has limited application. Specifically, the test does not apply when the text of the statute itself gives it a broader reach than the generic federal definition. And, because the “categorical approach” applies in both immigration cases and criminal cases, this holding should be helpful to many criminal defendants.

Williams fought removal from the United States based on his Connecticut state conviction for unlawful carrying of a pistol or revolver. The Second Circuit agreed with him that, under the “categorical approach,” the state statute criminalized more …

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