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Last week, Judge Morrison granted a motion to suppress a gun, holding that police didn’t have reasonable suspicion to seize or subsequently frisk a person stopped on the street in Brooklyn. United States v. Burvick, No. 23-CR-450 (NRM), 2025 WL 240976 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2025). The lengthy opinion discusses and rejects some common police reasons for a stop and frisk, including, supposedly nervous behavior and “evasive” answers, “blading” the body (read the decision for the court’s dubious explanation of what the word “blading” means), and a heavy pocket.

The facts, in brief, are this: an anonymous* 911 caller said that someone had “threatened” people outside a building, saying he had a gun. Police arrived and saw a person matching the 911 caller’s (detailed) description around the corner from the building, calmly walking up to the front door of his house. When told to stop, he did; when asked if police …

Yesterday, in Snyder v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 18 USC 666 prohibits bribes to state and local officials, but does not prohibit  gratuities to state and local officials. The difference between a bribe and a gratuity is largely one of timing of the agreement: a bribe is given to a public official to induce them to take future action, while a gratuity is given to a public official to thank them for taking a past action.  (But, note that “rewards” are still covered by Section 666). Applying the statute to gratuities would create “traps for unwary state and local officials.” The court trots out various examples:  “Is a $100 Dunkin’ Donuts gift card for a trash collector wrongful? What about a $200 Nike gift card for a county commissioner who voted to fund new school athletic facilities? Could students take their college professor out to Chipotle …

At long last, the Supreme Court last week issued its eagerly-anticipated decision in United States v. Rahimi, involving a post-Bruen Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which criminalizes possession of a firearm while one is subject to a domestic violence restraining order. Unsurprisingly to anyone who listened to the oral argument, the Court, in a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, voted 8-1 to uphold the criminal ban.

Justice Thomas dissented. Justice Sotomayor issued a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kagan. And Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson each penned separate concurrences. So there’s lots to review in the 100+ page opinion, more than can be done in this blog post. However, the top-level takeaways from the (relatively brief) majority opinion are as follows:

Clarification of the Bruen test: “relevantly similar” wins the day. Over the last two years, many lawyers (and judges) have …

Today, in Brown v. United States, the Supreme Court held that state drug convictions count as ACCA predicates if they involved a drug that was on the federal drug schedules at the time of the state conviction. In Brown, legislatures had eliminated two substances from the relevant drug schedules – hemp and ioflupane – between the time of the petitioners’ original cases and their ACCA cases. Thus, the state and federal drug schedules did not match at the time of their ACCA cases. The petitioners argued that, under the categorical approach, their prior state cases were not ACCA predicates.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the drug schedules at the time of the ACCA conviction are essentially irrelevant. In reaching this decision, Justice Alito highlighted the facts of the petitioners’ prior drug offenses at length, emphasizing that the petitioners had possessed marijuana and cocaine, “not hemp …

Yes, the Second Circuit means it! If the district court doesn’t explain why a special condition of supervised release is required in a particular case, the Circuit will vacate the condition.

Today, yet again, the Second Circuit vacated a condition of supervised release because the district court did not explain the reasons for imposing the condition or make an individualized assessment it was necessary for Mr. Syed. In Mr. Syed’s case the vacated condition was broad electronic and GPS monitoring, without any reasonable suspicion required. In that way Syed is a lot like United States v. Salazar, decided last year.

But, in a broader sense, Syed is just the latest in a string of Second Circuit decisions vacating conditions of supervised release. See also United States v. Alex Oliveras, No. 21-2954 (2d Cir. March 15, 2024), United States v. William Jimenez, No. 21-2954 (2d Cir. March 18, 2024), …

In United States v. Delvalle, No. 22-1539-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 2024) (per curiam), the Court reiterated its longstanding rule that a guilty plea is not rendered involuntary or unintelligent simply because the defendant expected to receive a lower sentence than he ultimately received.

