Archive | obstruction of justice

Monday, April 24th, 2023

Appellant’s submission of (three) “forged letters” of support, to the sentencing court, results in a 5-level increase in offense level: a two level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice (U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1) and the denial of a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility (id. § 3E1.1). United States v. Strange, No. 21-2923, __ F.4th ____ (2d Cir. Apr. 17, 2023) (C.J.J.’s Pooler, Wesley, and Menashi).

Background

Appellant worked for a company that (generously) matched the charitable donations of its employees “up to $25,000 in donations per employee annually.” Opinion (“Op”) at 2. From 2015 to 2019, Appellant he “carried out a scheme to defraud” by “submitt[ing] fake documentation purporting to show that he, as well as some of his coworkers, had made significant charitable donations to an entity that Strange himself controlled.” Op at 2-3. The coworkers “had no knowledge of the submissions.” Op at 3. Appellant received about $600,000 from the company’s matching program, which he used “for personal expenses.” Id.

Appellant ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343). And his initial Guidelines range was “33 to 41 months incarceration.” Op at 3.

But a few days before sentencing, he submitted three letters “each encouraging the imposition of a probationary sentence rather than imprisonment.”Op at 3. The government …


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Categories: acceptance of responsibility, obstruction of justice, wire fraud

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Tuesday, February 23rd, 2021

District court must make clear, specific finding that defendant committed perjury before imposing the 2-level obstruction enhancement based on trial testimony.

In United States v. Ivan Rosario, 2d Cir. No. 18-1994 (L) (Feb. 23, 2021) (per curiam), the Court (Sack, Chin, and Lohier) reaffirmed the longstanding rule that a district court may impose a 2-level obstruction enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, based on the defendant’s allegedly false trial testimony, only if it “make[s] findings to support all the elements of a perjury violation in the specific case,” namely, “that the defendant (1) willfully and (2) materially (3) committed perjury, which is (a) the intentional (b) giving of false testimony (c) as to a material matter.” Op. 6 (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) and United States v. Thompson, 808 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2015)). This “rigid requirement of fact-finding” ensures “that courts will not automatically enhance sentences whenever the accused takes the stand and is thereafter found guilty.” Op. 5-6. Because “[a]ny sentence …


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Categories: obstruction of justice, perjury

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Monday, March 9th, 2020

The evidence sufficiently proved the defendant “had a reasonable opportunity to observe” the underage victim, under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (sex trafficking of minors). And it wasn’t procedural error when the court used the defendant’s “false [trial] testimony” as an aggravating factor under § 3553(a) — in imposing a substantially below-Guidelines sentence — without finding the testimony qualified as perjury under Guidelines § 3C1.1. United States v. Almonte, No. 18-3769, __F.3d__, 2020 WL 1056786 (March 5, 2020).

1. Sufficiency of evidence of sex trafficking involving underage victim

The defendant was convicted, after trial,  of several offenses, including  sex trafficking of a minor who was less than 14 years old, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and (b)(1).  She moved unsuccessfully for a judgment of acquittal (Fed.R.Crim.P. 29), arguing the evidence didn’t  establish she “had a reasonable opportunity to observe” the underage victim as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).  The Circuit affirms the district court’s denial of the Rule 29 motion. Almonte, 2020 WL 1056786 at *1.

Section 1591(c) states that in a prosecution for sex trafficking under § 1591(a)(1), “in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the [underage victim] . . ., the Government need not prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c). …


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Categories: 3553(a), obstruction of justice, procedural reasonableness, sex offenses, substantive reasonableness

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Wednesday, December 11th, 2019

The Second Circuit issues an amended opinion in United States v. Pugh, No. 17-1889-cr, __F.3d__, 2019 WL 6708812 (Dec. 10, 2019) (“Pugh II”), a material support to terrorism case. As in the initial opinion — that was discussed in this blog on Sept. 3, 2019 — the Circuit affirms the convictions, but vacates consecutive prison sentences (totaling 420 months) as procedurally unreasonable because of the inadequate statement of reasons for the sentences.

Yesterday, the Circuit issued an amended opinion in United States v. Pugh. The initial decision issued on August 29, 2019 (United States v. Pugh, 937 F.3d 108) and was discussed in this blog. See infra, posting of Sept. 3, 2019.

The Amended Opinion reaches the same results as the initial opinion. The Circuit  (1) rules against the defendant on the marital communications privilege, Pugh II, 2019 WL 6708812 at *2-*4 ; (2) finds sufficient evidence of an “attempt” to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)), id. at *4-*6; and (3) finds sufficient evidence of obstruction and attempted obstruction of an “official proceeding” (18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(1),  (c)(2)), id. at *6-*7 ; but (4) vacates consecutive sentences totaling 420 months’ imprisonment because of the inadequacy of the Judge’s explanation for the consecutive sentences. Id. at *8-*12.

The Amended Opinion corrected …


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Categories: 3553(c), evidence, marital communications privilege, Material Support, material support statute, obstruction of justice, official proceeding, sentencing, sentencing allocution, terrorism

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Tuesday, September 3rd, 2019

Second Circuit affirms convictions arising from a person’s alleged attempt to join ISIS in Syria. But it vacates consecutive prison sentences (of 420 months) as procedurally unreasonable because of the judge’s deficient statement of the reasons for the sentence.

Second Circuit affirms convictions arising from a person’s alleged attempt to join ISIS in Syria.  But it vacates consecutive prison sentences (of 420 months) as procedurally unreasonable because of the judge’s deficient statement of the reasons for the sentence: United States v. Pugh, No. 17-1889-cr, __F.3d__, 2019 WL 4062635  (Aug. 29, 2019). 

