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Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog


Saturday, September 8th, 2012

The Cartridge Family

United States v. Graham, No. 09-2819-cr (2d Cir. August 15, 2012) (Cabranes, Livingston, Carney, CJJ)

Title 18, U.S.C. § 844(h) makes it a separate offense to use “an explosive” to commit a federal felony. During an attempted extortion of one of his fellow-gang members – a dispute over some robbery proceeds – defendant Graham fired a cartridge from his 9-millimeter semi-automatic into the ground. A jury convicted defendant Graham under this section, amongst other offenses; his 50-year sentence included the ten-year mandatory consecutive sentence that the statute requires.

On appeal, however, the circuit agreed that the single cartridge in his semi-automatic handgun did not constitute an “explosive.” It reversed the conviction on the § 844(h) count and remanded the case for resentencing.

Superficially, it would seem like firing a bullet might well trigger the statute (bad pun, I know). Section 844(j) defines “explosive” for purposes of § 844(h) as, …

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Categories: explosives, firearms, statutory construction, Uncategorized

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Friday, August 31st, 2012

Family Plot

United States v. Antico, 10-5026-cr (2d Cir. August 14, 2012) (Pooler, Livingston, Lohier, CJJ)

Mario Gulinello won $1.6 million at a horse race.  Defendant Antico was convicted of conspiring with members of the Genovese crime family to rob him of that money, one of the predicates of a racketeering conviction. On appeal, Antico argued that the evidence was legally insufficient. A divided circuit affirmed.

As is usual in sufficiency cases, this decision is very fact specific, but the facts here are kind of unusual. About four years after Gulinello won the money, two members of the Genovese family took him for a drive. They pulled up next to Antico’s car, and said “Hey, Tico, say hello to my friend Mario.” The entire encounter lasted only a few seconds. Gulinello had been told that Antico was a “good guy,” who had recently been released from jail.  This was Gulinello’s only …

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Categories: robbery, Uncategorized

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Categories: robbery, Uncategorized

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“The Truth” Didn’t Set Him Free

United States v. Williams, No. 11-676-cr (2d Cir. July 16, 2012, amended August 15, 2012) (Sack, Livingston, Lynch, CJJ)

At Malik Williams’ gun trial, the prosecutor, in rebuttal summation, said, “this is not a search for reasonable doubt, this is a search for truth.”  The circuit noted, and indeed the government conceded, that this statement “was improper and should not have been made.” A statement like that “has the potential to distract the jury from the bedrock principles that even if the jury strongly suspects that the government’s version of events is true, it cannot vote to convict unless it finds that the government has actually proved each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt” and that under the presumption of innocence the jury must acquit even if it cannot “independently find the truth.”   

Nevertheless, this “unwise and erroneous” remark was not plain error.  The remark …

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Categories: prosecutorial misconduct, summation, Uncategorized

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Monday, August 27th, 2012

A Bronx Tale

United States v. Davis, No. 10-3424-cr (2d Cir. August 8, 2012) (Leval, Raggi, Chin, CJJ)

Appellant Davis attempted to rob a drug dealer in Elmont, Queens. Once inside the dealer’s house, he shot and killed the dealer’s girlfriend, and shot at (but missed) the dealer’s mother. He was tried, convicted and sentenced on this – along with other offenses not challenged on appeal – in the Southern District

On appeal, he argued that there was no Southern District venue for the Elmont attempted robbery and associated weapons offenses. The circuit affirmed.

The opinion begins with a long and interesting discussion of venue, culminating with the circuit’s rule that for venue to lie there must be more than “some activity in the situs district” – there must be “substantial contacts.” Whether these exist depends on “the site of the defendant’s acts, the elements and nature of the crime, the locus …

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Categories: Uncategorized, venue

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Finding that “Relevant” Conduct is not “Relevant Conduct,” the Circuit Remands

United States v. Wernick, No. 10-2974-cr (2d Cir. August 8, 2012) (McLaughlin, Sack, Lynch, CJJ)

Defendant Wernick was convicted after trial of, inter alia, one count of child enticement – he persuaded two teenagers to meet with him. At his sentencing, the court factored in three other acts involving the abuse or attempted sex abuse of young children as “relevant conduct.”  The circuit concluded that the acts involving the young children, although clearly “relevant” to Wernick’s sentencing, were not “relevant conduct” under the sentencing guidelines.

The guideline under which Wenick was sentenced, § 2G1.1, has a specific offense characteristic involving the sex abuse of individuals other than those in the count of conviction:  if the “relevant conduct” to the offense of conviction includes “prohibited sexual conduct in respect to more than one victim,” regardless of whether that victim is specified in the count of conviction, each such victim …

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Categories: plain error, relevant conduct, Uncategorized

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Sunday, August 26th, 2012

Brady Violation Allows Defendants to “Squawk” Away

United Statesv v. Mahaffy, No. 09-5349-cr (2d Cir. August 2, 2012) (McLaughlin, Parker, Wesley, CJJ) 

This, the court’s most recent Brady decision, presents a truly shocking instance of prosecutorial misconduct.