Delvalle pleaded guilty to a drug conspiracy. The parties estimated that his Guidelines range was 360-480 months, with a statutory minimum term of 60 months. During the plea colloquy, the defendant acknowledged that he had not been “promised” a below-Guidelines sentence, but nevertheless thought it was a “big maybe.” He was disappointed at sentencing when the judge imposed 420 months of imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued that his plea was involuntary because he believed that he would receive a below-Guidelines sentence, and that this belief influenced his decision to plead guilty. The Circuit rejected this argument, “reiterat[ing] the well settled rule that a defendant’s guilty plea …

In United States v. Chaires, No. 20-4162 (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 2023) (per curiam), the Second Circuit (Carney, Sullivan, and Menashi) remanded for resentencing, on plain error review, where the defendant was sentenced as a career offender based on New York controlled substance predicates. As our dear readers are well-aware, Chaires follows in the footsteps of several important Second Circuit cases holding that state drug crimes are categorically overbroad – and cannot be used to enhance a sentence – because they punish possession of more substances than the federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA). To recap:

• United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018). In this leading case, in addition to holding that the categorical approach applies to the controlled-substance-offense determination, the Court ruled that, because N.Y.P.L. 220.31 punishes possession of human chorionic gonadotropin, but the CSA does not, it cannot serve as a predicate for offense-level-enhancement

In United States v. Gates, the Second Circuit today affirmed a 45-year sentence for a person with no criminal history, who was convicted of three counts related to sexual exploitation of her child based on five images found on the child’s father’s phone. (Even though the child’s father, unlike Gates, had thousands of additional images of child pornography as well as a criminal history, he received the same sentence as Gates). The Circuit appeared completely unmoved by her argument that her sentence was substantively unreasonable, failing to engage with or even mention any facts about Gates’s personal background.

The Circuit, however, did find that the district court erred in at least two ways. First, the Circuit found that the district court improperly counted a conspiracy count as a separate group. But, the Circuit said, this error was harmless because the offense level was so high that it would still …

In United States v. Hunt, No. 21-3020 (2d Cir. Sept. 20, 2023) (Walker, joined by Parker and Bianco), the Circuit affirmed Hunt’s conviction and sentence for threatening to assault and murder United States officials, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), based on Hunt’s online posting of a video entitled “Kill Your Senators.” In the video, which was posted on January 8, 2021, Hunt said, among other things: “We need to go back to the U.S. Capitol when all of the Senators and a lot of the Representatives are back there and this time we have to show up with our guns and we need to slaughter these motherfuckers …. If anybody has a gun, give me it. I will go there myself and shoot them and kill them.”

The Circuit held:

1. The evidence was sufficient. In so holding, the Circuit rejected Hunt’s argument for application of the “constitutional

This week, in United States v. Daniels, the Fifth Circuit held that a person’s conviction under 922(g)(3) was unconstitutional following Bruen. The facts of Daniels are straightforward: Daniels was found with guns and marijuana in his car and then admitted he was a habitual marijuana user. He was charged and convicted of violating Section 922(g)(3). The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that history and tradition did not justify disarming a “sober citizen based exclusively on his past drug usage.”

Although 922(g)(3) isn’t a a common charge, there is helpful language in the Daniels opinion for Bruen motions under 922(g)(1). And, the steady drumbeat of 922(g) reversals will hopefully give judges pause in relying on pre-Bruen decisions without a careful analysis.

In Daniels, the government relied on the same language and history that they point to for 922(g)(1) cases. The Fifth Circuit roundly rejected those arguments. The Circuit …

In Aponte v. Perez, No. 20-2186 (2d Cir. July 20, 2023), the Second Circuit rules largely in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, who brought a civil rights suit after he was wrongfully subjected to post-release supervision.

 In 2000, plaintiff Felix Aponte was sentenced in New York State court to 8 years in prison for robbery. After sentencing, the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) “administratively added a five-year term of post-release supervision” (PRS). This practice seems obviously unconstitutional and, in 2006, the Second Circuit so held. Aponte was eventually resentenced in 2008.

In the meantime, Aponte was subject to this illegal supervision term. He was imprisoned for violating the terms of his (illegal) supervision.

Aponte, acting pro se, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOCS and others, seeking damages related to his unlawful supervision and incarceration.

The district court found a violation of Aponte’s due …