This week in United States v. Jimenez, No. 24-1661 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2026) (Pérez, J.), the Circuit affirmed a 105-month sentence and three special conditions of supervised release. Although Jimenez (represented by this Office) did not prevail, the opinion contains significant pro-defense language useful for objecting to or challenging electronic search conditions.

I. The Governing Rule: Two—and Only Two—Paths to an Electronic Search Condition

After surveying its (many) recent published and unpublished decisions on this question, the Court articulated a clear limiting principle: An electronic search condition (authorizing probation to search a defendant’s person, property, and electronic devices upon reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct or a violation) is permissible only if at least one of two circumstances is present:

1. 1. Nexus to the Instant Offense

The defendant used an electronic device in the commission of the offense of conviction or relevant surrounding conduct.

Because Jimenez used a cellphone during the underlying drug transaction and firearm possession, the Court held that the condition was justified on this basis.

1. 2. “Unusually High Risk of Reoffending” (Rare)

Absent offense-related device use, though, the condition may be imposed only where the defendant presents an “unusually high risk of reoffending.” The Court described this as a “high bar that will not be reached in the vast majority of cases.”

This exception requires:

• An “extremely lengthy” criminal history; and
• Specific aggravating indicators — such as committing offenses while under supervision or deceiving law enforcement –demonstrating that the defendant is unusually likely to commit new offenses while on supervised release.

Critically, the Court made clear that Jimenez’s seven prior convictions, standing alone, would not have sufficed.

II. Individualized Assessment Is Mandatory

More generally, the opinion emphasizes the individualized-assessment requirement for supervised release conditions. The Court cautioned that:

• “Exclusive reliance on generalized considerations” such as deterrence and public safety is inconsistent with the obligation to conduct an individualized assessment;
• District courts “must rigorously ensure that electronic search conditions are reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the specific defendant before them”; and
• There is “reason to hesitate” before imposing such conditions, given that they “potentially pose enormous consequences to criminal defendants’ lives.”

The Court went so far as to acknowledge that some of its own recent decisions have been “less than rigorous” in policing generalized justifications. That concession strengthens objections to such conditions in mine-run drug and gun cases.

III. The Sex-Offense Carve-Out

The Court recognized an exception for sex-offense convictions. In such cases, an electronic search condition is permissible regardless of whether either of the two pathways above is satisfied, because “nearly all such offenses prosecuted under federal law involve the use of electronic devices.” (This categorical rationale seems inconsistent with the Court’s insistence on individualized assessment elsewhere in its opinion. But whatever!)

Bottom Line:

Jimenez clarifies when an electronic search condition is permissible (outside of sex-offense cases). Unless there is (1) a device-based nexus to the offense or (2) an extraordinarily aggravated record demonstrating an unusually high risk of reoffending, a court should not impose the condition.