Federal Defenders of New York Second Circuit Blog

Supreme Court REALLY Keeps the Faith

Monday’s post, titled Supreme Court Keeps the Faith, discussed the Court’s distaste for “faithless electors.” In two 7-2 rulings today, the Court took its distaste for the faithless to a new level, ruling labor and health laws largely do not apply to religious organizations. In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, two teachers sued the Catholic … Read more

Supreme Court Keeps the Faith

Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in today’s Chiafalo v. Washington, Justice Kagan upheld a state’s power to not just replace — but also to punish — “faithless electors.”  Such electors refuse to cast their Electoral College ballots for the presidential candidate the voters of their state selected. The Electoral College is, of course, an … Read more

Remedy for a violation of the prompt-presentment rules of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(c)(2) (concerning the “initial appearance” of someone arrested in a district “other than where the offense was allegedly committed”) isn’t “dismissal of the criminal case,” but an evidentiary sanction. In addition, a magistrate judge’s failure to sign the jurat on the last page of the supporting affidavit of the criminal complaint doesn’t render the complaint invalid, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 3, because the magistrate signed the criminal complaint, thereby attesting that the affiant’s assertions had been sworn before the magistrate. United States v. Peeples, No. 18-2309-cr, __F.3d__, 2020 WL 3406445 (June 22, 2020).

I.  Remedy for a violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(c)(2) Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(c)(2) governs the place for the “initial appearance” of someone “arrested in a district other than where the offense was allegedly committed” and the circumstances permitting the person’s transfer to a district outside the place of arrest. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(c)(2). In United States v. Peeples, No. … Read more

In a felon-in-possession case (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)), a person charged in a single count with possessing a firearm on two separate dates, during a six-day period, isn’t entitled to an instruction that the jury “must agree unanimously on a particular date or dates on which he possessed a firearm.” Rather, possession of a firearm “is a continuing offense,” so the jury only needs to find “unanimously that the defendant possessed the firearm at any point” during period of the alleged possession.  United States v. Estevez, No. 17-4159-cr, 2020 WL 3022983 (June 5, 2020).

In Estevez, the sole count of the indictment alleged that Estevez possessed a firearm on two different dates: on February 21, 2016 and February 26, 2016. The charge was based on two separate shooting incidents, on those days. But a puzzling aspect of the Opinion is that it makes no reference to last years’ Supreme … Read more

District Court Erred in Denying 3rd Point for Acceptance of Responsibility, Despite a Government Motion on the Defendant’s Behalf, Based on Its Belief that the Defendant’s Suppression Motion Caused the Government to Do Work that Overlapped with Trial Preparation

Reading a 45-page opinion about the “third point” in the acceptance-of-responsibility Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), makes one wonder whether Booker was but a dream. Why, one might ask, do judges in 2020 care so much about a miniscule adjustment to the offense level when they can simply go outside the advisory range and impose whatever … Read more

New York Fifth-Degree Drug Sale Does Not Qualify as “Felony Drug Offense” for Purpose of § 851 Recidivist Enhancement

In United States v. Jeremy Thompson, 2d Cir. No. 18-2545, __ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. June 8, 2020), the Court held (in an opinion by Judge Walker) that a New York conviction for fifth-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance, in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.31, does not qualify as a “prior conviction … Read more

Eligibility for First Step Act relief depends on the statutory offense for which a defendant was sentenced, not the “actual conduct.”

The First Step Act of 2018 authorizes district courts to make a discretionary decision about whether and how to reduce a defendant’s sentence, but only if the defendant was sentenced for a “covered offense.” The Act defines a “covered offense” as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified … Read more

The “realistic probability” test has no role to play in the “categorical approach” when a state statute on its face is broader than the federal definition.

Here’s an important decision you may have missed because it arises in the context of an immigration proceeding rather than a criminal case. In Williams v. Barr, No. 18-2535 (2d Cir. May 27, 2020) (Jacobs, Carney, and Bianco), the Circuit clarified that, under the “categorical approach” for determining whether a state statute criminalizes more conduct … Read more

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), district courts may not reduce a sentence below the bottom of the amended Guidelines range based on a § 5G1.3(b) adjustment at the original sentencing.

In United States v. Zapatero, No. 18-3829 (2d Cir. June 3, 2020) (Hall, Sullivan, and Bianco), the Circuit held that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and its incorporated Guidelines provisions, preclude a district court from reducing a sentence below the amended Guidelines range based on a § 5G1.3(b) adjustment at the original sentencing. … Read more