United States v. Ceasar, No. 25-949 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2026) (Sack, Livingston (writing), Carney).
The Second Circuit dismissed in part and otherwise affirmed Sinmyah Ceasar’s conviction for failure to appear under 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1). It also affirmed the two-month consecutive term she received under § 3147 for committing that offense while on release.
The panel did not reach the merits question at the heart of the appeal: whether a supervisee left at liberty pending violation proceedings has been “released under this chapter” within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act, as required by § 3146. It held instead that Ceasar waived this argument, given both an express waiver provision in the plea agreement and a record showing that defense counsel raised the argument in negotiations with the Government and then gave it up when signing the agreement. On the second issue, the panel held that § 3147 applies to a § 3146 conviction without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. NB: Ceasar is represented by Federal Defenders of New York.
Background
Ceasar pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS, and later to obstruction. Judge Weinstein sentenced her to 48 months against a Guidelines range of 30 to 50 years. The Government appealed.
In July 2020, while that appeal was pending, she completed the 48-month custodial term, was released by the BOP, and began serving an eight-year term of supervised release. Probation alleged that she soon began violating some conditions.
At a virtual arraignment on the violation charge in November 2020, the Government did not seek detention. Judge Matsumoto (who took over after Weinstein’s death) told Ceasar she “must continue to report to your Probation officer as directed.” Slip op. at 7 & n.4. In January 2021 Ceasar admitted two violations, and the court “continue[d] the condition of [her] home confinement with location monitoring up until the date of sentencing.” Slip op. at 8. This too was done virtually. Id.
On August 18, 2021, a panel of the Circuit vacated the 48-month prison sentence as “shockingly low and unsupportable as a matter of law.” Id. The panel “vacated the judgment and remanded for resentencing.” Slip op. 8-9. On August 25th, Ceasar removed her monitor and failed to appear in court at a scheduled conference on the violation case. She was arrested in New Mexico two days later.
During plea negotiations, defense counsel wrote that counsel was “still digging in but it doesn’t look like [Ceasar] was ever released on bail so as to trigger the bail jumping statute.” Slip op. at 10. The Government replied with its theory. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(6), Ceasar’s release at her initial appearance was “under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1),” which, the Government said, made her “a person ‘released under this chapter’ for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3146.” Slip op. at 10–11. In the same email, the Government said it would accept a plea to a higher-exposure obstruction offense instead, “if you prefer.” Slip op. at 11.
Ceasar eventually pleaded guilty to the § 3146 count. Her plea agreement waived appeal of any total sentence of 386 months or less. She “further waive[d] the right to raise on appeal or on collateral review any argument that . . . the admitted conduct does not fall within the scope of the statutes.” Slip op. at 12. She reserved the right to argue that § 3147 did not apply to her § 3146 violation. Id.
Before sentencing on either the violation case or the criminal case, Probation moved to withdraw the violation charges. It reasoned that the Circuit’s vacatur of the original judgment imposed by Weinstein “essentially nullif[ied] the custodial and supervised release sentence,” rendering “the violation of supervised release . . . void.” Slip op. at 15; see United States v. Lipscomb, 66 F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2023). Ceasar then moved to withdraw her plea to the § 3146 charge, arguing inter alia that she had never been released under Chapter 207.
The district court agreed with Probation and declined to sentence on the violations “because they arise from a supervised release term included in a vacated judgment.” Slip op. at 16 n.9. But it denied the plea-withdrawal motion and eventually imposed a total sentence of 230 months.
The Panel’s Ruling
- The § 3146 challenge is waived.
The panel held that the scope-of-the-statute waiver “bars this appeal of her § 3146 conviction.” Ceasar’s argument that the district court should have allowed withdrawal because her conduct fell outside § 3146 “is precisely the argument she now raises, on appeal.” Slip op. at 20.
