In United States v. Castillo, No. 23-6229 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2025), a Second Circuit panel (Livingston, Calabresi, Merriam, JJ.) remanded for the district court to clarify its reasons for denying a compassionate release motion—or, in the alternative, to grant the motion.
The defendant, 65-year-old Frank Smith Castillo, moved for compassionate release after serving more than 19 years in prison for three armed bank robberies in which no one was seriously injured. Castillo was sentenced in 2005 to a then-mandatory life sentence, but in 2018, the First Step Act opened the door for him and others to seek release if they demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances.
In his motion, Castillo cited, among other things, his exemplary record in prison, his “low risk of recidivism” per the Bureau of Prisons, and even a letter from the former prosecutor in his case urging the court to grant relief. Castillo further cited his age and deteriorating health in prison, which had culminated in a heart attack.
Judge Kimba Wood denied the motion. In doing so, she consulted U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and Application Note 1(B), which state that “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances exist where a defendant “(A) is at least 65 years old; (B) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process; and (C) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less.” Judge Wood did not dispute that Castillo satisfied all three criteria, but she stated that in “applying § 1B1.13, courts typically grant compassionate release only to senior citizen defendants whose ‘physical and cognitive deterioration has impaired basic human functions.’” Castillo could not make such a showing, she wrote.
Remanding, the Second Circuit noted an ambiguity in the district court’s opinion. If the district court believed that Note 1(B) applies only to defendants “whose conditions impair basic human functions,” that reading was mistaken—“the plain text of the Note contains no such requirement.” At the same time, it’s possible the district court referenced other cases only to inform its own “fact-specific assessment” of Castillo’s conditions, which would not have been in error. The panel noted that it is “particularly necessary” that district courts “be clear in their reasoning” when a case “appears to be close on the merits.” For that reason, the panel further remanded for clarification regarding whether the district court’s analysis of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) constituted an independent basis for its denial of the motion. Although remanding for clarification, the panel observed that the district court was free to “reconsider Castillo’s arguments and determine anew whether it should grant the motion for compassionate release.”
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