Archive | crime of violence

Wednesday, August 28th, 2024

Second Circuit: Postal Robbery And Aggravated Postal Robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a), Even On Pinkerton Theory Of Liability, Are 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Crimes Of Violence.

In Pannell v. United States, No. 21–2849 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2024) (Menashi, joined by Raggi and Wesley), the Second Circuit held that postal robbery and aggravated postal robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a), even pursuant to a Pinkerton theory of liability, are 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) crimes of violence.

A jury convicted Pannell of conspiracy to commit postal robbery, aggravated postal robbery, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely, the aggravated postal robbery. After Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), Pannell filed a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his § 924(c) conviction on the ground that aggravated postal robbery on a Pinkerton theory of liability was not a valid predicate crime of violence. The district court (Gershon, EDNY) denied the motion and the Second Circuit affirmed.

First, …

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Tuesday, October 3rd, 2023

Attempted Murder is a Crime of Violence (For Now)

In yesterday’s United States v. Pastore, the Circuit (Walker, Sullivan, Nathan, C.JJ.) held attempted murder in aid of racketeering – specifically, attempted New York murder – is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

The Circuit reasoned that, because murder requires someone to intentionally “’cause the death of another person,'” Slip Op. at 14 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1)), and because “intentionally causing the death of another person involves the use of force,” id., attempting to murder requires the “attempted use . . . of physical force against the person . . . of another.”  § 924(c)(3)(A).

The Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), the Circuit said, does not compel otherwise.  The Court there held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” given that it can be committed by means of an “…

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Wednesday, July 19th, 2023

Second Circuit finds that VICAR murder may categorically qualify as a crime of violence

This week, in United States v. Davis, No. 21-1486-cr (2d Cir. July 18, 2023), the Circuit holds that murder in aid of racketeering (also known as “VICAR murder”), 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), may categorically qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 924(j)(1).

In Davis, the defendant argued that VICAR murder is not categorically a crime of violence because it includes generic, second-degree murder, which can be committed recklessly. And offenses with a mens rea of recklessness do not categorically qualify as violent felonies. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (2021).

The Circuit rejected this argument. The Circuit found that VICAR murder is divisible, meaning a court must apply the “modified categorical approach” to determine the specific elements of a defendant’s underlying murder offense. Here the defendant’s jury instructions established that he was charged with and convicted …


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Categories: crime of violence, murder, racketeering

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Monday, June 26th, 2023

The Second Circuit holds that, despite the erroneous jury instructions defining the “crime of violence” required for a § 924(c) conviction — allowing the jury to convict the Petitioners based on predicate offenses that didn’t necessarily require the actual or threatened use of force — the Petitioners failed to show that the instructional errors “resulted in prejudice that would entitle them to the relief they [sought] under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Nardino Colotti, et al. v. United States, Nos. 21-932(L), 21-937(CON), 21-950(CON), 21-992(CON), 21-1548(CON), __ F.4th ____ (2d Cir. June 21, 2023) (C.J.J.’s Leval, Parker, Menashi).

Background

This is an appeal from a district court judgment denying the Petitioners’ motions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  The Circuit affirms the district court.

The Petitioners were convicted after a jury trial — conducted “in late 2005 and early 2006″ — on 14 out of 15 counts, including Count 13, which charged the Petitioners with using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which was predicated on the “offense charged in Count  One, racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (‘RICO’), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).” See Op. at 3-5.

The RICO offense, in turn, was “predicated on Racketeering Acts 4 and 5, which in turn  charged violations of N.Y. Penal Law § 155.40, the New York penal statute defining second degree …


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Categories: 2255, 924(c), crime of violence, divisible/indivisible statute, modified categorical approach, RICO

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Wednesday, April 5th, 2023

Kidnapping is Not a Crime of Violence

Most courts (and the government) have for a while acknowledged that kidnapping is not a crime of violence given that it can be accomplished through deception and thus without physical force.  The Second Circuit has now acknowledged this too, holding in US v. Eldridge that NY kidnapping in aid of federal racketeering isn’t a 924(c) predicate: it can be committed using “deception to hold a victim in a place” and thus without “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.”

