Archive | crime of violence

Tuesday, October 31st, 2017

Circuits Rule that Hobbs Act and 924(c) Convictions Are Not Predicates Under the ACCA and COG.

This month two circuits held, respectively, that offenses cannot serve as predicates under the Career Offender Guideline or the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because they can involve force against property as well as against persons.

The Tenth Circuit held that robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, is not a crime of violence under the Career Offender Guideline (COG), U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. See United States v. O’Connor. The enumerated clause of the COG identifies “robbery” as a crime of violence. The Tenth Circuit held that the elements of this generic offense include the use or threatened use of force against a person, but not against property. Hobbs Act robbery, by contrast, can involve “actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to . . . [a] person or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (emphasis added). The COG’s definition of robbery …


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Categories: 924(c), career offender, categorical approach, crime of violence, Johnson, robbery, sentencing

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Tuesday, September 12th, 2017

New Circuit Opinion on Old Career Offender Residual Clause

Yesterday the Circuit re-decided United States v. Jones. The panel held that in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Beckles, armed New York first-degree robbery is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of the pre-2016 Career Offender Guideline. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015). (The Guidelines have since been amended to remove the residual clause.) The opinion is available here.

In a concurring opinion, two of the panel’s three judges confirmed that New York robbery is not a violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause. Specifically, the concurrence observed that the Circuit’s decision in United States v. Spencer, 955 F.2d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1992), which had held that New York attempted third-degree robbery was a crime of violence under the Career Offender Guideline’s elements clause, had been “abrogated” by Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (“2010 Johnson


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Categories: career offender, categorical approach, crime of violence, Johnson, robbery, sentencing

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Tuesday, November 15th, 2016

Despite the Jones Delay, EDNY Rules New York Robbery is Not a “Crime of Violence”

still-not-a-cov

As blogged about here, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Jones that New York robbery is not a “crime of violence” for federal sentencing purposes.  And as blogged about here, the Circuit then vacated that ruling pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles v. United States.

Notwithstanding Jones being put on hold, Judge Cogan of the Eastern District of New York has ruled — like the Jones court and Judges Ross and Weinstein in pre-Jones rulings — that New York robbery is not a “crime of violence.”  The decision, available here, explains that New York robbery can be committed with less than the “violent” force required by the force clause of the Career Offender Guideline (which controls in felon-in-possession cases), and that the Guideline’s residual clause was effectively invalidated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  Because the Guideline’s …

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Categories: crime of violence, robbery

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Categories: crime of violence, robbery

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Wednesday, October 19th, 2016

Manslaughter is Not a “Crime of Violence”

keep-calm

In a recent ruling, Judge Woods of the Southern District held first-degree manslaughter in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) is not a “crime of violence” under the pre-August 1, 2016, Career Offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.  A person commits such manslaughter when, “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person.”

Judge Woods first held this offense does not qualify under the Guideline’s residual clause as that clause was “rendered void” by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  The judge next held the offense does not qualify under the Guideline’s force clause because “one can be found guilty of manslaughter under the New York statute on the basis of an omission.” Specifically, “the failure to perform a legally imposed duty” permits conviction if the inaction leads to another’s death.  People


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Categories: ACCA, career offender, crime of violence, manslaughter, murder

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Wednesday, August 3rd, 2016

An Uphill Battle

United States v. Elvin Hill, No. 14-3872-cr (Circuit Judges: Jacobs, Livingston, and Droney).(Disclosure: This is an appeal that this Office litigated).

In this direct appeal,  Mr.  Hill argued: (1)  that Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) did not “categorically” constitute a “crime of violence” under the “force” clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3);  and (2) that Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015)  applied to the residual clause of  § 924(c)(3), which is worded similarly to that of the ACCA statute — 18 U.S.C.. § 924(e)(2)(B) — and that Johnson rendered 924(c)(3)’s residual void for vagueness. Both claims were rejected by the Circuit.

The Cateqorical approach: The Circuit stated that it was applying the “categorical approach” in determining whether the predicate crime (the Hobbs Act robbery) was a “crime of violence” under §924(c).  The categorical approach looks only to the statutory definition of the predicate …


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Categories: 924(c), crime of violence, Hobbs Act, Johnson

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More to Follow

Johnson (Bad) News:

Today, the Circuit  decided  Hill adverse to the defendant. It holds that Hobbs Act Robbery is “categorically” a “Crime of Violence” under 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c)(3).  It also holds that Johnson does not apply to § 924(c): i.e., it does not  “effectively render[]  the ‘risk-of-force clause’” of § 924(c) “void for vagueness.” United States v. Elvin Hill, No. 14-3872-cr (Jacobs, Livingston, and Droney).