Factual Background

The Brady violation was here was  straightforward: the defendants were employees of brokerage houses and a day trading firm called A.B. Watley, accused of securities fraud by running a “frontrunning” scheme. Here’s how it worked: the brokerage houses had “squawk boxes” which, during the day, would transmit internal communications about, amongst other things, client trading orders. The squawks would allow the firms’ traders to find a client to take the other side of the trade. In the scheme, the brokerage defendants would place phone receivers over their squawk boxes and transmit the squawks directly to Watley employees, who would then place trades in the squawked securities before the brokerage houses could execute the customer orders. Watley hoped …

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Categories: Brady, Uncategorized

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Friday, August 24th, 2012

Truman/False Man

United States v. Truman, Sr., No. 11-784-cr (2d Cir. 2012) (Livingston, Lohier, CJJ, Rakoff, DJ)

Jeffrey Truman, Sr., recruited his son, Jeffrey Truman, Jr., to burn down a building that Truman Sr. owned in Oneida, New York.  The was in dire financial straits and the property had a very large insurance policy.

Truman Sr.’s odyssey through the legal system began in state court, where he was tried on arson and fraud charges. That case was dismissed because the state court could not corroborate Jr.’s testimony, as required under state law.

The feds then took up the case, which went to trial after Jr. signed a cooperation agreement. At trial, however, Jr. balked. While he described his own role in setting the fire, he steadfastly refused to implicate his father.  This prompted the government to introduce, over objection, portions of Jr.’s testimony from Sr.’s state court trial, in which Jr. confirmed …

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Categories: credibility, Rule 29, Rule 33, Uncategorized

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Let’s Get Metaphysical

United States v. Cassesse, No. 10-2210-cr (2d Cir. July 11, 2012, amended July 25, 2012) (Newman, Katzmann, Parker, CJJ)

This case untangles a mathematic quandary left by some unclear statutes: how can a life term of supervised release, imposed on a supervised release violation, be reduced by the number of months of the prison term imposed for that same violation?  Here the district court simply sentenced the defendant to twelve months in prison on the violation to be followed by another life term of supervised release.  Describing the issue as “almost metaphysical,” the circuit affirmed.

Cassesse was originally convicted under a drug statute that carries a maximum possible supervised release term of life, and was sentenced to that, to follow an eighty-seven month term of imprisonment.

After his release to supervision, Cassesse pled guilty in a new federal case – this one involving racketeering – and received a …

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Categories: supervised release, Uncategorized

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Grand Slam

United States v. Gonzalez, No. 11-1490-cr (2d Cir. July 19, 2012) (Jacobs, Kearse, McLaughlin, CJJ)

Omar Gonzalez was originally charged with a narcotics conspiracy in a superseding indictment that alleged his involvement with “mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of cocaine.” The indictment did not allege a drug quantity, and cited 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(C), a penalty section that carries no mandatory minimum. Before trial, the government superseded again. The second superseding indictment was identical to the first except it replaced the citation to § 841(b)(1)(C) with a citation to § 841(b)(1)(B), a penalty provision that, in cases involving 500 grams or more of cocaine, has a five-year mandatory minimum; in 500+ gram cases like Mr. Gonzalez’, where the government files a prior felony information, it specifies a ten-year minimum.

During trial, the defense, after seeing the government’s proposed jury instructions, objected, noting that trafficking in …

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Thursday, August 23rd, 2012

Up In Smoke

United States v. Morrison, No. 10-1926(L) (2d Cir. July 16, 2012) (Calabresi, Chin, Carney, CJJ)

After a jury convicted Morrison of violating the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act (here, “the Act”), Morrison persuaded the district court to vacate the conviction and dismiss the charges.  On this, the government’s appeal, the circuit reversed.

Background

Morrison managed a tobacco shop on the Unkechauge Indian Nation’s reservation on Long Island. Mostly, the shop sold untaxed cigarettes,  both in small over-the-counter sales and large wholesale transactions to “Big Customers,” whom Morrison knew were reselling the smokes off reservation.  The government ultimately charged him racketeering offenses predicated on his sale of contraband cigarettes. Morrison filed multiple motions for judgments of acquittal and dismissal, and ultimately persuaded the district court that Section 471 of New York’s Tax Law, which served as the legal predicate for the claimed violation of the Act, was void for vagueness …

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Friday, August 17th, 2012

Trust Fun

United States v. Zaleski, No. 11-660-cr (2d Cir. July 13, 2012) (Newman, Lohier, Droney, CJJ)

This fascinating opinion considers whether the defendant, Alan Zaleski, from whom a large quantity of  legally possessed firearms and ammunition were seized, should be permitted get them back from the government and sell them through a third party trustee, even though as a convicted felon, he is no longer permitted to possess them himself, even constructively.  While the district court denied his motion for a return of the property under Fed.R.Cr.P 41(g), the circuit remanded to give Zaleski a second bite at the apple.

The Facts

Among the weapons seized from Zaleski’s home were several illegal items.  He ultimately pled guilty to possessing (1) machine guns (2) a gun with an obliterated serial number and (3) a variety of unregistered devices. Until then, he was not a felon. 

The remaining items seized, which he …

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Categories: constructive possession, Rule 41(g), Uncategorized

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