PS – The career offender guideline lists “kidnapping” as a COV but doesn’t define it, meaning the generic definition (how most jurisdictions define it) applies.  The DC Circuit surveyed the law and decided generic kidnapping requires “a criminal purpose beyond the mere intent to restrain the victim.”  US v. De Jesus Ventura, 565 F.3d 870, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  Neither federal kidnapping nor NY kidnapping requires such heightened …

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Tuesday, May 25th, 2021

The Supreme Court throws a wrench into § 1326(d) motions in the Second Circuit

In United States v. Palomar-Santiago, No. 20-437 (May 24, 2021), Justice Sotomayor ruled for a unanimous Court that as a matter of statutory interpretation (1) each of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)’s three requirements must be satisfied; and that (2) a showing by the defendant that the deportation proceeding was “fundamentally unfair” under § 1326(d)(3) — because the immigration judge (IJ) mistakenly told him that he was removable as an aggravated felon due to his DUI conviction (this became error six years later in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), holding that a DUI is not a § 16(b) “crime of violence” and thus not an “aggravated felony”) – does not suffice to dismiss a reentry indictment. The decision overrules Ninth Circuit law holding that “defendants are ‘excused from proving the first two requirements’ of § 1326(d) [– noncitizen defendants must show that they exhausted administrative remedies and …


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Categories: aggravated felony, crime of violence, deportation

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Thursday, April 22nd, 2021

Second Circuit Holds that Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery Is a § 924(c) “Crime of Violence.”

The Circuit ruled today in United States v. McCoy, No. 17‑1315(L) (Kearse, Parker, and Sullivan, JJ.), that the crime of attempting to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), remains a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), even after United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). The Circuit had previously held that a completed Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of violence,” United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018), but that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not, United States v. Barrett, 927 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019).

In McCoy, the Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that attempted Hobbs Act robbery, like conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, does not qualify as a “crime of violence” because it does not necessarily have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened …


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Categories: crime of violence, Davis, Hobbs Act

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Monday, March 1st, 2021

Attempted Bank Robbery: Good News and Bad News

Do you have a client challenging a charge or conviction for attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and/or gun possession in relation to that crime in violation of § 924(c)?  Well, there’s good news and bad news.

First, the bad news: a two-judge panel of the Second Circuit has ruled attempted bank robbery — specifically, attempted robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” § 2113(a) — is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c).  See Collier v. United States, No. 17-2402, ___ F.3d ___ (2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2021) (available here).

But now the good news: the panel based its ruling on “the text of the attempt crime that is set forth in § 2113(a), which expressly requires that the attempted taking — like the completed crime — be perpetrated ‘by force and violence, or by intimidation.'”  Slip Op. at 4.  Again: § …

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Tuesday, July 21st, 2020

Circuit Will Decide En Banc Whether New York First-Degree Manslaughter Is a “Violent Felony” and “Crime of Violence.”

In United States v. Scott, 954 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2020), a divided panel held that New York first-degree manslaughter is neither a predicate “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act nor a “crime of violence” under the Career Offender Guideline because it can be committed by complete inaction and therefore without the use of force, as defined in Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). The panel also held that New York first-degree manslaughter does not match any of the generic offenses enumerated in the Career Offender Guideline.

On July 10, 2020, the Circuit granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc. No briefing schedule has yet been issued. Stay tuned.…


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Thursday, April 2nd, 2020

A Crime that Can be Committed by Inaction is Not a “Crime of Violence”

The Second Circuit held this week that an offense is not a “crime of violence [if] it can be committed by complete inaction and therefore without the use of force.”  United States v. Scott, ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 1522825, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2020).

Mr. Scott had originally been subjected to the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 15-year mandatory minimum, along with the Career Offender Guideline, based on two prior convictions for New York manslaughter in the first degree.  Someone is guilty of that offense when, “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1).  New York’s highest court has said this statute reaches a parent’s “failure to obtain medical care for a child.”  People v. Steinberg, 79 N.Y.2d 673, 680 (1992).  See also id(“The Penal …


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Categories: ACCA, career offender, crime of violence

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Wednesday, February 19th, 2020

Committing or threatening violence is a “crime of violence.”

For one brief, beautiful moment, it seemed like nothing could ever be a crime of violence. But the pendulum is swinging back and now everything is becoming a crime of violence once again.

In United States v. Nikolla, 17-2206-cr (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 2020), the Second Circuit held that threatening violence in furtherance of an extortion plan, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), is categorically a “crime of violence” under the force (or elements) clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

In Nikolla, the defendant pled guilty to several charges, including a § 924(c) offense, pursuant to a written plea agreement. On appeal, he nonetheless challenged his § 924(c) conviction. In upholding this conviction, the Circuit found § 1951(a) divisible and noted that the defendant pled guilty to the provision which applies to a defendant who “commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance” …


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