Author Archive | Edward S. Zas
Defendant’s Hearing Impairment Did Not Require New Trial
United States v. Crandall, No. 12-3313-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2014) (Walker, Cabranes, and Parker), available here
“Innocent Possession” and “Entrapment By Estoppel” Did Not Apply To Defendant Allegedly Returning Gun Under State or Local Amnesty Program
United States v. Miles, No. 13-1158-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2014) (Wesley, Carney, and Rakoff) (per curiam), available here
Summary Summary
Here’s a quick summary of noteworthy summary orders recently issued by the Circuit:
United States v. Davis, No. 12-4836-cr (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2014) (Katzmann, Livingston, and Carter) (summary order), available here
United States v. Marks, No. 12-3788-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2014) (Parker, Hall, and Livingston) (summary order), available here
This summary order upholds the district court’s decision to …
Evidence Was Sufficient To Prove That Defendant Was Physically Deported
United States v. Harvey, No. 12-1490-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 2014), available here
Harvey was convicted after a jury trial of one count of illegal re-entry into the United States after he was deported. He argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove his physical departure from the United States. The Circuit affirmed.
To prove Harvey left the country, the government relied on a 1992 warrant of deportation prepared by an immigration official, which indicated that the official witnessed Harvey depart on a flight from JFK airport to Kingston, Jamaica. That official was unavailable to testify at Harvey’s 2011 illegal re-entry trial, and the government did not present any other direct evidence that Harvey left the United States in 1992.
Nevertheless, the Circuit held that the evidence permitted a rational juror to conclude that Harvey had in fact left the United States on the date specified in the warrant. The Court ruled …
Forfeiture Is Limited to That Authorized by the Statute Listed in the Charged Count
United States v. Annabi, Nos. 12-4988-cr(L), 12-4990-cr(Con) (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2014), available here
This published decision holds that where the government fails to invoke an applicable forfeiture provision in the indictment, and fails to correct that error prior to entry of a final judgment, forfeiture must be limited to that authorized by the statute cited as the basis for forfeiture, and of which the defendant had notice.
The facts: A jury convicted Annabi of, among other counts, three counts of mortgage fraud (Counts Seven, Eight, and Nine). The government sought, and the district court ordered, forfeiture of the gross proceeds of the fraudulently obtained loans described in these three counts.
The Indictment sought, on all three counts, forfeiture to the United States, citing the civil forfeiture provision (18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C)), and 28 U.S.C. 2461(c). On Counts Eight and Nine only, the Indictment also sought forfeiture under the criminal forfeiture provision (18 U.S.C. …
Circuit Affirms Former Goldman Sachs Director’s Insider Trading Convictions
United States v. Gupta, No. 12-4448-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 25, 2014) (Newman, Kearse, and Pooler), available here
Rajat K. Gupta, a former director of The Goldman Sachs Group, was convicted, after a jury trial, of three counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, based on insider trading. He was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and a fine of $5 million. This published decision affirms the judgment.
Gupta argued on appeal that the trial court (Judge Rakoff) erred (1) by admitting statements of a coconspirator (Raj Rajaratnam), recorded in wiretapped telephone conversations to which Gupta was not a party, and (2) by excluding relevant evidence offered by Gupta.
The Circuit rejected these arguments. It held, first, that Rules 801 and 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allowed the admission of Rajaratnam’s recorded statements, both as non-hearsay statements in furtherance of the charged “Rajaratnam-Gupta conspiracy” and under …
District Court Had Jurisdiction To Adjudicate and Punish Violation of Supervised Release
United States v. Bussey, No. 13-1180-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2014) (Raggi, Lynch, and McMahon), available here
This summary was prepared by noted criminal defense attorney Francisco Celedonio, who is also a member of the Board of Directors of Federal Defenders of New York, Inc.:
Bussey appealed his conviction for violating the terms of his supervised release. He argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because his term of supervision expired before judgment was imposed. The Circuit affirmed.
The facts: Bussey began serving a three-year term of federal supervision on February 9, 2010, upon his release from federal custody for a felon-in-possession conviction. On April 1, 2011, and April 7, 2011, arrests warrants were issued, respectively, by New York State and the United States, for Bussey’s failure to report for state or federal supervision. Bussey was taken into state custody first and remained there until March 8, 2013. He …
Alford Plea Allowed Court To Conclude That Defendant Violated Supervised Release By Committing a New Crime
United States v. Glenn, No. 13-0231-cr (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2014) (Jacobs, Livingston, and Lynch), available here
Glenn appealed from an order of the District of Connecticut revoking his supervised release. The district court concluded that Glenn committed “another federal, state or local offense” in violation of the conditions of his supervised release, based solely on his pleas of guilty to state drug offenses entered under the Alford doctrine, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Defendant argued on appeal that his Alford pleas were insufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had violated the conditions of his supervision. But the Circuit affirmed. It held that an Alford plea, under Connecticut law, constitutes an acknowledgement of the strength of the state’s evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Glenn committed …
Term of Imprisonment May Not Run Concurrently With a Discharged Term of Imprisonment
United States v. Lucas, Nos. 12-4840-cr(L), 13-0743(Con), 13-1075(Con) (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2014) (Parker, Lynch, and Droney) (per curiam), available here
This published (and, therefore, precedential) decision reiterates what the Circuit had previously held only in non-precedential summary orders: that USSG 5G1.3(b) and 18 U.S.C. 3584 empower district courts to run sentences concurrently only to “undischarged” terms of imprisonment.
Defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute drugs and to using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to that conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The district court sentenced all three defendants to the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment on both counts: ten years for the drug charge and a consecutive five-year term for the gun charge.
On appeal, defendants argued that the district court mistakenly believed that it had no authority to impose less than the mandatory minimum sentences by running those sentences concurrently to completed prison terms that defendants had previously served on …