Archive | aggravated felony

Tuesday, May 25th, 2021

The Supreme Court throws a wrench into § 1326(d) motions in the Second Circuit

In United States v. Palomar-Santiago, No. 20-437 (May 24, 2021), Justice Sotomayor ruled for a unanimous Court that as a matter of statutory interpretation (1) each of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)’s three requirements must be satisfied; and that (2) a showing by the defendant that the deportation proceeding was “fundamentally unfair” under § 1326(d)(3) — because the immigration judge (IJ) mistakenly told him that he was removable as an aggravated felon due to his DUI conviction (this became error six years later in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), holding that a DUI is not a § 16(b) “crime of violence” and thus not an “aggravated felony”) – does not suffice to dismiss a reentry indictment. The decision overrules Ninth Circuit law holding that “defendants are ‘excused from proving the first two requirements’ of § 1326(d) [– noncitizen defendants must show that they exhausted administrative remedies and …


Posted By
Categories: aggravated felony, crime of violence, deportation

Continue Reading
Friday, January 17th, 2020

Circuit Holds That New York Offense of Possession of a Sexual Performance By a Child (N.Y. Penal Law §263.16) Categorically Matches 18 U.S.C §2252(a)(4)(B) and Is an Aggravated Felony Under the INA.

In Quito v. Barr, __ F.3d __ 2020 WL 218590 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2020) (Wesley, Livingston, Bianco),  the Second Circuit held that attempted possession of a sexual performance by a child under N.Y. Penal Law §263.16 is an aggravated felony under the INA because it categorically fits the definition of the federal offense of possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), an enumerated aggravated felony. The Court rejected petitioner’s arguments that the New York statute sweeps more broadly because it does not require knowledge of the minor’s specific age and does not include the affirmative defense to §2252(a)(4)(B) for someone who possessed fewer than three images and promptly destroyed them or turned them over.

The Court ruled, as a threshold matter, that it was not bound by its previous holding in Weiland v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2016),  that  a “nearly identical” New York …


Posted By
Categories: aggravated felony, categorical approach, child pornography

Continue Reading
Wednesday, June 29th, 2016

Second Circuit Updates – June 29, 2016

Today there is a short opinion discussing the meaning of “aggravated felony” in the context of a removal proceeding. And there is a summary order in a criminal case.

In Weiland v. Lynch, No. 14-3631-ag (Circuit Judges:  Parker, Lohier, and Carney), the Circuit rejects the petitioner’s argument, in his fight against removal to Germany, that his conviction for possession of child pornography under the New York Penal Law (§263.11) did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). His argument was that the New York offense was not an offense “described in” the analogous federal crime because the New York offense lacks an interstate commerce element that is present in the analogous federal child pornography statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felony as an offense “described in” certain federal laws).  The Circuit relied on this years’ Supreme Court decision in Torres v.


Posted By
Categories: aggravated felony, statutory construction

Continue Reading
Tuesday, February 24th, 2009

Re: Possessed

United States v. Ayon-Robles, No. 07-0785-cr (2d Cir. February 24, 2009) (Jacobs, Wesley, CJJ, Arcara, DJ) (per curiam)

Recently, in an immigration case, Alsol v. Mukasey, 548 N.Y.S.2d 207 (2d Cir. 2009), the court held that a second state-court conviction for simple drug possession was not an “aggravated felony” under the relevant immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), because it did not satisfy the statutory definition of “drug trafficking crime[].” See Simply Possession, posted 11/29/08.

The court’s decisions in this area have been confusing, however. The illegal reentry guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, incorporates the same statutory definition, but the court has in some cases suggested that it might interpret that provision differently in the sentencing context. This case appears to have put that confusion to rest. Here, the court held that since the guideline specifies that the term “aggravated felony” has the “meaning given that term in [8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)],” …


Posted By
Categories: aggravated felony, Uncategorized

Continue Reading
Saturday, November 29th, 2008

Simply Possession

Alsol v. Mukasey, No. 07-2068-ag (2d Cir. November 14, 2008) (Calabresi, Straub, Raggi, CJJ)

This decision, although an immigration case, clarifies an important legal issue that also arises in criminal cases.

Here, each petitioner had been convicted of two New York State drug misdemeanors involving simple possession of a controlled substance. The immigration courts, relying on the circuit’s decision in United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2002), held that the second simple possession misdemeanor was a “drug trafficking crime,” and hence an aggravated felony, because such an offense could have been prosecuted as a felony under federal law. The immigration consequences were profound, as each defendant was denied “cancellation of removal,” the only available relief from deportation.

The circuit disagreed, however, and granted the two petitioners relief. The relevant immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), includes as an aggravated felony any “drug trafficking crime,” a phrase that …


Posted By
Categories: aggravated felony, Uncategorized

Continue Reading