The panel rejected Ceasar’s argument that enforcing the waiver would be a miscarriage of justice under Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026), because she “pled guilty to an act that did not satisfy the elements of the offense.” Slip op. at 24. The panel relied heavily on the negotiation record in so concluding. “The record is clear that before Ceasar signed, her counsel raised the argument, and the Government explained its contrary view and offered an obstruction charge instead ‘if you prefer.’” Slip op. at 24–25. And “Ceasar thereafter signed the plea agreement, gaining the benefit of avoiding an obstruction charge that would have carried a higher sentence, while expressly waiving the chance to press a potential argument that the failure-to-appear statute did not apply.” Slip op. at 25. Enforcing the waiver here does not create a miscarriage of justice because “Ceasar refrained from litigating a potential legal defense and in exchange for giving up her right to do so, she obtained a favorable plea arrangement.” Slip op. at 26.
- Section 3147 applies to failure to appear.
Section 3147 provides that a person “convicted of an offense committed while released under [Chapter 207] shall be sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense,” to a consecutive term. Slip op. at 5 n.2. Ceasar argued that applying § 3147 to § 3146 punishes the same offense twice without a clear statement from Congress, because a § 3146 offense is by definition committed on release. Slip op. at 28.
The panel’s “inquiry begins—and indeed ends—with § 3147’s plain and unambiguous language.” Id. “Failure to appear under § 3146 constitutes ‘an offense’ and, by definition, it is ‘committed while released’ under Chapter 207.” Id. The panel joined “at least six courts of appeals” and rejected the contrary position of Judge Stanton in United States v. Tavares, 166 F. Supp. 2d 903 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Slip op. at 28–29.
The double jeopardy claim failed on two grounds. First, § 3147 is a “sentence enhancement,” and in a single proceeding “the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Slip op. at 30 (quoting United States v. Dison, 573 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2009), and Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)). Second, even if §§ 3146 and 3147 define the same offense under Blockburger, § 3147’s “in addition to” language is “‘crystal clear’ evidence of a legislature’s intent to overcome Blockburger.” Slip op. at 31 (quoting Barrett v. United States, 607 U.S. 128, 140 (2026)).
Practitioner’s Notes
First, the waiver ruling is narrower than the Government may later cite it for. Ceasar does not hold that a claim of legal innocence doesn’t satisfy Hunter‘s miscarriage-of-justice exception. Nor does it hold that a broadly worded waiver forecloses such a claim in the ordinary case. What defeated Ceasar’s claim here was a record purportedly showing that this specific issue was actually known and deliberately given up by the defense in plea negotiations. The panel’s own description is that Ceasar “refrained from litigating a potential legal defense and in exchange . . . obtained a favorable plea arrangement.” That describes a bargained-for surrender of a known claim, not a defendant bound by a boilerplate waiver.
Where the Government has only general waiver language on its side, Ceasar‘s miscarriage-of-justice analysis should not carry over. Enforcing such a waiver to bar an appellate claim of legal innocence – that the defendant pleaded guilty to an offense with an element that he does not satisfy – likely falls under one of the exceptions outlined in Hunter.
Second, the merits question under § 3146 remains open in this Circuit and there are strong favorable arguments. Ceasar was not detained on the violations. She appeared by video and was told to “continue” reporting to Probation. Her liberty came from her term of supervised release under § 3583, in Chapter 227, not from any release order under Chapter 207.
Third, there is a hidden defense win – Ceasar prevailed below on a closely related point. After this Court vacated her original judgment, Probation moved to withdraw the supervised release violations as void. The district court agreed and declined to sentence on them “because they arise from a supervised release term included in a vacated judgment.” Slip op. at 16 n.9.
That is the Lipscomb principle: revocation proceedings (and resulting judgments) arise from the underlying sentence and judgment – and thus disappear when the judgment is vacated. 66 F.4th at 612. Whenever a client’s sentence is vacated, whether on a Government appeal, under § 2255, or otherwise, check whether pending or completed revocation proceedings rest on the vacated term, and move to dismiss or vacate them.