The White House announced yesterday that President Biden would grant “full, complete, and unconditional” pardons to U.S. citizens and lawful residents previously convicted of simple possession of marijuana under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and D.C. Code 48-904.01(d)(1). The move is intended to “help relieve the collateral consequences arising from these convictions,” and will doubtless help eligible individuals facing bars to employment, public housing, and some other civil disabilities. But because of the Kafka-esque tangle that is immigration law, a presidential pardon may do little or nothing to relieve noncitizen defendants of what is likely the gravest consequences they face from a marijuana conviction—deportation or ineligibility for immigration status. Clients who are eligible for the pardons should be advised that they may still face adverse immigration consequences even after a pardon is granted, and should consult an attorney expert in criminal-immigration issues prior to seeking one. Read on for the gory …
Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog
Court must provide habeas petitioner with notice and an opportunity to respond before sua sponte dismissing the petition on procedural grounds
In Ethridge v. Bell, 2d Cir. No. 20-1685-pr (Sep. 20, 2022), a Panel of the Court (Lynch, Bianco, and Nardini), in an opinion by Judge Bianco, ruled that the district court erred when it sua sponte dismissed Ethridge’s § 2254 petition, challenging his New York drug and weapons conviction on the ground that state courts erroneously denied his motion to suppress a gun seized during an allegedly unlawful search, without giving him any notice or an opportunity to be heard. Before sua sponte dismissing a petition on procedural grounds, the Circuit ruled, a district court must give the petitioner notice of its contemplated decision as well as a genuine opportunity to respond.
The district court erred in dismissing Ethridge’s petition sua sponte by invoking Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), which “held that a petitioner may not obtain [federal] habeas relief under the Fourth Amendment on the …
A sealed sentencing conducted by videoconference, which was not accessible to the public, does not implicate Rule 53’s ban on broadcasting judicial proceedings
In United States v. Sealed Defendant One, 2d Cir. No. 21-118 (Sep. 21, 2022), a Panel of the Court (Newman, Chin, and Sullivan), in an opinion by Judge Sullivan, principally ruled that a sealed sentencing proceeding, which occurred via Skype videoconferencing during the COVID-19 pandemic, did not violate Rule 53’s bar on the “broadcasting” of judicial proceedings. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 53 (“Except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom.”). This is so because the term “broadcasting” “clearly entails ‘public’ distribution to make something ‘widely’ known.” Op. 16-17 (emphases in original) (quoting Merriam-Webster’s online entry for “broadcast”). Because the sealed sentencing here occurred through a “closed” Skype call, which “no one other than Sealed Defendant, his wife, and …
Three Interesting Cert. Petitions
Our friends at Scotusblog.com recently discussed three pending cert. petitions that present important and interesting criminal issues. Because these issues may arise in your practice, I note them again here so that you can preserve them for review:
- Shaw v. United States, No. 22-118.
Issues: (1) Whether the jury clauses of Article III and the Sixth Amendment or the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment bar a court from imposing a more severe criminal sentence on the basis of conduct that a jury necessarily rejected, given its verdicts of acquittal on other counts at the same trial; (2) whether the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Watts should be overruled; and (3) whether, in avoidance of the constitutional question, the rules of issue preclusion, as applied in federal criminal cases, bar imposition of an aggravated sentence on a factual predicate necessarily rejected by the jury at trial …
Categories: Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Sixth Amendment
A prior conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 130.50(3) (1965) categorically “relates to” the sexual abuse of a minor, justifying the sentencing enhancements (for child pornography offenses) of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) and (b)(2) — which aren’t unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Ragonese, No. 20-3371-cr, __F.4th__ , 2022 WL 3903437 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2022) (Sack, Lynch, and Bianco, Circuit Judges).
- The sentencing enhancements of 18 U.S.C.§ 2252A(b)(1) and (b)(2)
This case concerns the recidivist sentencing enhancements of the child pornography statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. For offenses involving “possession” of child pornography, the penalty is 0 to 10 years’ imprisonment. For “receipt,” there’s a 5-year mandatory minimum prison sentence. But, if the defendant has a prior state conviction under a law “relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward,” the minimum penalties are significantly enhanced: for possession, the minimum prison sentence increases from 0 years to 10 years; for receipt, the minimum increases from a 5-year prison term to 15 years. See18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (receipt), (b) (2) (possession). (The maxima also increase: from 10 years to 20 years for possession, and from 20 years to 40 years for receipt).
In this case, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing …
In a motion for Compassionate Release, “a district court does not have discretion to consider new evidence . . . attacking the validity of the underlying conviction” in weighing “the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Amato (Victor Orena), No. 21-2747, __ F.4th ____ (2d Cir. June 15, amended Aug. 31, 2022) (per curiam) (C.J.J.’s Pooler, Sack, and Nathan).
(The opinion in this case was originally issued on June 15 2022, and published at 37 F.4th 58, but was withdrawn and “this amended opinion [was issued] in its place”). See ECF No. 85, Opinion of Aug. 31, 2022 (“Op.”) at 3 n.1.