In United States v. Pugh, the Second Circuit rules (against the defendant) on the marital communications privilege. And it finds there was sufficient evidence of an “attempt” to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization (18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)), and of obstruction and attempted obstruction of an official proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) and (c)(2)).

The Circuit does, however, vacate the (consecutive) sentence because of the inadequacy of the Judge’s explanation. In addition, a separate concurring opinion explicates concern about the overuse of obstruction of justice charges. Pugh, 2019 WL 2019 WL 4062635 at …


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Categories: 3553(c), evidence, marital communications privilege, Material Support, material support statute, obstruction of justice, official proceeding, sentencing, terrorism

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Saturday, October 8th, 2011

Aliens vs. Predator

United States v. Archer, No. 10-4684-cr (2d Cir. September 20, 2011) (Newman, Calabresi, Hall, CJJ)

Thomas Archer, a solo-practitioner immigration lawyer in Queens, ran a visa fraud mill. His specialty was the I-687, an amnesty program that permitted certain aliens who were here illegally in the 1980’s to adjust their status and receive a visa. In 2004 and 2005, Archer filed nearly 240 I-687 applications; the DHS denied them all.

Convicted of visa fraud and conspiracy to commit visa fraud, his appeal concerned both trial issues – centered around his claim that he did know know that his assistants were filing forms with false information – and sentencing issues. The circuit affirmed Archer’s conviction, but remanded for resentencing and recalculation of the restitution.

The Trial Issues

At trial, an immigration agent who had reviewed 175 I-687 applications that Archer’s office filed, testified that almost all of them had certain suspicious …


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Categories: document enhancement, knowledge, obstruction of justice, restitution, Uncategorized, victims

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Friday, May 13th, 2011

Beating Disorder

United States v. Wells, No. 10-1266-cr (2d Cir. April 28, 2011) (Kearse, Sack, Katzmann, CJJ)

The defendants here, Wells and Rhodes, both former prison guards, were convicted of covering up the beating of a prisoner at the Queen Private Correctional Facility (“QPCF”). The episode began when the prisoner commented on the appearance of a female guard in Wells’ presence. Wells beat the prisoner, and the beating was witnessed by Rhodes and three other guards. The QPCF immediately began an internal investigation, and the witnesses, at Wells’ urging, filed false reports. Later, Wells and Rhodes were interviewed by an agent of the Office of the Inspector General and lied to her about what happened.

After a jury trial, Wells was convicted of five offenses relating to obstruction of justice, witness tampering and the making of a false statement. Rhodes was convicted of obstruction of justice and making a false statement.

On …


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Categories: obstruction of justice, Uncategorized

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Tuesday, November 3rd, 2009

Cash and Quarry

United States v. Byors, No. 08-4811-cr (2d Cir. October 29, 2009) (Cabranes, Livingston, CJJ, Korman, DJ)

Defendant, while ostensibly raising money for a Vermont marble quarry, made material misrepresentations to his investors. He also converted substantial amounts of their money to pay for his personal expenses, including vacation homes, cars and horses. He pled guilty to multiple fraud and money laundering offenses and was sentenced to 135 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he raised two unsuccessful challenges to his Guidelines calculations.

He first argued that the district court should have deducted from the loss calculation – about $9 million – the “legitimate business expenditures” that went into his efforts to “capitalize” the quarry business. The circuit disagreed. Under the “plain language” of Application Note 3(E) to the fraud guideline, the loss amount is only offset by any “value” that the victims receive, and not by legitimate expenditures. Byors’ expenditures conferred nothing …


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Categories: loss calculation, obstruction of justice, Uncategorized

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Monday, August 3rd, 2009

Going Down!

United States v. Perez, No. 08-4131-cr (2d Cir. August 3, 2009) (Newman, Pooler, Parker, CJJ)

Here, the circuit concluded that an internal BOP investigation into corrections officers’ use of force against an inmate constituted an “official proceeding” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. The court rejected the defendants’ sufficiency challenge and affirmed their convictions.

The case arose from the beating of an inmate by a CO in an elevator at the MDC. Two other CO’s watched the beating, although one of them finally put a stop to it, and all three were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) by making false statements in the paperwork that they were required to fill out by the BOP’s administrative procedures – various “use-of-force” memoranda.

The BOP investigates every use of force by a staff member. That investigation begins with the use-of-force paperwork, which is reviewed by an After-Action Review Committee …


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Categories: obstruction of justice, official proceeding, Uncategorized

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Saturday, December 6th, 2008

How Not To Seek A Change Of Counsel

United States v. Salim, No. 04-2643-cr (2d Cir. December 2, 2008) (Newman, Walker, Sotomayor, CJJ)

With the help of a cellmate, defendant Salim, while awaiting trial for the bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, abducted an MCC guard and stabbed him in the eye with a sharpened comb, nearly killing him. He pled guilty to conspiracy and attempted murder of a federal official. Although Salim had originally claimed that this was a botched escape attempt, at the Fatico hearing, his story changed. He testified that he abandoned the escape plan as unworkable; rather his goal was to take the guard’s keys, unlock the attorney-client visiting room, and attack his attorneys so that they would withdraw from the case. Salim had indeed, on several occasions, unsuccessfully sought a substitution of counsel from the district court.

The district court credited Salim’s story; it held that the assault was …


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Categories: obstruction of justice, terrorism enhancement, Uncategorized

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