We are still digesting the Opinion. More will follow.  But defense counsel will still have to raise and litigate these claims until the Supreme Court decides the issue. The Government already has a cert petition pending with the Supreme Court  based on defendant wins in the Ninth Circuit and two other circuits. This Second Circuit case clearly creates a split that the Supreme Court will most likely take on.…


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Categories: 924(c), crime of violence, Hobbs Act, Johnson

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Thursday, July 21st, 2016

New York Robbery is Not a “Crime of Violence”

marble rye-blog

In today’s United States v. Jones, the Second Circuit (Walker, Calabresi, Hall, C.JJ.) overruled its prior precedents in light of Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), and Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), to hold that “a first‐degree robbery conviction in New York is no longer necessarily a conviction for a ‘crime of violence’ as that term is used in the Career Offender Guideline.”

New York robbery, whatever its degree, is “forcible stealing” and requires actual or threatened “physical force upon another person.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00.  This does not make the offense a “crime of violence,” the Circuit explained, because New York courts “have made clear that ‘forcible stealing’ alone does not necessarily involve the use of ‘violent force'” required to make something a “crime of violence” under the Guideline’s force clause.  “Violent force” is “strong” and “substantial,” Johnson, …


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Categories: ACCA, career offender, crime of violence, robbery

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Friday, May 6th, 2016

Summary Order Reaffirms Second Circuit Rule that Youthful Offender Adjudications Can Count as Crimes of Violence under the Guidelines even after Sellars

There is only one summary order today, United States v. Oscar Cardoza, 15-1602-cr. The Second Circuit reaffirmed its rule that a New York youthful offender adjudication counts as a crime of violence under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), if the nature of the proceedings, the sentence received, and the actual time served shows that the state treated the conviction as an adult conviction. See United States v. Pereira, 465 F.3d 515, 520-22 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Reinoso, 350 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 2003). The Court distinguished its holding in United States v. Sellars, 784 876 (2d Cir. 2015) that a youthful offender conviction does not qualify as a violent felony under ACCA on the ground that ACCA explicitly excludes convictions that are deemed “set aside” under state law, while there is no such provision in the guideline.…


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Categories: crime of violence, youthful offender adjudication

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Friday, April 22nd, 2016

Second Circuit Updates – April 22, 2016

After this week’s Supreme Court decision in Welch v. United States, — S. Ct. –, slip op. (April 18, 2016) (No. 15-6418), which found that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) is retroactive to those serving Armed Career Criminal sentences, the next big question is whether the rule in Johnson will apply retroactively to career offender guidelines cases. (Quick reminder: Johnson struck down the “residual clause” in ACCA as void-for-vagueness. Identical or nearly-identical language to the residual clause pops up in many other sentencing statutes and guidelines). Welch gives some cause for hope. In an amicus brief filed yesterday in support of petitioner Alfrederick Jones for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court (Alfrederick Jones v. United States, No. 15-8629), the Federal Public and Community Defenders and the National Association of Federal Defenders laid out the case for why the Supreme Court …


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Categories: ACCA, career offender, crime of violence, guideline, retroactivity

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Saturday, January 21st, 2012

PC World

United States v. Baker, No. 10-1925-cr (2d Cir. January 12, 2012) (Pooler, Parker, Carney, CJJ) (per curiam)

This latest per curiam affirms an Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentence, rejecting the defendant’s claims that his Vermont prison escape convictions were not ACCA predicates. The statute at issue contains two distinct offenses – failure to report to custody, which is not a predicate, and escape from custody. Baker agreed that his convictions were for escape from custody, but argued that the district court should have looked beyond the charging instruments to determine whether his actual conduct posed a sufficient degree of risk to qualify.

The circuit disagreed. While a sentencing court can, and sometimes must, look beyond the charging instrument, it cannot go beyond the judicial record evidence. Where the defendant pled guilty, the offense is a predicate if the record establishes that his plea necessarily admitted elements of a predicate …


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Categories: ACCA, crime of violence, escape, Uncategorized

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Wednesday, January 5th, 2011

PC World

United States v. Brown, No. 09-4991 (2d Cir. January 5, 2011) (Calabresi, Sack, Katzmann, CJJ) (per curiam)

The court’s latest per curiam holds that assaulting a correction officer, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c(a), satisfies the “catch-all” definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act. Under Circuit law, an offense qualifies under the catch-all if it is both similar “in kind” and in “degree of risk posed” to the listed offenses of burglary, arson, extortion and the use of explosives.

The Connecticut offense is similar “in kind” because it requires the offender to intentionally prevent an officer from performing his duties, primarily in a prison setting, where “the act of injuring an employee for the purpose of preventing her from performing her official duties tends to entail especially violent consequences.”

As for the degree of risk posed, the court noted that the statute only applies where …


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Categories: ACCA, crime of violence, Uncategorized

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