Appellant Victor Orena appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce his life-sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), “colloquially known as the ‘compassionate release’ provision,” which “permits a district court to reduce a previously imposed sentence ‘after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that … extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” Op. at 2-3 (alterations in original)..
Orena argued primarily that the district court erred in denying his § 3582(c) motion “by refusing to consider new evidence that he says calls into question the validity of his conviction.” …
Marijuana distribution is still a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Second Circuit REJECTS the argument that marijuana’s inclusion in Schedule I of the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”) lacks a rational basis and thus violates Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. United States v. Green, Nos. 19-997(L), 19-1027 (Con), __F.4th__ , 2022 WL 3903654 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2022) (C.J.J. Sack and Bianco; D.J. Underhill).
Two Rochester, New York, marijuana entrepreneurs, “the Green Brothers,” asked the Circuit to strike down marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I drug as an unconstitutional violation of their due process and equal protection rights and, on that basis, dismiss the narcotics charges against them. Green, 2022 WL 3903654 at **1-2.
“They argued that marijuana’s scheduling has no ‘rational basis’ because it does not meet the statutory criteria for Schedule I classification; that is, the CSA requires that a substance have no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States to fall under Schedule I, see 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1), and marijuana does have accepted medical uses.” Id. at *2. The Circuit rejects this argument.
I. Background facts
“Alexander Green obtained hundreds of kilograms of marijuana from California which he shipped to his brother, Charles Green, in New York State” for distribution “in the Rochester, New York area.” …
The government can garnish your 401(k) for restitution
In United States v. Greebel, 21-993-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2022), the Second Circuit holds that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) enables the government to garnish a defendant’s retirement accounts to pay restitution.
Defendant Greebel was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud and ordered to pay over $10 million in restitution. Pursuant to this restitution order, the government tried to garnish two of his 401(k) retirement accounts. The defendant objected. The Circuit found that these accounts’ plans permitted the defendant himself to withdraw lump-sums. And because the MVRA empowered the government to reach any property “in which the debtor has a substantial nonexempt interest,” allowing the government to “step[] into the defendant’s shoes, acquiring whatever rights the defendant himself possesses” to property, the funds were fair game for the government.
In so holding, the Circuit addressed a potential conflict between the MVRA and the …
No GAAP violation, no expert, no problem
Are accounting standards and securities laws as complex as the tax code? Not according to the Second Circuit. In United States v. Petit, Taylor, Nos. 21-543-cr, 21-559-cr (2d Cir. Aug. 22, 2022) (summary order), the Second Circuit upheld the securities fraud convictions of two former public company executives charged with using “accounting tricks to artificially inflate” their company’s reported revenue in quarterly reports.
The defendants, who were convicted after trial, argued that the government failed to prove their so-called “tricks” violated any Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). They also argued that the district court gave erroneous jury instructions on the scienter element (“knowingly and willfully”) and conscious avoidance.
The Circuit was unmoved. According to the Circuit, the “government was not required to prove” the defendants “violated GAAP,” so long as the defendants “intentionally misled investors.” Similarly, to prove the charged fraud, the government “did not need to offer expert …
Panel holds, over dissent, that non-disclosure of 5,000 pages of complainant’s psychiatric records is not an unreasonable application of Brady
The 2010 New York trial at issue in McCray v. Capra, 18-2336 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 2022), an appeal of a state habeas corpus denial, was a pure credibility contest: the complainant testified she was violently raped; McCray testified the encounter was consensual but the two struggled afterward when she tried to steal from him; and both parties had injuries.
Prior to trial, however, and as often occurs in New York, after the prosecution disclosed the complainant’s psychiatric history, the trial judge examined her mental health records in camera for Brady material. Although there were over 5,000 pages of records, the judge only turned over 28 pages to the defense. McCray’s ensuing first-degree rape conviction was affirmed in the Appellate Division and New York Court of Appeals, both of which were closely-divided on the Brady non-disclosure issue he raised.
On appeal of the denial of McCray’s N.D.N.Y. habeas…
Factual dispute at sentencing? Object, object, and object again!
Yesterday, in United States v. Cherimond, the Second Circuit remanded a sentence for the defense to make a fuller objection.
Here’s what happened: at sentencing, the district court upwardly departed based on pending and dismissed charges. Defense counsel objected to the departure and added that the defense was “not consenting or conceding to the allegations of fact in any of those cases.” Counsel said this in a few different ways: it was “not conceding any of the factual recitations are accurate,” and later that the defense had “said repeatedly we’re not conceding.” It seems clear, right? The defense objected. But – at one point, counsel said that “certainly the Court can take [the allegations] into account if it wants.” Counsel then again said that it “wouldn’t be appropriate” to do so.
On appeal, the Circuit discussed counsel’s comments at some length, saying counsel “signaled an objection,” but also “appeared …