Author Archive | Anthony O'Rourke

Friday, October 5th, 2018

Inaccurate Barrett Dicta

(This post has been updated to discuss the amended opinion in Fiseku.)

The Second Circuit issued an opinion this week containing some facially incorrect, and substantively troubling, dicta concerning tits recent decision in Barrett. See United States v. Fiskeu, No. 17-1222 (2d Cir. 2018) (Cabranes, Lynch, Carney) (appeal from Engelmayer, J., S.D.N.Y.), opinion available here.

The narrow, fact-specific holding of Fiseku is that under the “unusual circumstances” presented in the case, police officers did not act unreasonably when they briefly restrained the defendant in handcuffs while conducting a investigatory stop. Slip op. at 18. However, the defendant also raised an ineffective assistance claim because his defense attorney failed to argue that his crime of conviction, conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, was not a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2. The Second Circuit declined to address this claim on direct review.

In so …


Posted By
Categories: 924(c), conspiracy, crime of violence, Johnson

Continue Reading
Friday, September 7th, 2018

Second Circuit Holds that all Degrees of New York Robbery Are Crimes of Violence

A Second Circuit panel held today that, under the force clause of the subsequently revised U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (2014), all degrees of New York robbery are crimes of violence. United States v. Pereira-Gomez, No. 17-952 (2d Cir. 2018) (Cabranes, Carney, Caproni (SDNY)) (appeal from Azrack, J., EDNY), opinion available here. Despite this holding, practitioners are urged to preserve the argument that New York robbery is not a crime of violence under the force clause, as the Supreme Court will soon be deciding this issue in Stokeling v. United States, No. 17-5554.

Mr. Pereira-Gomez was convicted of illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C.§§ 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2). The version of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 then in effect provided for a sentencing enhancement if the defendant had a prior conviction for an offense that “has as an element the use,attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against …


Posted By
Categories: ACCA, categorical approach, robbery

Continue Reading
Monday, August 27th, 2018

Judge Gold Holds that New York Third Degree Robbery Is Not a Violent Felony Under the ACCA

Magistrate Judge Gold (SDNY) recently issued a Report & Recommendation (R&R), available here, concluding that third degree New York robbery, N.Y. Penal Law §160.05, is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). See Baldwin v. United States, No. 16-CV-3350. Judge Korman has adopted the R&R.

Judge Gold’s reasoning will be familiar to those who have read opinions by the First Circuit, Judge Rakoff, and others reaching the same conclusion. Significantly, Judge Gold rejects the reasoning of a Sixth Circuit opinion, Perez v. United States, 885 F.3d 984, 990 (6th Cir. 2018), holding that third degree NY robbery is a crime of violence under the ACCA. The Sixth Circuit’s holding, Judge Gold explains, relies on a recent New York Court of Appeals case for the proposition that New York robbery cannot be “a taking” “by sudden or stealthy …


Posted By
Categories: ACCA, categorical approach, robbery

Continue Reading

Second Circuit Limits Scope of Conspiracy Liability Under the FCPA

Today the Second Circuit issued an opinion holding that a non-U.S. citizen, employed by a foreign company, could not be prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). See United States v. Hoskins, No. 16-1010 (2d Cir. 2018) (Katzmann, Pooler, Lynch). The opinion is a statutory interpretation tour de force. Of course, the case does not necessarily present a factual scenario that attorneys will often encounter while representing indigent defendants. However, Judge Pooler’s analysis and methodology provide an excellent template for for those arguing for limitations on the scope of conspiracy liability in other contexts. The opinion is available here.

The defendant in Hoskins does not fall within any of the categories of persons who are subject to prosecution under the FCPA. This fact did not, in itself, render him immune from prosecution for conspiracy to violate the statute. As a general principle, “[a]  person …


Posted By
Categories: conspiracy, FCPA, statutory construction, statutory interpretation

Continue Reading
Wednesday, August 1st, 2018

Second Circuit Holds That NYPL § 220.31 (5th Degree Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance) Is Not A “Controlled Substance Offense” Under USSG 4B1.2(b)

Last week the Second Circuit held that NY Penal Law § 220.31 (fifth-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance) is not a “controlled substance offense” under USSG 4B1.2(b). See United States v. Townsend, No. 17-757 (2d Cir. 2018) (Cabranes, Carney, Vilardo (W.D.N.Y.)) (appeal from Irizarry, C.J., E.D.N.Y.). The opinion is available here.

The upshot of Townsend is that any New York state statute that just uses the term “controlled substance” is not a controlled substance offense for purposes of the Career Offender Guideline. As our office’s Daniel Habib explains, the analysis in Townsend is straightforward:

(1) The term “controlled substance” in USSG 4B1.2(b) refers exclusively to those substances in the federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA), 21 USC § 802.

(2) NY Penal Law § 220.31 criminalizes the sale of a drug, human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG), that is not included in the CSA.

(3) NY Penal Law § 220.31 …


Posted By
Categories: categorical approach

Continue Reading
Tuesday, July 31st, 2018

Second Circuit Narrowly Construes Appellate Waiver and Holds That Embezzlement Is Not a Continuing Offense

In a short and interesting opinion, available here, the Second Circuit held today that (1) a defendant did not waive her right to appeal a restitution order on the ground that it covered conduct outside the statute of limitations period, and (2) that violations of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (embezzlement of government property) are not continuing offenses, rendering the defendant liable for funds embezzled outside the limitations period. See United States v. Green, No. 16-3044 (2d Cir. 2018) (Cabranes, Carney, Goldberg (Ct. Intl. Trade )) (appeal from W.D.N.Y.). The second of these holdings, concerning the scope of  § 641, creates a circuit split.

The defendant in Green was charged under § 641 for drawing money out of a joint bank account between 2009 and 2011 in amounts similar to those of VA payments to her deceased mother that went into the account. She pled guilty, and …


Posted By
Categories: appeal waiver, forfeiture, property, statute of limitations, statutory construction, statutory interpretation

Continue Reading
Wednesday, July 11th, 2018

Judge Kavanaugh on Criminal Law: Bad News Except…

Bloomberg News has an article (behind a paywall) that surveys Judge (and presumptive Justice) Kavanaugh’s criminal law jurisprudence.  The short story is that Judge Kavanaugh has been very bad for criminal defendants; one former SDNY prosecutor predicts that “he will be a reliable vote for the government in criminal cases, along the lines of Justice Alito.”

There are, however, a few glimmers of hope:

  • Concurring in an opinion reversing a murder conviction for faulty jury instructions, Judge Kavanaugh explained that, notwithstanding the defendant’s “heinous crime,” he was “unwilling to sweep under the rug” that the instructions left the jury with an incorrect understanding of the mens rea requirements governing second-degree murder and manslaughter. United States v. Williams, 836 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
  • In a concurring opinion affirming false statements conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, Judge Kavanaugh cautioned that “§ 1001 prosecutions can pose a risk of

Posted By
Categories: 924(c), acquitted conduct, false statements, jury instructions

Continue Reading

NACDL Report on the Trial Penalty

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) recently released a report that is somewhat provocatively, but fairly, titled: The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How to Save It.  The report, available here, offers a succinct assessment of the legal and institutional pressures that coerce 97% of state and federal defendants into plea bargains.

From the Executive Summary:

[O]ver the last fifty years, trial by jury has declined at an ever-increasing rate to the point that this institution now occurs in less than 3% of state and federal criminal cases. Trial by jury has been replaced by a “system of [guilty] pleas”3 which diminishes, to the point of obscurity, the role that the Framers envisioned for jury trials as the primary protection for individual liberties and the principal mechanism for public participation in the criminal justice system.

Guilty pleas


Posted By
Categories: guilty plea, Sixth Amendment

Continue Reading
Tuesday, July 10th, 2018

Judge Weinstein Urges More Frequent Termination of Supervised Release (Including for Marijuana Users)

Last week Judge Weinstein issued a remarkable opinion, available here, terminating supervised release for a defendant who, apart from habitual marijuana use, has committed no crimes since his release from prison. See United States v. Trotter, No. 15-cr-382, DE 543 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2018). The lengthy-but-readable opinion is worth reading in its entirety, particularly for those not intimately familiar with the law governing supervised release.

The opinion in Trotter made headlines for Judge Weinstein’s commitments to avoid punishing supervisees for marijuana use, and to terminate supervised release for marijuana users who are otherwise rehabilitated.  Equally relevant to practitioners, however, is Judge Weinstein’s more general critique of excessive supervision. Particularly important is Judge Weinstein’s suggestion that the defense bar move more frequently for termination of supervised release in the interest of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Indeed, Judge Weinstein urges practitioners to move for termination of supervised release …


Posted By
Categories: marijuana, sentencing, sentencing findings, supervised release

Continue Reading
Thursday, June 28th, 2018

Second Circuit Reversal of Vulnerable Victim Sentencing Enhancement

Today, in a summary order, the Second Circuit remanded a case for resentencing based on the district court’s erroneous application of the vulnerable victim enhancement. The decision may be useful to practitioners whose clients who were not necessarily aware of a victim’s vulnerable status during the commission of their charged offenses. The summary order in United States v. Nicholson, No. 17-197 (2d Cir. 2018) (Newman, Cabranes, Carney) (appeal from WDNY), is available here.

The defendant in Nicholson was himself a victim of a “Jamaica lottery scam,” wherein he was advised that he won $15 million in a lottery, which he could collect after paying $860 in local taxes. The scam-runner told Nicholson he could bay off these taxes by collecting money from third parties who were also victims of the scam. As it happened, one of those third parties was an elderly man in California, who …

Posted by
Categories: Uncategorized

Posted By
Categories: Uncategorized

Continue Reading

Recap of Supreme Court Decisions in Carpenter and Currier

As we mourn Justice Kennedy’s retirement, Sentencing Resource Counsel Sissy Phleger has graciously allowed us to post her summaries of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Carpenter v. United States (opinion available here) and Currier v. Virginia (opinion available here):

First, in the eagerly-anticipated Carpenter v. United States, the Court held that the government’s acquisition of Mr. Carpenter’s cellphone location records was a Fourth Amendment search. Roberts wrote for the majority, joined by Kagan, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg. All the dissenters filed separate opinions (and variously join in each other’s). While the majority opinion is at pains to confine its impact, this is a great win with potential implications far beyond its specific circumstances.

Mr. Carpenter had challenged the use of warantlessly-obtained historical cell-site location records used to convict him of a string of armed robberies. He argued that the records constituted a search, and thus required …


Posted By
Categories: cell phone location information, double jeopardy, Fourth Amendment

Continue Reading